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THE EMERGING "RIGHT TO TREATMENT"ELABORATING THE PROCESSES OF DECISION IN
SANCTIONING SYSTEMS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
By KENNETH L. PENEGAR*
Professor Penegar discusses the changing approaches in our
criminal law sanctioning system, pointing out that emphasis in treatment of offenders has shifted from deterrence and punishment to
rehabilitation. He notes the lack of judicial evaluation of present
criminal law sanctions and engages in a detailed analysis of existing
trends of decision in terms of overriding policies, strategies, and outcomes or effects within selected phases of the sanctioningsystem. In
his Summary Appraisal, Professor Penegardiscusses four major principles supporting social goals in light of the trends in the sanctioning
process. He concludes that the major social goals of the system,
protection of society and promotion of human dignity, are not being
supported adequately by the trends of decision, suggesting that more
judicial involvement is needed for a continuing appraisal of the
authoritative decisions within the system.
INTRODUCTION

The history of penal reform thus becomes the history of the diminution of gratuitous suffering.'
of the most thoughtful observers of developments in penology
has thus recently characterized the authoritative efforts to make
our society's criminal law sanctions more rational. While we may not
be certain of our path, we are a good deal less sure of the efficacy
and decency of prevailing practices in the past. We have not lost
faith in deterrence, yet we espouse more willingness to rehabilitate.
There might be, however, a more naive faith in techniques of rehabilition than we have recently had in those of deterrence. And therein
lies, in Professor Morris' view, a certain threat to individual "justice,"
for more power may have been given to the "treaters," or those whose
guiding star is rehabilitation, than we have so far been willing to
bestow on the "punishers." 2
0
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One of the great shortcomings of our age, of course, is that
precious little effort has gone into evaluating the impact of our
criminal law sanctions, whether in individualistic or general societal
terms. 3 To what extent can the central decision makers of our criminal
law processes, the courts, assist in the process of evaluation? This is
a question which deserves some discussion in the context of the continuing concern about other critical features of the criminal law. I am
referring here, of course, to the contemporary evolution of a kind of
procedural code fashioned by the courts just at a time when we are
gaining our most significant insights into the sanctioning phase of
the criminal law- how police function; who gets arrested for what,
by whom, under what conditions; who gets charged and tried, for
what offense, etc. 4 Traditionally the courts have shied away from
very substantial involvement in the sanctioning or application phase
of the criminal law process. This is not to say that there are not
developments, particularly of late, in the direction of importing more
and more of the due process model into the procedures by which
in the parole and parole
liberty is taken, restored, retaken -as
5 However, by and large the
revocation practices of administrators.
courts have been accustomed to think that the content of the sanctioning institution is beyond their ken or legitimate inquiry.6
It is a principal task of this article to explore whatever trend of
decision may be discernable away from or in support of this traditional
indifference. In the process of describing such a trend we may discover that common goals have not been established across the different
arenas of power: the courts on the one hand and the administrators
of our penal or quasi-penal institutions on the other. If that be so,
we shall wish to consider what range of policies is sought to be effectuated in these separate arenas, as well as the kind of strategies
actually applied with respect to their impact on human values and
their implications regarding over-riding policies supported by our
legal system. Whether the abstraction employed in particular contexts
3 For this we should all be in Professor Morris' debt for his provocative call for re-

search- research within ethical limits, yet tested rigorously by empirical methods.
The humanitarianism which has thus far sparked many of the ameliorative policies in
effect now provides, he argues, an insufficient framework for such research.
4
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(1965); LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY
(1965); NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE
WITHOUT TRIAL (1966); SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1966); Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of
Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929 (1965).

5 See, e.g., Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ; Fleming v. Tate, 156 F.2d
848 (D.C. Cir. 1946) ; Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert: Role of Counsel in the
Peno-CorrectionalProcess, 45 MINN. L. REV. 803 (1961).
6 See, e.g., Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to
Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963) (numerous cases collected there, particularly at 508 n.12).
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is "punishment" or "treatment," the effort will be to discover to what

extent meaningful content has been, is being, or will be poured into
it by major participants or decision-makers in the processes relevant
to sanctioning.
In keeping with the fashion of the times, which suggests that
various "models" or "processes" are appropriate constructs for analysis, we will at the outset concern ourselves with several systems
recognizable in the sanctioning phase of that body of policy, institutions, prescriptions and strategies roughly called the criminal law.
Just as there are said to be a crime control model and a due process
model of the criminal law,7 there are, or seem to be, several systems
cutting across or partaking of these models which do, whether or not
explicity designed, treat certain types of social situations in predictable
fashion - in the sanctioning phase of the over-all process. The term
"process" refers to that dynamic continuum which consists of someone
invoking, another prescribing,yet another applying, others reviewing,
recommending, terminating, and gathering intelligence about con-

ditions, effects and outcomes - all in terms of basic human values,
policies, and detailed expression of the policies in partciular modes
s
of strategy.
I. SELECTED SANCTIONING SYSTEMS

A. The Juvenile System

1. Policies
The prescriptive background of the system dealing with juvenile
delinquency may be summarized by the doctrinal phrase "parens
patriae." This is but a shorthand expression for society's expressed
preference to deal with young people in a way which in theory does
not carry the stigma of criminal proceedings, but which nevertheless
leads to imposition of restraints and remedial strategies designed to
protect society and enhance the individual's likelihood of self-fulfillment. This preference, embodied in statutes of the several states and
those of the federal government for about sixty years, continues to
receive the highest authoritative support. Thus, in the recent decision
of the Supreme Court, Kent v. United States,9 this parenthetical com-

ment is found:
The theory of the District's Juvenile Court Act, like that of
other jurisdictions, is rooted in social welfare philosophy rather than
7

Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1964).

8 For general orientation see LASSWELL & KAPLAN,

POWER AND SOCIETY (1950);

Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in
the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943), in McDoUGAL & ASSOCIATES, STUDIES

IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 42 (1960).

For a more specialized explication see Arens

& Lasswell, Toward a General Theory of Sanctions, 49 IOWA L. REv. 233 (1964).
9 383 U.S. 541 (1966). See Editor's Note, page 224, infra.
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The Juvenile Court is theoretically engaged

in determining the needs of the child and of society rather than
adjudicating criminal conduct. The objectives are to provide measures of guidance and rehabilitation for the child and protection for
society, not to fix criminal responsibility, guilt and punishment. 10
An important feature of the system is the identity of those who,
in various arenas of authority, apply sanctions in the light of society's
objectives. The principal participants include the juvenile court
judge,1 ' a probation officer or other officer responsible to the judge,
state or county welfare officers, city or county detention home superintendents, and foster parents (private individuals who agree to take
custody of the child). The qualifications for their posts may be
established by statute or regulation, but it is not uncommon to see
none of the principals possessed of training specialized to their tasks.
Of course, the child' 2 who is the subject of the sanctioning process
will be interacting with these decision-makers as well as with witnesses
who may include his parents or other relatives.
One critically distinguishing characteristic here has traditionally
been the presumed irrelevance of an attorney. Accordingly, it is
thought that the decision in Kent v. United States will have profound
impact on the juvenile system, since that decision suggests the need
for and desirability of introducing the skills of the lawyer into the
process in a pervasive way, recognizing that the process does impose
restraints or value deprivations upon the individual.
The situations evoking the sanctioning process include a broad
range and variety of events which are disturbing to some elements or
individuals in society. Thus, a young person may be sanctioned in this
system for that which, in the general or larger system of the criminal
law, would be called theft offenses, crimes of violence, crimes involving the so-called public welfare - or for other less generally disturbing events not at all subject to sanctioning under the general
criminal law, such as school truancy or disobedience of parents.' 3 The
prescriptive language which allows sanctioning typically describes
these latter instances in terms of "delinquency," although many
statutes also include parental neglect as a basic situation sufficient to
'l0 d. at 554.
11He is often not a judge at all but some other state functionary, such as the Clerk of
Court of general jurisdiction. One recent survey shows that of about 1200 "full-time"
juvenile court judges, 72% spent only one-fourth or less of their official time dealing
with juvenile matters. McCune & Skoler, juvenile Court Judges in the United States:
Part I: A National Profile, in 11 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 121, 126 '(1965). See
also Walther & McCune, Juvenile Court judges in the United States: Part Il: Working Styles and Characteristics,in 11 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 384 (1965).
12
The chief identifying characteristic of the subject will be his or her age - typically
fourteen to eighteen years of age, although in some states it is lower.
13 See generally Tappan & Nicolle, Juvenile Delinquents and Their Treatment, 339
Annals 157, 161 (1962).
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invoke the juvenile court's power and hence, the system's application.14 "Currently, about one-fourth of all cases handled by the
juvenile courts are youth offenses that have no parallel in adult crime:
curfew violation, running away from home, ungovernability, and
related types of activity."' 5
In broadest formulation the fundamental policies to be pursued
by the system of juvenile courts are (1) the substitution of specialized
tribunals for penal ones from the general system, (2) the substitution
of state responsibility for a child's welfare when his natural parents
have failed in their responsibility, and (3) the implementation of
remedial restraints - all in the best interest of the child's wholesome
development and the protection of society currently as well as in the
future. To a great extent the creation of this specialized system in
the last sixty years is an explicit recognition of the failures, or at least
the "slippage," in other social institutions like the family and home,
schools, and responsible peer groups to achieve acceptable rates of
maturation in the most susceptible individuals in our society.
The principal goal of the system is restorative, that is, to conserve
the human resources of our society both for the individual good as
well as the common good. At the same time the system, consistently
with other goals of authoritative decision, has sought to accommodate
the basic desire of individual families to rear their children according
to their own best lights and not according to some social blue print.
Consequently the system has to accord a wide margin of error to
parents before intervening for "the best interests of society... and
their own good."1
Among the range of human values sought to be enforced and
supported, several particular values may be identified as receiving
primary emphasis in this system: (1) the actual physical well-being
of the child, including his nutrition and medical needs, housing and
clothing; (2) the enlightenment value inherent in schooling;
(3) rectitude and affection; and (4) respect.
What base values or resources are at the disposal of the system
to achieve its goals? Obviously, the physical arrest and detention
power of the state vested in its various agents directly supports the
STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTS 33-34 (Children's
Bureau of HEW 1966). Where the disturbing event and the central point here is
that these may be events significantly less disturbing than traditional crimes- is a
serious crime such as a capital felony many states give the criminal courts concurrent
jurisdiction. This procedure is definitely viewed by some commentators as antithetical
to the fundamental philosophy of the system. Id. at 34.
15WHEELER, COTTRELL & RoMAsco, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: ITS PREVENTION AND
CONTROL 25 (Russell Sage Foundation 1966).
16Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 Ill.
328, 100 N.E. 892 (1913). See also People v. Gutierrez,
47 Cal. App. 128, 190 Pac. 200 (1920). But see Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d
152 (Iowa 1966).

14 See SHERIDAN,
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system. More important, from the standpoint of the explicit goals
of the system, would seem to be the aggregate knowledge and skill
of individuals supervising the system's principal institutions - the
child welfare case worker, the probation officer, the children's home
superintendent, and sometimes the judge and lawyer participating
at the more formal parts of the sanctioning phase. Closely allied to
these values are those of rectitude, respect and affection centering
about the individuals and institutions making up the system. The
child custodian, case worker or policeman who interacts effectively
with the child in situations of varying intensity is thought to be successful not only because he is formally clothed with the authority of
the state, but also because he provides a dependable source of concern
for the child as an individual and because he possesses sufficient
personal security to provide a realizable model or pattern for respon7
sible behavior.'
To the extent that there is inter-agency and inter-professional
cooperation along lines clearly designed to effectuate major goals of
the system there is an added element of strength in the base values
of the system. 1" Mention should be made of the distinct value of
continuing research by the related behavioral sciences into conditions
of deviancy and effective treatment methods as a base of support
for the juvenile sanctioning system.' 9 Crucially related to all these base
values is the wealth value: specifically, how much the state is willing
to commit to the whole range of the system's needs, including attractive salary levels for professionals in the field, building of new
institutions, and subsidies to foster parents, as well as fundamental
research and modest experimentation.
2. Strategies
The particular strategies designed to achieve the goals of conserving the child include a wide range of modalities, from the judge's
lecture to the truant or disobedient child, to immediate institutionalization of the child with a persistent pattern of aggressive behavoir.
Between these extremes fall the strategies of placing a child into the
custody of parents or foster homes, or of active supervision by a
probation officer or social worker, the choice depending on a variety
Yet the increased personal involvement of decision-makers working toward exceedingly broad goals, raises the real danger that intervention into the life of a child
may be undertaken in many marginal cases, thus risking distinctly negative results in
over-all value outcomes. WHEELER, COTTRELL & ROMASCO, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY:
ITS PREVENTION AND CONTROL 26 (Russell Sage Foundation 1966).
18 See generally Sheridan, The Court and the Community, in STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE
AND FAMILY COURTS 124 (Children's Bureau of HEW 1966).
19 See, e.g., Gibbins, Psychiatric Aspects of Delinquency in TRENDS IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 14 (World Health Organization 1961).
17
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of factors such as age, degree of past responsibility, and expectations
about the juvenile's attitudes and understanding of his motivations.
In theory, the juvenile court system makes a basic distinction
between neglect cases on the one hand and delinquent cases on the
other. In the former category the customary disposition is supervised
treatment at liberty, with the child living at his parents' home or in a
foster home.
In the delinquent category the range of potential dispositions is
greater. The more typical disposition is not institutionalization, but
probation or simply holding the case open. The conditions of probation, when they are officially enunciated, will in large measure depend
not only on what the court perceives as the child's particular needs,
such as attending school regularly, obeying parents, avoidance of
certain companions, or restitution of damages, but also upon what
agencies are available to help, such as the citizenship training course
used in Boston.20 Where commitment to a training school or similar
institution is the disposition, as is the case in a distinct minority of
adjudicated as well as "informal" dispositions, it is generally for the
period of minority or until discharged by the institution. 1 The average length of actual detention in the institutions appears to be about
22
ten months.
Even though institutional commitment is used in less than ten
per cent of all juvenile cases processed in the system (including the
so-called unofficial dispositions handled without a record) ,23 some
account should be taken of the typical content of institutional treatment. It can be noted that, in general, the institutional programs
designed to effect the values of wealth, skill, enlightment, and wellbeing do not vary significantly from those in the adult criminal law
system. Effort is made to continue formal school instruction, usually
with classes in the institution; the emphasis is on achieving completion of the primary grades, although some institutions have junior
high and high school programs as well.
Vocational training seems to be largely a function of the maintenance program of the institution. Thus, painting, carpentry, and
farming are typical, although in some institutions, particularly the
federal ones, more resources are put into the program to offer at least
a basic introduction to the trade or craft. There are no industrial
production programs here like those of the adult prison. Heavy

21

See Reinemann,- Probation and ihe Juvenile Delinquent, in THE PROBLEM OF JUVE610 (Sheldon Glueck ed. 1959).
Tappan & Nicolle, supra note 13, at 169.

22

See U.S.

2

See U.N.,

20

NILE DELINQUENCY

DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, CHILDREN'S BUREAU, STATISTICS ON PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS FOR DELINQUENT CHILDREN 1956-57 (1958).
COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, PART I, NORTH
AMERICA, Table V, at 56 (1958); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, & WELFARE, CHILDREN'S BUREAU, JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS 1964 11 (1965).
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emphasis, not surprisingly, is placed upon sports and recreation pro24
grams in most institutions.
Program content more specifically related to -the values of rectitude, respect, and affection, while not as well developed as the more
traditional educational programs and certainly not as widely distributed throughout these institutions, is receiving increasing emphasis
from professionals. Effort is made to involve the child in selfexpression, group participation (including the setting of goals and
supervision of conduct for the group), and community-self orientation. This is not to say that more coercive strategies are not still a
feature of many institutional programs.2 5 But there does appear to
be a slight trend in the direction of relatively more persuasive modalities, stressing the individual's interaction with a definable group.2"
Historically this trend has some antecedents, if only dimly perceived,
in the use of cottages in the training school. However, like other
features of the system, this one has undergone considerable perversion. Not only are the groups in such housing today ineffectively
large, but the groupings are by age and size and not on other more
relevant criteria. Security and economy are often the only realizable
27
goals.
According to one of the few existent surveys on the extent of use
of group therapy approaches within juvenile institutions of correction,
the type most often reported was defined as "group counseling."
Reliance was primarily upon nonprofessional staff, only about a third
24

See generally U.N., COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, op. cit.
supra note 23, at 72-76. Some idea of the chronic shortage of staff for such institutions can be seen in these ratios: in 1956 the average teacher to pupil ratio was 1 to
24; of recreation supervisor to child, 1 to 133. The Children's Bureau has recommended an outside ratio in the teacher category of 1 to 15, since the training school
teacher is analogous to the teacher of classes of maladjusted pupils in community
schools. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, CHILDREN'S BUREAU, INSTITUTIONS SERVING DELINQUENCY CHILDREN: GUIDES AND GOALS 66-67

(1957).

25Although there is apparently no systematic empirical data to suggest the incidence of
corporal discipline, impressionistic accounts are available which suggest extraordinarily punitive practices are used. See, e.g., DEUTSCH, OUR REJECTED CHILDREN

(1950). Such measures as shaving the heads of runaways, the "fire hose water cure,"
marching back and forth for hours are some of the more benign ones recounted in
TEETERS & REINEMANN, THE CHALLENGE OF DELINQUENCY 461-62 (1950).
26 The trend is seen in the increased willingness to experiment with therapeutic models
both within and without the institution. See e.g., Close, CaliforniaCamps for Delinquents, THE PROBLEM O JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 646 (Sheldon Glueck ed. 1959);
Blackley, Treatment Practicesin Juvenile Court, 10 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 533'(1961)
U.N., COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, Op. cit. supra note 23, at
50-52. The emphasis in New York's new state-wide specialized body for youth deviance is on preventive techniques in the community as opposed to post-event strategies.
See HARTUNG, CRIME LAW AND SOCIETY 244-63 (1965) (chapter on juvenile court,
prediction and the rehabilitative ideal). Since 1961 there has been federal support for
a variety of such state efforts. Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act
of '1961, 75 Stat. 572 (1961). See Frankel & Kravitz, Federal Program for Delinquency and Control, in NCCD, CURRENT PROJECTS IN THE PREVENTION, CONTROL
AND TREATMENT OF CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 14 (1962-63).

27 U.N., COMPARATIVE

at 69.

SURVEY OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, Op. Cit. supra note 23,
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of the reporting institutions using psychiatrists, psychologists or
social workers. 28 This approach, although some professionals set
large goals for it ("assisting clients in the perception and acceptance
of social reality, providing positive group experiences... and enhancing self-esteem"), is primarily a kind of periodic bull session hardly
related to the myriad of events, feelings, and persons otherwise
encountered during the days or weeks between sessions.2 9
Perhaps the next most significant strategies in terms of their
wide use in correctional institutions for juveniles are the group
psychotherapy and group social work approaches. Both of these bear
the strong imprint of the two professions most directly involved,
psychiatry (especially of the psychoanalytic bent) and social work.
In the former approach, emphasis is on getting the patient to develop
personal insight and to resolve conflicts. The role of the other
members of the group is supportive only. In the group social work
approach the emphasis, traditionally, has been on changing the conditions and patterns of living for the client by limiting size and
membership of the cottage group and the quality of the surroundings,
and by encouraging adoption of vocational training and healthy
recreation patterns. Essentially it is a leader-directed model, although
a fairly permissive one." ° Neither approach receives universal support
in the current literature. Criticism of both is made because neither
makes explicit attempts to mobilize peer group forces for change, and
in both the staff member remains largely out of primary interaction
31
with the group and does not identify with it.
To some extent, perhaps, as an outgrowth of these earlier
approaches, but definitely in a spirit of experimentation encouraged
by disappointment in other efforts, there is another kind of program
now used both within the institution and in the community. This is
the guided group interaction concept, so-called because the principal
28McCorkle & Elias, Group Therapy in Correctional Institutions, 23 Fed. Prob. 57
(June 1959).
29 Sarri & Vinter, Group Treatment Strategies in juvenile Correctional Programs, 11
CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 326, 332 (1965):
The difficulty in group counselling is the tendency to seek changes in the
attitudes or behavior of the client which have little connection with, or only
tangential relevance to, his immediate life situation and his behavior in
the community.
30 See Sarri & Vinter, supra note 29, at 335-37; VINTER & JANOWITZ, THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF JUVENILE INSTITUTIONS: A RESEARCH REPORT (1961).
31 These views rest of course on the prevailing sociological assumption that youth deviancy is group focused and must be dealt with as such - the subculture notion. See,
e.g., Cressey, Contradictory Theories in Correctional Group Therapy Programs, 18
Fed. Prob. 20 (June 1954) ; Grosser, The Role of Informal Inmate Groups in Change
of Values, 1958 CHILDREN 25; Illing, Group Psychotherapy and Group Work in
Authoritarian Settings, 48 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 387 (1957). Indeed one team of investigators has discovered that in some instances a group therapy approach may actually increase negative client attitudes toward the desired change goals. VINTER &
JANOWITZ, supra note 30.
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focus is upon a definite peer group in which each member is persuaded to participate both as a target for change and as a precipitator
of change in others. The basic theoretical assumption of such a
program is not that the youth have distinctly alienated attitudes about
how they should behave in society, but rather that they know about
the community's norms and are ambivalent about their own patterns
with respect to conforming. By allowing its members to vocalize their
conflicts in relation to particular problem situations, the group comes
to grips with the detailed rationalizations and defenses used to justify
behavior, thus turning to constructive use the anxiety produced by the
latent ambivalence. 2 Such an approach requires continuing interaction of the group, so that not only the working day but also part of
each evening are subject to scrutiny by the group. It is therefore considered a "total environment" approach to re-socialization, whether the
33
particular group is from a probation or a training school population.
Since probation represents the most often used strategy in the
juvenile system other than dismissal with warning,34 it warrants separate comment. The following summary seems succinctly accurate:
The assumption is that the offender can profit from guidance,
counseling, and help provided by a person experienced with human
problems. Professional training for probation work has typically
been social casework, and hence has had as its intellectual foundation
some form of psychiatric or psychoanalytic theory. In actual practice,
probation methods have varied from those of psychiatric social work
to friendly counseling, to a form of supervision very like surveillance.
In most jurisdictions the probation officer is the chief link

between the delinquent and the programs established for him. It is
the officer who works with and advises the judge, who is in regular
contact with the delinquent, who may know the problems he and his
family face, and who may work most directly with him in solving
them. Despite all the handicaps of probation officers with heavy
caseloads and overwork on pre-sentence investigations, probation

remains3 5the central core of any court-established program for delinquents.
The content of the probation approach is a function of three variables: the case load of the probation officer, the kinds and number of
conditions imposed on the individual, and the availability and accessi; Sarri &
Vinter, Group Treatment Strategies in Juvenile Correctional Programs, 11 CRIME
AND DELINQUENCY 326, 333-35 (1965).
33 See also Scarpitti & Stephenson, The Use of the Small Group in the Rehabilitation
of Delinquents, 30 Fed. Prob. 45 (Sept. 1966), describing the New Jersey Essexfields
experiment. For comparable developments on an institutional model in England see
Fisher, Total Institutional Commitment and Treatment: Trends in English Corrections, 2 ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY 61 (1966).
34 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, CHILDREN'S BUREAU, JUVENILE
4
COURT STATISTICS--196 , Table 6, at 11 (1965), shows 49% probation for "judicial" cases and 21.3% for all cases together.
32 See generally MCCORKLE, ELIAS & BIXBY, THE HIGHFIELDS STORY (1958)

35

WHEELER, COTTRELL & ROMASCO, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY:
CONTROL 38 (Russell Sage Foundation 1966).
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bility of supportive assistance from other community institutions. In
all three respects the current indications are that, with some notable
exceptions, genuine program content is all but non-existent.3 6 Consequently the community oriented strategies, 7 which involve the
juvenile in some small group with its constant interaction of members
and professional leader are counted the most promising developments
to date.
In this setting the key judicial function is of course the careful
consideration of substantial information on the child's social history,
intelligence, emotional development, education and self-awareness.
Not only the future status of the child until he reaches majority, but
also the kind and quality of treatment he will receive depend upon
this evaluation, its accuracy, and its relevance to an enlightened
judgment about what the child needs at that point.3" Practical considerations intrude on this exercise of judgment in such substantial
ways that the actual range of dispositions made in the cases coming
before a juvenile court might be quite narrow indeed, considering the
theoretical alternatives. The central point here is that although the
competence bestowed on the juvenile system is comprehensive and farreaching, the actual dispositions may not be commensurate in scope.
Since the child's best interest is considered paramount and his condition is a dynamic and not a static one, ideally the various parts of the
system (court, social agency, state institution) will remain in continuing interaction. To this end, the court's jurisdiction continues until
majority so that orders may be modified in accordance with the child's
39
needs and progress.
Case loads, for example, range from 50 to 100 cases per officer in nearly 78% of
all juvenile cases, with 46.41% of these in the range of from 71 to 100; many
probation officers are also responsible for additional adult offenders. PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 168-69, fig. 3 (1967)
[Hereinafter cited
as THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY.] Actual contact with the delinquent has been characterized in the following terms:
Probation and parole supervision typically consists of a 10- or 15-minute
interview once or twice a month, during which the officer questions and
admonishes his charge, refers him to an employment agency or a public
health clinic, and makes notations for the reports he must file.
Id. at 165. Given these conditions it is not difficult to imagine how little time the
probation officer has to intercede with school officials, recreation leaders, police
authorities, and so on in the child's behalf, or to get the child's family involved in
wholesome activities with or for the child.
37See notes 32, 33 supra and accompanying text.
38 "Court orders as a rule represent major treatment decisions .... The court in its
disposition should determine the status required to accomplish the necessary treatment." SHERIDAN, supra note 14, at 12.
39 One glaring practice that seems antithetical to the stated aims of the system, although
it is not in the strictest sense designed to fall into the disposition phase, is the detention of children in common jails awaiting juvenile court action. Even though some if
not all state systems provide that it is unlawful to detain children in county jails, it is
common knowledge that in less populous areas the practice is quite common. The
courts could help remedy this situation by awarding temporary custody to social
workers pending adjudication.
36
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The procedures by which the system applies these various strategic sanctions, euphemistically labeled orders of disposition and not
judgments or sentences, deserve passing description. 40 The child who
is suspected of being neglected or delinquent (or in some statutory
schemes dangerous to himself) may be taken into custody without the
safeguards of the probable cause requirement of the adult criminal
process, detained for varying periods of time without notice of
charges, without warning as to silence, counsel, and preliminary
hearing. 4 ' The proceedings are not completely informal, but the rules
of evidence are not strictly enforced, nor are there yet generally any
requirements for confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses.
Juvenile court petitions are often imprecise in raising two basic issues
- one of fact as to the conduct or condition alleged, the other of a
sound judgment as to an appropriate disposition. This imprecision,
the absence of counsel from the hearing, the free-wheeling inquiry
into the social background of the child, or the common failure of the
court to make explicit findings of fact may obscure the reasoning
behind the disposition of many cases.
The Kent decision suggests that this relatively laissez-faire atmosphere is due for some tightening-up.4 2 The Court's own language is
instructive:
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose
of juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise serious
questions as to whether actual performance measures well enough
against theoretical purpose to make tolerable the immunity of the
process from the reach of constitutional guarantees applicable to
adults. There is much evidence that some juvenile courts, including
that of the District of Columbia, lack the personnel facilities and
techniques to perform adequately as representatives of the State in a
parens patriae capacity, at least with respect to children charged with
law violation. There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds

for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he
40 This

phase of the juvenile system has been the one most frequently and critically
commented upon. See, e.g., Beemsterboer, The Juvenile Court- Benevolence in the
Star Chamber, 50 J. CRim. L., C. & P.S. 464 ('1960).
41See, e.g., Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961). See also Edwards v. United States, 330 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1964). The Supreme Court in
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 545 n.3 (1966), expressly declined to express
any view "as to the legality of these practices."
42 The Court has in this case begun at the critical frontier between the juvenile court
system and the adult criminal process. Here the juvenile court could waive its otherwise exclusive jurisdiction to the District Court in cases involving felonies where
the child is sixteen. But the statute stipulated a "full investigation" of the case before
exercising such discretion. Here no hearing was held. The Court held that the petitioner was entitled to an adequate hearing before the waiver order was entered, that
counsel (the right to which had been established in a prior Court of Appeals decision) should have access to social records considered by the court, and that the
court must give its reasons for waiver.
We do not mean . . . to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform
with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing;but we do hold that the hearing must measure up to the
essentials of due process and fair treatment.
Id. at 562.
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gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the
solicitous
care and regenerative treatments postulated for children. 48
Whatever the apparent shortcomings of the system in its procedural dimensions when compared with the "due process model" of
the general criminal system, it is apparent that the emphasis has been
deliberately placed upon the disposition phase, that a good deal of
efficiency is expected and desired at the sacrifice of what would be
the adult's basic procedural safeguards. Hence, from the perspective
of the distinterested observer, the system is to be evaluated primarily
in terms of its effects and outcomes, taking the system at face value
to be less concerned with how those effects are achieved.4
3. Outcomes and Effects
The particular outcomes of applied sanctions in the juvenile
system can be assessed in the familiar terms of several human values:
well-being, rectitude, respect, affection and enlightenment. It is proposed to look at these sanctioning outcomes categorically in these
terms.
Well-being. The most immediately observable outcome in many
instances is that the child whose family is of small economic means,
if he goes to an approved foster home or is committed to a state
children's institution, is awarded a more dependable and qualitatively
different environment. He will be allowed (indeed required) to get
full night's sleep (without interruptions from domestic quarreling
and drunken behavior by parents). He will be given, if not a rich
diet, one that is quite sufficient for sustenance and growth. His
clothing, while perhaps not individualistic, will be adequate; his
shelter, warm and basically secure. To the extent that these dispositions to surrogate homes are not employed, it seems doubtful whether
the environment is much changed. Although the probation officer
may and does frequently insist on such things as regular hours in the
home of the child's own family, the supervision of diet, dress and
internal arrangement of living quarters is much less the subject of
detailed regulation.
Although in an objective sense the new environment may be
seen as more "normal" or at least more middle-class and comfortable,
subjectively the degree of comfort or contentment the individual will
3Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1966). See Editor's Note, page 224,
inIra.
must not, however, overlook the obvious possibility that the very ends
sought may be lost or only marginally achieved if in the details of the process the
child is not recognized as a subject of rights and duties, hence a responsible member
of the society interested in his welfare. Thus, the oft-repeated observation that the
child may not perceive the solicitous quality of the system because hustled
through it, would seem to have cogency. Contrast this with the commonly held understanding of subjects in the general criminal law system that, while they may or may
not be convicted, depending on a host of variables, the clear intention of the system
is to punish the convicted individual.

4One
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feel depends not alone on such conditions, but also on his own
attitudes about the desirability of such trappings. More specifically,
the sense of well-being is not so simply regulated; there may be
peculiar emotional attachments to certain persons, places, things, and
habits which are closely related to the child's outlook on his own
life-style.
Rectitude. To the extent that little account is taken of the
particular social and psychological background of the child in making
an initial disposition, it is difficult to generalize about the impact of
the sanction upon him- except to see if he recidivates either as a
juvenile or subsequently in the post-adolescent years.
Although there is not a great deal of hard data on which to base
evaluative estimates of rates of return to crime and to the system, a
few surveys have recently been made in various areas. In the District
of Columbia, of all children (under 18) who were released from the
Children's Center in 1964 about 50 per cent became involved in a
subsequent law violation before their eighteenth birthday.4" These
are of course rather crude figures and do not take account of variations in intensity of parole efforts. Rates of return have in at least
one instance been shown to decrease markedly in correspondence to
such efforts. 46 Nor, in fairness, do such reports take account of what
variables were at work in the institutional phase or what variables in
the child or his social situation might have accounted for the trend.47
However, for the juvenile who has gone to one of the newer grouporiented programs, whether an institutionalized form or one operating
totally within the community, the emerging evidence seems to suggest
that distinctly lower rates of return to new offenses are to be
expected. 4" There are apparently no published reports on the return
rates of those juveniles going to pure probation (of the traditional
sort), although general estimates of the probation sanction suggest
that the rates are quite low comparatively.4"
45 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUM-

BIA 709 (1966).

46 Id. at 709-10.
47
Recidivism rates for institutions for juveniles ... can be expected to exceed
rates for the adult prisons because probation and other alternatives to confinement are used more liberally for juveniles than for adults. Hence, only
the worst risks among juveniles are committed to institutions, whereas prisons for adults receive more diverse risks. A second reason for expecting
higher reimprisonment rates for juveniles is simply the consistent statistical
evidence that the earlier the age at which an individual is first committed
for criminal behavior, the more likely he is to continue in that behavior.
GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM 18 (1964).
48 See Scarpitti & Stephenson, The Use of the Small Group in the Rehabilitation of Delinquents, 30 Fed. Prob. 45, 49 (Sept. 1966). Glaser offers this estimate of the
California programs: "The first two years' experience indicates that the communitytreated offenders commit markedly fewer and less serious offenses than those kept in
institutions - in the average case, eight months - before release." GLASER, Op. Cit.
supra note 47, at 420.
49 THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 166 (1967).
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There is need for one explicit qualification at this point.
Although abundant literature deals with the etiology of delinquency,
with suggested preventive attacks on its conditions, and with recent
fruitful experiments, there are few if any systematic efforts to relate
specific post-event strategies to particular delinquent "symptoms,"
and specific events, preferred or deviant, in the post-application
phase.50 It should not be surprising that little work along these lines
has been forthcoming, considering the vast range of variables operative. Furthermore, it seems quite likely that if any such research were
developed, it would be somewhat vague for the simple reason that
explicitly desired outcomes, except in the negative sense of no return
to the system, are impossible to state in concrete terms.51 Particularly
in a society where individual freedom is sought to be maximized,
some deviancy, or departure from the norm, is not only expected
but desired.
Respect. Although not one of the stated goals of the system, it
hardly seems arguable that, for any individual who is formally sanctioned, some loss of respect is involved. In any appraisal of postsanctioning outcomes, therefore, some account should be taken of
re-acceptance or re-integration patterns, for expectations about an
individual's behavior are probably as closely associated with the way
in which other individuals and informal social groups perceive him
as with authoritative perceptions of deviancy and personal awareness
of one's own past behavior patterns.
A neighborhood may have been the outer limits of the child's
contacts, and an abrupt exclusion from it may prove in the short
run disastrous to the teenager, particularly in the thirteen to fifteen
year range. The issue here for the sanctioning decision-maker is
whether to distort the current identifications, hoping for a "wholesome" substitution later (a hope which seems naive in view of the
plain reality that the child will shortly return to the neighborhood),
50 Some observers are, however, willing to generalize in terms of personality types along
a range from least likely to need or benefit from institutionalization to most likely.
See, e.g., Gibbins, supra note 19.
51 The lack of relevant intelligence is decried by the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, as the following passage illustrates:
We know much too little about how various actions of the criminal justice
system affect the number and types of crimes committed by different classes
of offenders. It is necessary to collect data on recidivism (rearrest probabilities, reconviction probabilities, etc.) by type of crime and by offender
treatment. It is important to know how recidivism varies with how far a
person travels through the criminal processes (discharged on arrest, prosecution
dropped, put on probation, paroled, etc.). This information needs to be
correlated with age, crime type, and other relevant variables.
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 266 (1967). Nor does the Commission despair of researching the potentially unresearchable: "While collecting and
processing such a large amount of data is clearly a difficult task, it is well within
the capabilities of today's technology and will be considerably aided by the development of a national criminal justice information system." Ibid. See also Bittner &
Platt, The Aleaning of Punishment, 2 ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY 79, 82 '(1966).
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or to leave them relatively intact and seek to divert particular activities
of either the group or the individual or both in the direction of selffulfilling activity.
Two other aspects of the total process by which delinquents are
sanctioned suggest that labeling the immature person presents formidable problems for his subsequent acceptance in a variety of contexts.52 One is the relatively frequent use of the so-called unofficial
disposition by principal decision makers in the system. The other is
the frequently heard suggestion that some remedial steps be taken
either to protect the confidentiality of a juvenile court appearance or
to "erase" the record once the sanction has been exhausted, or to
do both.5"
Affection. The intimate sharing of feelings between individuals
who are most obviously "friends," or more formalized affection in the
traditional patterning of "family," can be critical in the child's adequate treatment. These patterns are distinctly interfered with when
institutionalization is indicated, although to a degree perhaps less
coercively than in adult prisons. 4 On the other hand, it is not uncommon for formal relationships (for example, between an aggressive
teenager and an equally aggressive parent) to require deliberate
manipulation as by putting some time and distance between the child
and these relatives, or associates. Formerly it could be said that the
child case worker may have been all too ready to interrupt these
"unwholesome" relations, but increasingly it is being recognized that,
however quarrelsome a parent-child relationship might have been,
or however "misdirected" the advice of peers or older adolescents,
for example, there could be a dependency which may not easily be
transferred.
Enlightenment and skill. For the average youthful offender,
whether he is the product of a short training school experience or of
several years on probation, it is likely that his net value position in
the area of education is little if any better than the norm for his
community and economic class. Indeed, his chances of successfully
completing high school may be slightly lower if the probation is in an
52

See WHEELER, COTTRELL & ROMASCO,

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: ITS PREVENTION

AND CONTROL 22-23 (Russell Sage Foundation 1966). For fuller exposition of the
labeling process see Kitsuse, Societal Reaction to Deviant Behavior Problems of
Theory and Method, THE OTHER SIDE: PERSPECTIVES ON DEVIANCE 87 (Becker ed.

1964).
3
5 See Gough, The Expungement of Adjudication Records of Juvenile and Adult Offenders: A Problem of Status, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 147, canvassing the need and the
response in a few states by statute.
54The furlough or temporary leave policy now only very slowly coming into adult
prison programs has apparently been long established in juvenile training schools.
See U.N., COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, PART I. NORTH

AMERICA, 75 '(1958). Visiting in the institution by family, while not discouraged by
policy, is often made difficult by reason of the remoteness of the facility. Receipt of
letters by the institutionalized individual, adult or juvenile, does seem to keep kinship ties viable. See GLASER, Op. cit. supra note 47, at 366.
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urban context and of the traditional sort. The most meaningful work
experience seems to be developed in the guided group interaction
programs or in work release programs now being used for training
school inmates. The most promising educational experience, though
it is too early for evaluation, seems to be the kind being tried at the
National Training School. It is a work-study program in which the
boys are "employed" and paid points with a dollar equivalent for work,
5
study and achievement of 90% accuracy on periodic examinations.
An additional, general test of the success of a behavior control
system involves what is coming to be called general prevention - that
is, the extent to which people in the population at large are prevented
from engaging in deviant behavior without themselves having been
directly involved in the system. The juvenile system cannot be judged
a success in those terms."
Two points need to be made here. One is that while it may be
empirically sound to ask such a question of the juvenile system,
general prevention is not explicitly one of the goals of the sanctioning
system itself. This stems from the conceptual clam-shell which sees
the system as non-penal and hence limited to the business of restoring
57
the individual misdirected youth.

The other point is that from the general debate about the interaction of a range of variables which affect the individual's perceptions
of reality, his attitudes about authority, his identification with models
of socially acceptable behavior, and his developed capacity for control
or choice of alternatives in situations of stress,58 has emerged a new
emphasis upon prevention strategies, a shift toward rehabilitation
of neighborhoods. More attention is being given to a range of social
services which in varying degrees affect the future of the young
person. These include public health measures for the whole family,
welfare case work for mother and child, employment relief or redirection for the father plus occasional alcoholic rehabilitation, and
encouragement and support in school for the child - all combined
with observation for early signs of social, familial, or personal failures
in the child.
55 This experiment is described in

REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME
IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 704 (1966).

56 "In 1965 a majority of all arrests for major crimes against property were of people

under 21, as were a substantial minority of arrests for major crimes against the
person. The recidivism rates for young offenders are higher than those for any other
age group." THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 55 (1967).
57

Ironically, the teenage subculture of the slums may long have had a tradition of
actually desiring to go to training school, for that would suggest genuine success in
patterns condoned by the peer group. For colorful impressionistic evidence of this see
BROWN, MAN CHILD IN THE PROMISED LAND (1965).
The influences of community life, particularly of family, school, and neighborhood,
received great emphasis in the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice. See THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY
55-88 (1967).
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A range of dispositions is becoming available to redirect the
child beginning to show signs which indicate that his chances are
poor to stay out of the delinquent or offender category later on. In
other words immediate invocation of the authoritative decisionmaking of the system is being used less, but intervention for substantially the same goals continues. We are just beginning to appreciate
some of the implications of this preventive, contextually oriented
approach in terms of the individual's basic liberty and dignity. 9
Further comment on these trends will be postponed to the Summary
Appraisal section below.60
B. The Drug-Alcohol Dependence System6 1
1. Policies
In recent times this system has undergone distinctive metamorphosis as a system concerned with control of human behavior. The
changes have occurred in rather direct proportion to the incidence of
the abuse of alcohol and drugs in the culture. Paradoxically, the
poorly clarified policies of earlier models of the system may have led
to the need for radical changes in strategy and, of course, to a drastic
need to be explicit about goals.62 Recently, for whatever social
59 See, e.g., one observer who sees a series of shifts of theory which guides us from
delinquency based on moral degenerency to delinquency based on mental or emotional illness and now ultimately to delinquency based on poverty. HARTUNG, CRIME
LAW AND SOCIETY (1965).
"If the objective of the program [war on poverty]
becomes the rehabilitation of the poor, rather than the rehabilitation of the sociocultural processes that produce them, it will, I predict, fail." Id. at 263.
60 Suffice it to say here that if it is thought ironic that we are emphasizing the traditional sanctions of the system less and less at a time when rates of delinquency are
climbing and when we have only begun to test systematically the effects of our
sanctions, several other facts should be remembered. For one thing the percentage
of young people in the total population is growing more rapidly than other categories. This factor is not taken into account by the FBI tables in annual reports of
the Bureau. Equally substantial as an evaluative factor is that young people are
physically maturing earlier than in former eras, but continuing for a variety of not
not so well known reasons, in a sort of adolescence longer than was the case with
other generations. One observer estimates that the average age of the onset of puberty
has been going down at the rate of about half a year every ten years. "It is generally
assumed that this is related to better nutrition." Gibbins, supra note 19, at 19.
"At the same time, the tendency is to regard young people as pychologically immature
to a higher age than formerly." Ibid. Furthermore it is clear that increased urbanization with its concomitant migration of rural and minority families has had unstablizing effects which certainly must account for some of the trend. "Traditional
controls are easily damaged irreparably by migration or urbanization." Gibbins,
supra note 19, at 23. Even so, the President's National Commission on crime thinks
the real incidence of crime is much higher than we have dared to imagine. See
generally Crime in America, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 17-43
(1967).
61The primary characteristics of other particularized systems will be examined in this
and the following sections. The description will focus upon three phases of each
system: (1) essential policies; (2) sanctioning strategies; and (3) outcomes and
effects.
62The first federal legislation, the Harrison Narcotic Act of 1914, was essentially a
revenue measure to control the import of morphine and heroin, partially in response
to treaty obligations with other nations about traffic in addictive drugs. See Statement
of Emmanual Celler, Representative from New York, in Hearings Before Sub-com.
mittee No. 2 on Civil Commitment and Treatment of Narcotic Addicts of the House
Committee on the judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., ser. 10, at 53 (1966).
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causes, authoritative concern has begun to focus on the consequences
of drug and alcohol dependence in terms of wasted personal income,
neglect of family needs, unemployment, and ultimately, entrance into
personal and property crimes to sustain the need.
Associated with concern about this self-perpetuating syndrome
is the attempt to control the illicit economic hierarchy which facilitates
the importation, manufacture, distribution, and sale of drugs. In this
respect, the licensed access to alcohol represents a more permissive
policy, perhaps resting in large part on pragmatism if not ideology;
absolute denial of access to alcohol is impossible, at least in a society
which abhors the police state.
The system as it has evolved in the more urban states and in
federal legislation and administration distinguishes three categories
of offenders subject to the sanctions of the system, and the policies
are different with regard to each. First, the big-timer or the simple
'pusher" - the non-user who imports or otherwise manipulates the
market in drugs (though hardly different empirically in function
from legitimate distributors of liquor) - is thought to be a menace
to the adult or young person who is led ultimately to disrupt his life
radically by dependence and thus the chief actor whose apprehension
is most highly desired.6 3 The central goal here is explicitly one of
stopping or controlling a commercial enterprise in contraband merchandise. It is like other government efforts to regulate the economy
or the conduct of business insofar as certain outlets, for certain
purposes, to certain persons are condoned,6 4 and hence a complete
blackout is not anticipated or desired, but it is unlike other models
of government control of business in that the penal processes are
more heavily relied upon, and legitimate participants in society's
wealth process are not systemtically employed as prime participants
in the system.6"
The second category is the addict himself in situations where he
poses little threat of value deprivations to society. The charge is
usually for mere possession of the prohibited substance or for public
63 Nevertheless, "the brunt of enforcement has fallen heavily on the user and the

addict. In cases handled by the Bureau of Narcotics, whose activities are directed
against international and interstate traffickers, more than 40 per cent of the defendants prosecuted are addicts." THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 219
(1967). The President's Commission also reports that the traffic in narcotics is a
very large scale business in America, something on the order of $350 million
annually being spent in the heroin trade alone, with $21 million of this going as
profit to the importors and major distributors. Id. at 189.
64 The medical use of morphine, for example.
65 The suits for treble damages in anti-trust violations, patent infringement, etc., have
no parallel in the narcotics control system. Hence, the enforcement process takes on
a good deal more sinister, secretive, cloak and dagger appearance, the police and
federal agents routinely having to resort to the use of stoolies and provocateurs. See
Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091 (1951).
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behavior which, though not otherwise socially harmful, demonstrates
that one is under the influence of the drug or alcohol (e.g., public
drunkenness). The third category deals with more threatening
situations, such as robbery, which may be intimately related (in the
personality of the actor) to the dependency need.
In the category where the charge is mere possession, use or
addiction there has finally evolved a clear policy. Chronic alcoholism
-even
though it may manifest itself in public places -is
now
being authoritatively recognized as an "illness" not subject to ordinary
penal sanctions." Relying on expressions of professional and administrative concern about "revolving door" confinement of alcoholics
in jail and prison, and upon congressional purpose "to establish a
program for the rehabilitation of alcoholics, promote temperence, and
provide for the medical, psychiatric, and other scientific treatment of
chronic alcoholics," 67 the courts are coming to see the social and
individual problems involved in dependence on alcohol as a mental
health concern, albeit one for which the community has considerable
responsibility.
So, too, with regard to addiction or dependence on drugs. Thus
in Robinson v. California,68 a landmark decision which figured
prominently in the two alcoholism cases mentioned above, the Supreme
Court said: "[I]n the interest of the general health or welfare of its
inhabitants, a State might establish a program of compulsory treatment for those addicted to narcotics. Such a program of treatment
might require periods of involuntary confinement." 69
Congress has recently enacted a statute the thrust of which is to
give a person charged with a non-violent federal crime, who is an
"addict likely to be rehabilitated," a choice between a sentence
to
prison (where he might get some therapy anyway) and a civil commitment for treatment. 70 Congressman Emanual Celler, Democrat
of New York, spokesman for the Bill in the House, said in testimony
before the House Judiciary Committee: "Rehabilitation is the goal to
be sought [not solely for the benefit to the individual but also to
protect society]. . . . The deterrent effect of long sentences is
vigorously challenged. The threat of long sentences may deter nonusing traffickers, but long sentences do not necessarily deter the drug
abuser." 71 Attorney General Katzenbach gave similar views as to the
Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C.
356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
67 361 F.2d at 51 '(emphasis added).
68 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
69 d. at 665.
70
Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1766, 80 Stat.
71 Hearings before Subcommittee No. 2 on Civil
Narcotic Addicts of the House Committee on the
sess., ser. 10, at 57 (1966).
66

Cir. 1966) ; Driver v. Hinnant,

1438 (1966).
Commitment and Treatment of
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st & 2d
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purpose of the legislation: "Drug addition is a fearful disease of
mind and body no less damaging and no less deserving of our attention. This legislation, I am convinced, represents our best current
hope to halt its eroding effect on our society." 7 2
In the final category of offender mentioned above, competing
policies are at stake. On the one hand it is recognized that in individual cases the act committed by the person may be severe enough to
be sanctioned by the general criminal system, i.e., not subject to "civil
commitment"; on the other hand the person's dependence on drugs
or alcohol may have precipitated the event.7 Neither the Easter nor
the Driver Court presumed to pass on this kind of case, and indeed in
the latter decision there is dictum to the effect that a substantive
offense other than public drunkenness could not be defended by a
plea of addiction.7 4 This ambivalence is characteristic of the new
federal legislation. It is explicitly recognized that in cases of crimes
of violence, crimes of selling narcotics primarily for profit, and situations wherein persons have two or more prior felony convictions or
prior narcotics civil commitments, something other than rehabilitation
should be given primary expression. It is not expected that these
individuals would be denied access, after conviction, to the remedial
approach provided for others; but nevertheless it is thought 7desirable
5
to stigmatize them with a criminal conviction and sentence.
2. Post Disposition Sanctioning Strategies
By and large the principal sanctioning strategy employed by both
federal and state variants of this system is still confinement, usually
in prisons. The mode will vary according to which part of the
criminal code has been violated; but generally speaking, the offenders
who have been convicted of public drunkenness will be sentenced
Id. at 83. Mr. Katzenbach also said: "This legislation ...

allows us to treat criminals
as criminals but allows us to treat addicts when they can be rehabilitated." Id. at
79. In certain situations, some deviants are to be selected out for reformative treatment, others because of the nature of crimes they commit and/or because of their own
predispositions or personality structure will still be subject to "punishment." It
remains to be seen whether this was a jury argument needed to convince the skeptic
in Congress, or whether anyone caught in the criminal law processes who has an
identifiable addiction problem will be treated anyway.
7 Those jurisdictions with fairly broad tests for mental irresponsibility might avoid
the dilemma by treating the whole syndrome - addiction, stealing, etc. - in terms of
loss of behavioral controls. Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir.
1966) ; Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
74 Furthermore, it is clear that these courts will insist on loss of control of the use of
alcohol and will not accept "voluntary use" as its equivalent.
75 Both Presidential Commissions on crime and law enforcement have taken issue with
the denial of the civil commitment alternative to certain addicts. See THE CHALLENGE
OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 229 (1967); REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMIS72

SION ON CRIME IN THE DIsTRICT OF COLUMBIA

579 (1966),

where it is stated:

We see little reason to exclude such addict-sellers from pretrial commitment although allowing them post-conviction treatment. Pretrial commitment would perimt treatment to be started at the earliest possible stage and
avoid prolonged trials and appeals in pretty addict cases.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 44

either to jail or to prison as misdemeanants for terms up to two years
for "habitual drunkenness." In the case of an alcohol offender there
is, if he is a state prisoner and not confined in a county jail, a prospect
for parole; but the granting of it is usually dependent upon, minimally, refraining from use of alcohol or association with persons and
events where its use is expected. In the more severe cases, the potential parolee must have a well developed plan for his association with
a private treatment group like Alcoholics Anonymous or with a public
health agency.
It is the exceptional prison unit that affords active treatment of
alcoholics while in confinement. Some prisons, however, do have
units of Alcoholics Anonymous within the walls. In the prisons of
the larger states and the federal system, some opportunity is available
to the alcoholic to join group therapy sessions. (Keep in mind that
many such persons will be in prison on charges other than violation
of the liquor laws.) Furthermore, in some hospitals used as prisons
for addicts (e.g., the U.S. Public Health Hospital at Lexington, Kentucky) the administration of drugs to engender a nauseaous reaction
to imbibing has been tried.7"
In the case of narcotics addicts who are convicted of selling or
smuggling, commitment to prison is the rule 7 7 (or has been until
recent federal legislation and similar statutes in two or three states).
The content of the programs for dealing with narcotics addicts is not
very different from programs dealing with alcoholics, save that the
convicted person in the federal courts may elect to go to one of two
U.S. Public Health Hospitals. Of course, the program in the hospital
is limited by the sentence imposed by the court. Use of group therapy
and administration of withdrawal drugs (Methadone maintenance,
for example) are the characteristics of treatment.
In California and New York, it is possible for narcotics addicts
to be involved in a combination inpatient-outpatient program of
treatment, characterized by work therapy, vocational courses and high
school instruction for at least six months, followed by supervised
release during which periodic tests for relapse are made. Final discharge becomes possible after three drug-free years on supervised
release. 8
Recent federal legislation takes a similar approach, providing
that one about to be tried for a narcotics offense may elect a three76

See

TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE AND CORRECTION

531 (1960).

77 68A Stat. 1003, 560 (1954) ; 26 U.S.C. §§ 4705, 4742 (1954) ; 70 Stat. 570 (1956);

21 U.S.C. §§ 174, 176a (1961).
78 In California part of the parole process may include membership in a Halfway

House project, the first of its kind to be established in the United States. See
Fisher, The Rehabilitative Effectiveness of a Community Correctional Residence for
Narcotic Users, 56 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 190 (1965).
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year civil commitment to a hospital, followed by two years of intensive parole involving "out-patient" work with a hospital or other
agency. 79 According to the sponsors of the legislation, the new
federal approach, modeled after New York's and California's systems,
will give the individual addict more real incentive to cooperate in his
own therapy program. s
Supportive of the aims of these innovations are the efforts of
private voluntary membership organizations like Synanon, which
began in California and now operates in one or two other states. In
an aggressive regimen of group therapy, the participants tear away
each other's defenses used to support addiction. 8"
3. Outcomes and Effects
A minimal requirement of systems which purport to "cure"
individuals of anti-social conduct is that they will not need to go
through the process again. The value of rectitude, then, is our
standard for evaluation. Recidivism rates among addicts (both
alcoholics and narcotics dependents) are among the highest of all
groups of offenders, 2 with the return to addiction occurring fairly
soon after institutional release. It is too early to test the effectiveness
of the newer modalities which stress intensive "after-care" as well as
treatment during confinement. s3 Moreover, as the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice observed,
There is great need for better standards for measuring the out-

come of treatment. To think only in terms of 'cure' is not very
meaningful in the case of a chronic illness such as addiction. There
is little knowledge about why a good outcome is achieved for one
addict but not another, by one method but not another.... Methods
of treatment for abusers of nonopiate drugs must be developed, and
there is a general need for research effort in the whole area84of personality disorder, of which drug abuse is usually a symptom.
79Some form of civil commitment statute exists in about twelve states, in addition to
the usual criminal processes. See Cantor, The Criminal Law and the Narcotics
Problem, 51 J. CRiAM. L., C. & P.S. 512 (1961); King, The Narcotics Bureau and
the Harrison Act: jailing the Healers and the Sick, 62 YALE L.J. 736 (1953).
80 See, e.g., Senator Robert Kennedy's statement in HearingsBefore Subcommittee No. 2
on Civil Commitment and Treatment of Narcotic Addicts of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., ser. 10, at 53 (1966) ; id. at 53 (statement by Congressman Emanual Ce!ler).
81 See generally YABLONSKY, THE TUNNEL BACK: SYNANON (1965). It has been
suggested that perhaps the group approach works too well for some addicts, who
may find more community in such a group than ever before at large and consequently
are loath to venture forth and build new lives outside the group.
82Estimates based on the few existing studies place the range for narcotics offenders
between 50 and 90 percent recidivism. See GLASER & O'LEARY, THE CONTROL AND
TREATMENT OF NARCOTIC USE 32-33 (Nat'l Parole Institutes 1966). Return rates
are not well established for the alcoholic. But impressionistic research indicates that
most individuals going to prison or serving any sentence for an alcoholics offense
are chronic offenders. THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 233 (1967).
83 The limited evaluative data which has been assembled is referred to in THE CHAL84

LENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 226-28.
THE CHALLENGE TO CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 228.
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In any event, for the foreseeable future the civil commitment avenue
is likely to be the most heavily traveled, and the leadership in the
few jurisdictions already using it should generate similar measures
elsewhere.
There is need for authoritative caution, however, lest the spirit of
experiment born of frustration with older strategies carry us into
empty formalities which deny citizens substantial liberty. 5
C. The Insanity System"6
1. Policies
The most controversial of the American criminal law sanctioning
systems is certainly that system by which persons formally accused
and tried for crime (usually a major offense though not conceptually
so limited) are relegated to a quasi-civil process at some stage in the
proceedings because it is decided that they are "not responsible."
Originally this determination was the end of the State's concern, but
gradually the public interest in controlling the individuals' subsequent
behavior asserted itself.
Although the details of the system vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, two basic models are discernable. In one there is an
automatic commitment to a public hospital.1 7 In the other a separate
hearing is held to determine whether the individual is "dangerous to
himself or others"; he is generally found to be in one or both categories. Commitment follows in either case.
The purpose of commitment, though not often stated explicitly
in the statutes establishing the procedure, is to effect a "cure" for the
insanity, mental illness or defect. Additional implicit goals are to
afford society some protection from the person's possible deprivations,
and to afford a measure of the deterrence which might have been
forthcoming if conviction had been achieved. The latter goal, of
85 Ibid.
Most of all, it is essential that the commitment laws be construed and
executed to serve the purpose for which they were intended and by which
alone they can be justified. This purpose is treatment in fact and not merely
confinement with the pretense of treatment.
86 This system could be considered a particularistic decisional outcome of the adult
(general) criminal system, as it customarily is; even more conventionally it is placed
in the context of the guilt-no-guilt dichotomy being based on inherited concepts of
mens rea and actus reus. See, e.g., CLARK & MARSHALL, THE LAW OF CRIMES 336
(Wingersky ed. 1958); HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 449 (2d

ed. 1960); PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 738 (1957). Special emphasis is justified
because of the incidence of its use and the special policies and sanctions it draws
into play.
87 E.g., District of Columbia.
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course, is not highly visible and seldom authoritatively enunciated. 88
Seldom have courts taken occasion to be explicit about the immediate
subgoal sought in a given case. Thus the recent decision in Rouse V.
Cameron89 is deserving of mention here, for there the court stated in
deciding to hear a habeas corpus petition of one confined in a hospital
following acquittal by reason of insanity: "The purpose of involuntary hospitalization is treatment, not punishment. The provision for
commitment rests upon the supposed 'necessity for treatment of the
mental condition which led to the acquittal by reason of insanity.' "'0
It was not clear until fairly recently that a viable assumption was
being made that something affirmatively helpful was to be done to
the individual confined under the decisions of this system. Indeed, if
an evaluation be made on the basis of average length of incarceration
and the burdens of proof and initiation imposed upon the inmate who
seeks release, it is fair to say that this system's major purpose has been
to detain out of society's sight the "drop-outs" of the general system,
those that could'not be conceptually fitted into it, yet about whom
society retained profound fears and doubts.9
2. Strategies
The commitment to a mental hospital is typically, if not uniformly, for an indefinite period - until "cured" or until the committed person is no longer dangerous to himself or society. Normally
the burden of initiating review procedures to test whether there has
been a cure is upon the inmate, although automatic periodic review is
provided in some jurisdictions.
What content is there in the program for bringing about a cure
or treatment of the mental illness which was the justification for
88 But see Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense" - Why Not?, 72 YALE
L.J. 853, 865 (1963), where it is argued:
[T]he insanity defense is not designed, as is the defense of self-defense, to
define an exception to criminal liability, but rather to define for sanction
an exception from among those who would be free of liability. It is as if
the insanity defenses were prompted by an affirmative answer to the silently
posed question: 'Does mens rea or any essential element of an offense exclude from liability a group of persons whom the community wishes to
restrain ?'
89 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
0

9 1d. at 452-53.

91 A like purpose probably underlies the commitment of substantial numbers of
persons for whom a criminal trial could have been the regular course but for the
decision - made by the state's attorney in the first instance and ratified by the
court- to commit the person prior to or during trial because of his "incompetency"
to participate in his own defense. See generally RUBIN, WEIHOFEN, EDWARDS, &
ROSENZWEIG, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTIONS 495-507 (1963). The author is

advised by members of the Commission on Mental Health in one state that to their
knowledge persons have languished for years (thirty years being the longest time
given) in state hospitals after being initially committed rather informally prior to
trial, even when the charge was a relatively minor one. Without safeguards requiring
the keepers periodically to justify the detention of anyone in their charge, the likely
abuse of this strategy is patent.
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removing the individual from the general criminal system and placing
him in this special one?
Although the diagnostic sub-categories of "not guilty by reason
of insanity" are as numerous as the varieties of human personality,
this has not meant that inmates are treated individualistically. It is
not uncommon to find that state mental hospitals group all such
inmates together, at least initially, confining them to a separate
pavilion or building of a multi-unit hospital which is also responsible
for the care and treatment of persons civilly committed under "lunacy" proceedings and voluntary patients for treatment of alcoholism
and the like.
Rouse v. Cameron9 2 provides a useful illustration of specific
program content in a hospital considered a model for innovation in
the treatment of the mentally ill. Rouse was said to be receiving
"environmental therapy." This apparently meant that he was subjected to the constructive influences of a structured social setting. His
daily life was regulated by the requirement that he keep his room
neat and tidy, participate in hall sessions of clean-up, and occasionally
meet with his psychiatric nurse. An opportunity was provided for
participation in group therapy sessions led by a non-professional.
The staff prognosis for Rouse was that he was anti-social and
lacking in insight; hence his continued confinement was justified.
Rouse challenged this appraisal of himself through a habeas corpus
petition, alleging that his condition was appreciably unchanged and
that, in effect, if this was all the institution had to offer, he should be
given his freedom, since there was no continuing justification for his
remaining. In agreeing to consider these assertions, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals undertook to appraise the content of the
treatment program for such an inmate. Therein lies the significance
of the case-an expressed judicial willingness to give critical appraisal
to the modes in which the system's sanctions actually were cast. 3
"The milieu of the hospital, if properly structured, is... a constructive force for getting well; if improperly constructed it is a force
F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See also Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C.
Cir. 1966).
93The court found the 1964 Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act controlling:
A person hospitalized in a public hospital for a mental illness shall, during
his hospitalization, be entitled to medical and psychiatric care and treatment. The administrator of each public hospital shall keep records detailing
all medical and psychiatric care and treatment received by a person hospitized for a mental illness and the records shall be made available, upon
that person's written authorization, to his attorney or personal physician.
D.C. CODE § 21-562 (Supp. V. 1966). The court did not seek to put the hospital
in the all but impossible position of having to guarantee "cure" in order to justify
continued restraint. "The hospital need not show that the treatment will cure or improve him but only that there is a bona fide effort to do so." 373 F.2d at 456. But,
on the other hand, "continuing failure to provide suitable and adequate treatment
cannot be justified by lack of staff or facilities." 373 F.2d at 457.
92373
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of remaining sick."" Even the best available milieu therapy is not
well suited for every patient (Rouse, for example), and for some it
may be harmful. The conditions or quality of the milieu will quite
obviously vary according to a number of variables, including the
over-all size of the inmate population, the resources given over to the
ward, the size of staff, and the time to experiment and conduct
research on optimum inputs and conditions for the milieu. In a few
hospitals, the patient will have access to shock therapy, intensive
group and individual psychotherapy, and vocational work therapy.
However, it seems that the typical "criminal ward" inmate is unlikely
to have such access. If he does, the play and work sessions will be
reduced in scope, quality and frequency, compared to programs for
the general hospital population.9 5 The implicit goal of protecting
society often leads to an emphasis on the secure restraint of patients
at the expense of strategies aimed at treatment.9 6
The other principal variable controlled by decision-makers in
this system, other than content of the treatment program, is time.
While the time factor may be manipulated by the extraordinary
habeas corpus procedure, as in Rouse v. Cameron, clearly the more
usual decision to release or to continue the retraint is taken by the
staff and administration of the mental hospitals, coupled with the
9 7
acquiescence of committing courts in the majority of jurisdictions.
Considering the potential for abuse or for mere unnecessary conDr. Dale Cameron, Superintendent of Saint Elizabeths Hospital, District of Columbia, in Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary on a Bill to Protect the Constitutional Rights of the
Mentally Ill, 88th Cong., 1st sess. 1466 (1963), cited in the majority opinion in
the Rouse case.
95See RUBIN, WEIHOFEN, EDWARDS & ROSENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 91, at 519.
See also the description of the program at Saint Elizabeth's in the District of
Columbia in the REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 543-45 (1966).
9 While many of the inmates of such wards have actually committed violent personal
deprivations, it is generally said that they are no more aggressive in hospital than
the general population of those institutions. RUBIN, WEIHOFEN, EDWARDS &
ROSENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 91, at 520-26 (1963). But this does not mean that
relaxed security concomitant with efforts at treatment will not produce some escapes
(or walkoffs) by those committed following acquittal by reason of insanity, as well
as by others of the inmate population. An example of an individual hospital's escape
9

record is set out in REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE

DISTICT OF COLUMBIA 555-58 (1966). Inadequate staffing is deemed primarily
responsible for high escape rates. See e.g., Goffman, On the Characteristicsof Total
institutions. cited in RUBIN, WEIHOFEN, EDWARDS & ROSENZWEIG, Op. Cit. Supra
note 91, at 522 n.104. In any event, "maximum security and other extraordinary
precautions need to be determined for each patient individually, and not on the
arbitrary basis that he has been accused of a crime" or because the individual is
thought to be a murderer, a rapist, etc. Cruvant & Waldrop, The Murderer in the
Mental Institution, 284 Annals 35, 42 (1952).
97For a summary of the various release provisions in American jurisdictions see Susee,
Procedure for the Commitment and Release of the Criminally Insane, 4 WILLIAMETTE
L.J. 64, 72-74 (1966). And see Note, 68 YALE L.J. 293 (1958). A very few jurisdictions insist upon either Gubernatorial approval or a special legislative bill, an
incomprehensibly involved procedure which may not be honored in practice. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 122-86 (1964).
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servatism in exercising this judgment, especially by professional staff,
it may come as a surprise that in at least one important mental hospital in this country the median time spent in restraint is not much
longer than for felons committed to prison. 8 The courts have begun
to make plain that decisions affecting several goals established for
the system will not be the province solely of the administrative and
professional staff. Both treatment goals pursued by hospital personnel and the judicial conservatism which holds to security as the prime
consideration will be placed in dynamic balance.99
3. Outcomes and Effects
The data available for an evaluation of the outcomes of the
Insanity System is not voluminous. Nevertheless, we will look briefly
at the system's effects in terms of the rectitude value. 100
Although the potential abuse, from the standpoint of the individual's liberty, balanced against society's interest in restraint used to
change behavior patterns and attitudes and improve related value
positions so that changed attitudes may succeed, is enormous, still it
bears emphasis here that this long standing fear today may be unjustified. In other words, it would appear that many, perhaps the great
majority, of all persons committed under the system do in fact serve
only a predictable period of time in active restraint and are actually
released for varying periods of supervision in the community, and
some are freed or discharged directly.' °1
98 Saint Elizabeths in Washington, D.C., reports that of all patients committed after
acquittal in felony cases the median time spent in the hospital was 22.7 months.
Homicides fell very near the median at 23.1 months. The median time for misdemeanants were 15.8 months. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME
IN THE DismcTr OF COLUMBIA, Tables 9 & 10, at 548-49 (1966). These data are
based on fiscal years 1954-65 records for felony patients and on fiscal years 1958-65
records for misdemeanor patients.
99 E.g., Hough v. United States, 271 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1959), in which Saint
Elizabeths had sought to bestow the status of conditional release on an inmate committed after acquittal on charges of a major felony, after some six months treatment.
The hospital made a considered decision that her release under supervision at that
time was warranted, to give her a chance to find a job and to build up her confidence.
The District Court refused to admit the inmate to such release or to allow her to
leave the hospital under guard, relying in part on an assumption that she was a
"prisoner" whose safe-keeping was one of the institution's major responsibilities.
The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a finding as to whether
the hospital had shown that the inmate had sufficiently recovered so as not to be,
in all reasonable likelihood, a danger to others. Thus the court construed applicable
statutes broadly enough to encompass the treatment policy pursued by the hospital
staff and yet gave voice also to the fair demands for public safety clearly written into
the statute.
10 The observations regarding outcomes and effects of the Insanity System are equally
applicable to the Mental Defective and Sex Deviant Systems to be discussed, infra,
§§ I, D and E.
101 Figures from state studies are reported in RUBIN, WEIHOFEN, EDWARDS & ROSENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 91, at 541 n.152. But the observer is forced to express his disquiet at not finding among these studies figures on what percentage
of inmates remained for lengthy periods, until senility or death. The studies deal
primarily with comparisons among those actually released; we are not told how
many remained in a category of ill-defined hopelessness.
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What expectations for post-sanctioning behavior are generated
by this and related systems? Is the probability that most will avoid
criminal conduct? Two qualifications appear to be in order. First,
for any person released from active restraint it is impossible to be
certain whether unlawful behavior takes place; we are dependent on
someone invoking the processes of the criminal law. Secondly, estimated rates of recidivism are quite crude because varying lengths of
time after release are involved in most surveys of hospital releases,
and further because they are not commonly related to type of psychiatric indication, but sometimes are related to category of offense
(which could have formed a basis for conviction). More fundamentally, such reports do not take account of marginal success stories:
for example, those individuals whose lives on a qualitative level are
more productive and meaningful, and who because of a situation
yet
endemic in the ex-patient's associations or economic status may
10 2
conduct.
criminal
level
low
of
kind
some
in
involved
become
Nevertheless, one principal measure of the effectiveness of a
behavior control system is thought to be the extent to which it inclines
people- particularly those directly involved in it - distinctly away
from deviant behavior. Although the data are far from being comprehensive, that which is available suggests that releases from mental
hospitals have about a fifty-fifty chance of "getting into some trouble"
within the first several years. That is, somewhere in the area of forty
to fifty percent will be arrested again, although something less than
this, perhaps around one third will actually be convicted of such
offenses. °3
As to variables primarily affecting the return to some criminal
conduct, the conclusion reached by Henry Weihofen seems borne out
by recent research:
Whether the ex-patient is later arrested for crime is directly related
to all the factors that influence the crime rate generally: age, marital
status, depth of drug and alcohol addiction, amount of community
support given him, influences of family and friends, availability of
professional help at crucial points in the period of adjustment .... 104
102 Of those persons in Saint Elizabeths in the category of acquitted by reason of insanity and released up to the end of 1965, only 6% were involved in charges more
serious than the original charge that brought them through the process initially. And
only 11% were equally serious. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME
IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 558, Table 13 (1966).
103 This should not obscure the possibility of a return to an institution without proof
of such crime, for they may simply violate the conditional release or be returned
through the "civil commitment" process much the same as before. The estimates in
the text are reflected in studies based on Saint Elizabeths releases in 1965-66. See
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 558-59
(1966).
104 WEIHOFEN, Disposition of the Mentally Ill., in RUBIN, WEIIOFEN, EDWARDS &
ROSENZWEIG, Op. cit. supra note 91, at 540. "The likelihood of later criminality also
is inversely related to the severity of the person's mental symptoms: the more
manifest the evidences of mental illness during hospitalization, the lower the rate of
arrest after release." Ibid.
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D. The Mental Defective System
1. Policies
Several states have in recent years sought to fill what are perceived to be wide gaps between the outer reaches of one system
and another. For example, a person with a severe personality disorder
may for various reasons (including narrowly drawn legal rules
defining insanity) not be acquitted by reason of insanity and thus not
be given over to the mental health keepers of the Insanity System.
Such a person may, however, suffer from such disorientation as to
present serious problems of custody in the general prison system.
One expedient in such a situation has long been to transfer the inmate
usually adminstratively - from the prison to the state hospital,
where he then typically goes into the bin with those processed through
the Insanity System.' 5 The drawback in this disposition, as perceived
by the mental health people, is that such an individual's stay has often
been artifically set at some definite number of years, which may not
be long enough to effectuate desirable treatment.
The legislative response to the problem has been the creation of
the label of "mental defective" or "defective delinquent" or something
similar.'
The assumption of such legislation is that there are certain
identifiable persons who, regardless of the punitive sanctions imposed
upon them, are beyond the reach of ordinary approaches to correction
or control of human behavior and consequently must be confined
10 7
indefinitely and treated.
A recent Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision indicated that
the court is persuaded that this is a tenable policy, relying in part upon
105 Contrast, however, the procedural obstacles judically imposed on the reverse kind of

transfer, namely, where the state hospital seeks to transfer one committed by reason
of insanity to the security of the prison. In re Maddox, 351 Mich. 358, 88 N.W.2d
470 (1958). More recently the Supreme Court has taken occasion to consider a New
York statute which permitted an administrative transfer directly from a state prison
to a state hospital maintained by the department of corrections of a person whose
penal term was at an end. In Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966), the Court
held this violated the petitioner's equal protection of the laws in that no court hearing was held to determine whether he was dangerously mentally ill, which judicial
determination was the prescribed course for those not coming from penal institutions.
106 There are "defective delinquent" statutes in at least six states: New York, California,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. TAPPAN, CRIME,
JUSTICE AND CORRECTIONS 419 (1960).
107 Consider for example, the Maryland provision:
For the purposes of this article, a defective delinquent shall be defined
as an individual who, by the demonstration of persistent aggravated antisocial or criminal behavior, evidences a propensity toward criminal activity,
and who is found to have either such intellectual deficiency or emotional
unbalance, or both, as to clearly demonstrate an actual danger to society so
as to require such confinement and treatment, when appropriate, as may
make it reasonably safe for society to terminate the confinement and
treatment.
Maryland Defective Delinquent Act. MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 5 (1967).
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a report from a committee of the American Psychiatric Association
on the Patuxent (Maryland) Institution:
'From the standpoint of social policy, the Defective Delinquent
Law is primarily concerned with the protection of society, secondarily
with the rehabilitation of antisocial persons by means now developed
by psychiatry, psychology and the social sciences.' 108
The particular significance of such developments is that preventive custody is thought to be justified because of potential threats to
social values. Ordinary criminal law processes are in effect not considered adequate (either from the point of view of content of sanctions
or from the point of view of time) to meet the perceived challenge.
Although not explicitly rested upon the evolution of a similar system
in the juvenile court rationale, this approach may be seen as an extrapolation of the same kind of thinking. Furthermore, the idea of
"criminal propensity," as opposed to demonstrated criminality, is
based upon a probability model imported from the social sciences and
not upon the more rigorous "certainty beyond a reasonable doubt"
traditional to the general criminal law system." °9 Accordingly, while
the courts have sustained the new development as being "progressive
and humanitarian," the conformity of the system with overriding
policies supportive of individual human dignity should be tested in its
actual application, lest "it become a mere device for warehousing the
obnoxious and anti-social elements of society." 0
2. Strategies
Except for two states (Pennsylvania and Maryland) the nine
states which have special policies for this category usually commit persons so categorized to a state mental hospital. There the treatment is not
fundamentally different from that employed in the insanity system."'
A description of the program at the Maryland treatment center". clearly indicates that something more substantial than custody
' 0 8Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506, 513 n.3 '(4th Cir. 1964). See also People v. Levy,
151 Cal. App. 2d 460, 311 P.2d 897 (1957).
109 It should be pointed out here, however, that the Maryland approach does require
a conviction first before the second disposition and labeling as a "defective delinquent" be made. Other states employ a more direct approach. See, e.g., MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. §§ 113-118A (1958). See generally Note, Hospitalization of Mentally
Ill Criminals in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, 110 PA. L. REV. 78 (1961). Note
should be taken, too, of the system's similarity to the older commitment for lunacy,
the goals of which cannot be radically different.
10Sas v. Maryland, 324 F.2d 506, 516 (4th Cir. 1964). See also Minnesota ex rel
Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940) ; Palmer v. State, 215 Md. 142, 137
A.2d 119 (1957) ; Eggleston v. State, 209 Md. 104, 121 A.2d 698 (1956).
111 See Tenney, Sex, Sanity and Stupidity in Massachusetts, 42 B.U.L. REv. 1 (1962).
It has been found, however, that peculiar custody problems are present where the
person is indeed suffering from some socio-pathic disorder. He may harass the more
seriously disturbed patients and cooperate less in attempts at re-socialization. He is
more aggressive and hence constitutes a greater security risk. See RUBIN, WEIHOFEN,
EDWARDS & ROSENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 91, at 529.
112 Boslow & Manne, Mental Health in Action: Treating Adult Offenders a; Patuxent
Institution, 12 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 22 (1966).
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is contemplated in these specialized institutions, although objective
examination is lacking with which to make an explicit comparison."'
The wording of the enabling legislation has left the institution free
to try almost anything it likes. The proof of the pudding in an
individual case is whether on the next bi-annual review (to which
the inmate is statutorily entitled) the court finds that he is no longer
a "defective delinquent." If he is still in need of treatment, he goes
back to the institution; if he is not, he goes free or to prison.
The statutory scheme however, does not envision any requirement
that the institution justify what it is doing from time to time. In
this sense the Fourth Circuit's decision in Sas v. Maryland..4 elaborates the appraisal aspect of the sanctioning process. There the
court remanded to the District Court for a hearing to determine
"whether Patuxent does in fact furnish treatment for treatable defective delinquents." "' In the words of the Court,
the creation of a non-medically determinable category of persons
who may be confined for indeterminate periods by a civil proceeding

is so serious a departure from traditional concepts of justice that it
deserves a critical analysis on the broadest of terms after a careful
factual development of its present operation.'

16

3. Outcomes and Effects
Because of the similarity in goals and strategies between the
Insanity System and the Mental Defective System, the observations
regarding the outcomes of the Insanity System are equally appropriate here." 7
E. The Sex Deviant System
1. Policies
In examining this system, which applies sanctions in situations
said to involve an abuse of the affection value,"' it is virtually impossible to generalize about contemporary policies in a broad range of
situations which are and traditionally have been partially subject to
Similar programs for mentally retarded or disturbed children are described in Kane,
An Institutional Program for the Seriously Disturbed Deliquent Boy, 30 Fed. Prob.
37 (Sept. 1966); Reed & Hinsey, A Demonstration Project for Defective Delinquents, 11 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 375 (1965).
114 334 F.2d 506 (1964).
115 id. at 509.
116 Id. at 517. See also the guarded approval by the United States Supreme Court of the
Minnesota sexual psychopath statute in Minnesota ex rel Pearson v. Probate Court of
Ramsey County, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
117 See notes 100-04 supra and accompanying text.
118 Not included herein are the so-called morals offenses of prostitution, soliciting,
assignation, and related offenses which are handled in the general criminal law
system. It is suspected by some investigators that most such known offenses rarely go
through to the sanction phase in its official dimensions anyway. These situations and
persons are subjected more routinely to harassment by police for non-sanctioning
purposes, such as discovering organized vice rings or sources of drug pushing. See,
e.g., SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 124-63 (1966).
113
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the general criminal law. Forcible rape and intercourse with a person
of minor years, for example, are usually treated as part of the adult
system (assuming the defendant himself is of sufficient age). So
also are ad hoc instances of homosexual acts between consenting
adults, incest, voyeurism and exhibitionism." 9 On the other hand, if
an individual is involved with a person below the age of consent or
if he has been convicted, charged, or even suspected (sometimes) of
prior indiscretions, then in many states he may be labelled either an
habitual sex offender, a sexually dangerous person, or a sexual
psychopath and given a kind of civil commitment to be "treated" for
12 0
his "condition."
Although the empirical assumptions which supported legislation authorizing special labelling and disposition have been rather
thoroughly discredited, 121 the stated purpose of such statutes was to
treat certain offenders as if they possessed special characteristics rendering them particularly susceptible to medical and psychiatric therapy,
and potentially to make them less dangerous to society. Were it not
for the authoritative enunciation of this policy in a rash of statutes,
it would hardly be meaningful to identify this as a separate system
for the reason that it has fallen into disuse if it ever was routinely
employed.'2
2. Strategies
Although the system as it was formulated in legislation has been
relatively unused as a separate sanctioning system, and although
those processed in it are involved in relatively minor crimes, such as
exhibitionism and homosexuality, still it is instructive to see how
2
declared policies have been implemented.' 3
The principal sanctioning strategy in most of the twenty-three
jurisdictions having such laws is simply commitment to a mental
hospital, and in a dozen jurisdictions, without a criminal trial first.
The commitment is typically for an indefinite period, regardless of
119 See generally BLOCH & GErS, The Sexual Offender, MAN, CRIME AND SOCIETY 282311 (1962).
120 See generally RUBIN, WEIHOFEN, EDWARDS & ROSENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 91,

at 408.
121 See, e.g., GEBHARD, GAGNON, et al., SEX OFFENDERS 845 (1967) ; HENRY, SOCIETY
AND THE SEX VARIANT (1955); Sutherland, The Diffusion of Sexual Psychopath
Laws, 56 AM. J. Soc. 142 (1950).

122 E.g., a 1950 report of the New Jersey Commission on the Habitual Sex Offender
indicates that as of that time, only California appeared to be invoking the statute at
all. Cited in RUBIN, WEIHOFEN, EDWARDS & ROSENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 91,
at 410-11.
123 It is likely, considering the under-development of this system, that the policies were
not seriously declared; or they may be perceived simply as immediate responses to
situations of high crisis level, where public opinion had been greatly outraged by a
series of "awful sex crimes." See Sutherland, The Diffusion of Sexual Psychopath
Laws, 56 Am. J. Soc. 142 (1950).
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the severity of the offense, or until "cured" or found not likely to be
a further danger to the community.
Only two states, Maryland and California, have special institutions for commitment of sexually deviant persons (and the Maryland
one doubles for the mental defective system as well) ;124 all the
others apparently use a mental hospital or in some instances a prison.
In the majority, using mental hospitals, no special divisions have been
established for the care and treatment of such inmates.12 5 "Their
treatment," concludes Tappan, "is almost purely custodial.... Hospital administrators generally indicate that they are unable to provide
effective therapy for sex psychopaths." ' 12 6 There are, however, significant efforts in a few places looking toward more intensive therapy
2
and actual release in many cases.' 1
More recent developments in a few states indicate that the system, as it is retained in viable form, is undergoing some sharpening.
Thus, New Jersey in revising its statutes in 1950, has provided that
commitment cannot exceed the maximum term for which the inmate
would be eligible under a prison sentence.128 The statute also provides for some persons to be treated under probation in the community, and deals primarily with major rather than minor offenses.' 2 9
California, Illinois, Florida, Utah and Virginia have had parallel
developments, including the legislative recommendation of the creation of specialized treatment centers. 13 0
3. Outcome and Effects
A study of California's Atascadero State Hospital (the institution
responsible for the sexual psychopathy program) correlated age,
California Atascadero State Hospital although it houses some civil committees
and some mentally ill criminal offenders seems to a large extent specialized to this
system. For a critical appraisal of the hospital suggesting that security is emphasized
at the expense of treatment, see Nasatir, Atascadero: Ramifications of a Maximum
Security Treatment Initiation, 2 ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY 29 (1966).
125 In 1959, Massachusetts set aside a separate building in its Bridgewater institution for
sexual psychopaths. See Tenney, Sex, Sanity and Stupidity in Massachusetts, 42 B.U.L.
REV. 1, 21 (1962). The population of this facility in 1961 was reported to be fortyfive, among whom were persons convicted of various crimes and committed there,
and a larger group transferred there from prison. Ibid. At least another twenty were
there for observation, about five of whom would probably be found to be sexual
psychopaths and given formal commitments. Id. at 23. Group therapy is the only
treatment form discussed as being used at the Massachusetts center. Id. at 21.
26
1 TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE AND CORRECTIONS 415 (1960).
127 The single largest category of personality disorder in one of these institutions was
simple neurosis. Lieberman & Siegel, A Program for 'Sexual Psychopaths' in a State
Mental Hospital, 113 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 801 (1957), describing California's program. See also, for follow up comment on administration of the Massachusetts program, Cohen & Kozol, Evaluation for Parole at a Sex Offender Treatment Center, 30
Fed. Prob. 50 (Sept. 1966).
128N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2A: 164-6 (1957). Wisconsin and Wyoming have the same provision. WIS.STAT. ANN. § 959.15(12) (1958) ;WYO.STAT. ANN.§ 7-356 (1957).
124The

129

TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE AND CORRECTIONS 417 (1960).

130 Ibid.
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geography, marital status, schooling and occupation, as well as characteristics of victims and length of hospitalization, with recidivism in
nearly two thousand cases. 18 1 This study showed that rates went up
to a high of 26.6% in the last five years studied; this for all releasees.
More significant are the variations shown among different categories
of offenders. Thus, as had been hypothesized, the pedophile had a
lower rate than the less aggressive offender, for example, the exhibiOf equal importance in terms of rational
tionist and the voyeur.'
appraisal of all sanctioning efforts to induce desirable community
behavior are the indications in such studies which correlate recidivism
(an index of rectitude) to other values including enlightenment,
skill, respect, etc.' 3
The general observations regarding the Insanity System outcomes
are also applicable here.13
F. The General CriminalSanctioning System
The general criminal sanctioning system, juxtaposed with all
those previously considered in the overall American mosaic of publicly directed systems for control of human behavior, is the oldest in
our traditions. It is the one that is employed, initially at least, for
almost all deviant behavior except that committed by children.' 35
And it is the furthest removed from the juvenile system in terms of
formality and stated goals.' 3 6 How this system differs substantially
from the juvenile and other systems in terms of sanctioning strategies,
outcomes and effects will now be considered.
1. Policies
The evolution of the purposes sought by Anglo-American criminal law is co-extensive with the history of the culture of the English
131 See Frisbie, Treated Sex Offenders Who Reverted to Sexually Deviant Behavior, 29

Fed. Prob. 52 (June 1965). It should be noted in passing that California, in 1963,
substantially revised significant segment of the system: specifically, changed the operative concept from "sexual psychopath" to "mentally-disordered sex offender;" established mandatory eligibility for probation and parole; and provided that credit on
subsequent prison sentences would be given for time spent in hospitalization. Id. at 53.
32
Id. at 55.
133 For example in the California Atascadero study the reporter remarks that "in each
category the lower the skill the higher the recidivism rate." Id. at 56.
134 See notes 100-04 supra and accompanying text.
135 We leave to one side the civil commitment process for the mentally ill, which is of
course, a related system designed to control human behavior, the goals of which may
not be radically different from some of the systems considered above. Only considerations of space remove it from our focus here.
136 Passing notice should be taken here of a sort of sub-system within the general criminal
law system, although for most of the early phases (invoking, applying general criminal
code) it is conterminous with the general system. This is the Youthful Offender concept. Statutes in most states allow first offenders under a certain age, usually around
twenty-five, to be sent to institutions which are separate from the prisons used for
"'hardened criminals," in which the vocational and educational efforts are often more
impressive than in the other penal institutions of a particular state. This specialized
institution is sometimes called a reformatory. See generally RUBIN, WEIHOFEN, EDWARDS & ROSENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 91, at 142.
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speaking peoples. Hence, it is not possible to look solely to the
verbalisms contained in the statutes affecting various segments or
functions of the system, as it was to do with the latter-day contrivances represented in the several systems just described. It is rare
indeed to find in the codes of American states the expressed hopes
and expectations of and about the system.' 3 7 The courts have done
little more than reflect the fashion of the day in terms of the attitudes
of commentators, law enforcement officials, and to some extent the
perspectives of the professional correction administrator. These reflections are conditioned to some degree by outcries of periodic public
concern expressed in the polemics of subjective, albeit vigorous,
journalism. Nevertheless, it is this judicial reflection which, however
diffuse and imprecise, has been the only perceivable constant thread
of policy and should therefore be sampled here.
It is not often that an appellate court will take occasion to say
anything about the goals which the system is designed to support.
When the courts do write of these matters, it is usually not at length
but in cryptic and abstract terms. The abstractions commonly employed relate to "protect[ing] the public"' 13 8 or deterring others' 9
or "reformation and rehabilitation of offenders." 1 0 It is rarely made
clear, however, whether the broad goal of "protection of the public"
is meant to subsume other goals such as reformation. Frequently,
several such abstractions will appear in tandem with no expression
as to any desirable hierarchy. Thus, one Ohio court has said that
"the object of a criminal penalty is to punish the accused, deter
others from crime, and to protect the public."' 4
Not all attempts at basic policy clarification are at such high
levels of abstraction. One federal court has thoughtfully included
some admittedly irrational goals, recognizing that the system is closely
related to human emotional taints:
At least one purpose of the penal law is to express a formal
social condemnation of forbidden conduct, and buttress that concondemnation by sanctions calculated to prevent that which is forbidden. The ultimate goal is deterrence. In attempting to achieve
this end we employ 42means which secondarily satisfy the retributive

feelings of society.'
137

A few state constitutions have provisions which express a preference for reformation
and prevention. E.g., MONT. CONST. art. III, § 24; N.C. CONST. art. XI, § 2; ORE.

CONST. art. 1, § 15. Some others, perhaps reflecting the fashion of Victorian draftsmen, state that punishments shall be proportionate to the crime. E.g., R.I. CONST.
art. I, § 8; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 5.
138 See Weber v. Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 56, 196 S.W.2d 465, 471 (1946).
139See, e.g., France v. State, 95 Okla. Crim. 244, 244 P.2d 341 (1952).
140 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949).
141 State v. Meyer, 163 Ohio St. 279, 126 N.E.2d 585, 589 (1955).
1 Sauer v. United States, 241 F.2d 640, 648 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 940
(1957). Of course, there may be less commendable judicial candor here than meets
the eye. It may be retributive feeling of the judge making such a statement that is
most prominently involved.
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Still, it is probably fair to say that most statements of this kind
fall into neither extreme; that is, of favoring individualized rehabilitation as the major sub-goal of public protection on the one hand,
or hard-headed, no nonsense, old-fashioned retribution on the other.
Indeed, courts are more likely to approach the former end of the
spectrum than the latter. The nearest that the courts are likely to
come in expressing themselves in favor of pure "punishment" (whatever it is supposed to mean) is something like the following: "The
sentence for any crime must be punitive and exemplary. It should be
adequate as a penalty to the person who commits the crime....
More frequently, it is possible to find statements tending in the
opposite direction, suggesting that sanctions should prevent future
crime "by the defendant through education, reformation or detention,
and ... the deterrence of others ... from committing such crime ...

of the two the latter probably is the more important." 144
It is relatively clear that we have a multi-goal system. However,
it is one in which there is not complete agreement on priorities among
the goals. Neither have particular sub-goals been very frequently
clarified. One observer suggests that the criminal law "seeks to
punish, restrain, and rehabilitate ... as well as to deter .... ,,145 According to some scholarly observers, no matter how much our stated
aims may appear garbed in the dress of other ages, still we in the
modern age are tending rather markedly in the direction of a "rehabilitative ideal" (and away, presumably, from a deterrence model).146
However this might be, "renunciation of punishment as an instrument of legal policy actually involves a change in means rather than
ends... "14
43

Larkey v. State, 95 Okla. Crim. 338, 245 P.2d 751, 755 (1952).
Territory v. Dojiro Oshiro, 39 Hawaii 303, 306 (1952).
145 Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process.-Low Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 544 (1960). This author's
attempt to clarify the several major goals in respect of some particular decision outcomes is in Penegar, Criminal Law Sanctions in Two Civil Rights Cases- A Brief
Comparison, 43 N.C.L. REv. 667 (1965).
146
The rehabilitative ideal is itself a complex of ideas which, perhaps, defies an
exact definition. The essential points, however, can be identified. It is
assumed, first, that human behavior is the product of antecedent causes.
These causes can be identified as part of the physical universe, and it is
the obligation of the scientist to discover and to describe them with all possible exactitude. Knowledge of the antecedents of human behavior makes
possible an approach to the scientific control of human behavior. Finally,
and of primary significance for the purposes at hand, it is assumed that
measures employed to treat the convicted offender should serve a therapeutic
function; that such measures should be designed to effect changes in the
behavior of the convicted person in the interests of his own happiness,
health, and satisfactions and in the interest of social defense.
ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 26 (1964).
147 Dession, Social Sanctions, 1 VA. L. WEEKLY DICTA COMP. 22, 25 (1949). The
thought following the quoted passage was: "We should simply renounce the erroneous view that inflicted expiation or punishment is well adapted either to the deterrence and reform of past offenders or to fostering respect for the law and its agencies
among the rest of us." Ibid.
1

144
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Of course, punishment has not been renounced, but we are not
very proud of it. Where thoughtful observers of and participants in
the system meet together, such as in the American Law Institute or
in a state's penal code reform commission, the resultant expressions
of general purpose are apt to be a refinement of both the deterrence
goal and the "rehabilitative ideal," 148 with expressions of concern
for the "law's authority" being the stylized vestige of the "punitive
ideal."
It is somewhat surprising that little scholarly interest in recent
years has been shown in what exactly our institutions of the criminal
law have intended, meant, or assumed by "punishment." This is most
surprising in an age conditioned by Freud to ask questions about self
and perspectives of reality. What is intended to punish (kill, hurt,
embarrass, inconvenience) may not be perceived as punishment by
the recipient.'4 9
Of course there are older philosophical antecedents which gave
some shape to the concept of just punishment. Hegel and Kant's
metaphysics, for example, postulate a great cosmic ledger of rights
and wrongs which in part can only be balanced by the entries of
human error on the one hand, and just punishment on the other.
More recently, the combination of natural law ideas and a kind of a
functional morality supported by law and its institutions has produced
new defenses.' 50
Today the feeling is certainly widespread, despite the lack of
data suggesting its validity, and indeed often in the face of some
evidence to the contrary, that long prison terms (if that can be
accepted as a common denominator for modern punishment) in and
of themselves deter others from committing crimes (this point to be
carefully distinguished from the ego support such sanctions give to
conformists). Nevertheless, as a team of thoughtful observers has
recently noted:
Even if it could be shown that punishment is both right and
expedient, we have neither the means nor the nerve to institute its
use on a scale anywhere commensurate with the problem it is meant
to address. Of course, we continue to punish offenders, and when
we do, we do it with the solemnity that ordinarily attaches to traditions. There is, however, hardly any doubt that this is done, by and

large, with misgivings and the punitive approach is abandoned
readily at the slightest hint of an alternative, while at the same time
the first article of the newly enacted New York Penal Law, among other general
statements of purpose, appears this provision: "To insure the public safety by pre-

14 In

venting the commission of offenses through the deterrent influence of the sentences
authorized, the rehabilitation of those convicted, and their confinement when required

in the interests of public protection." N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1.05-5 (becomes effective on

September 1, 1967).
TmE STRANGER (Gilbert transl. 1946).
15o See, e.g., DEVLrN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1951) ; Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONisT 397 (1965).
149 Cf. CAMUS,
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the suggestion that we punish harshly, say by mutilation, would
certainly be repudiated even against perfect evidence of its deterrent
effect.

151

"Punishment" then, may be definable only in terms of sanctioning alternatives or in functional terms, and not in discrete abstractions.' 5 2
Whatever tentativeness is apparent in today's expressions of
major policy in the general system of the criminal law, two lines of
research prospects have been thought most attractive: (1) the effectiveness of rehabilitation;... and (2) the effectiveness of deterrence
or general prevention.'
Accordingly, it seems appropriate to defer
any further comment upon goals until some description has been
given of the particular sanctions themselves which are thought to be
the more detailed expression of major goals or policies. 5 '
2.

Strategies

In a comprehensive sense it is possible to identify a host of particular sanctioning strategies which touch nearly every human value
commonly used in the general adult criminal system. Basic political
power, for example, may be attenuated in individual cases as by the
denial of the right to vote or to hold public office.' 56 Wealth may
151Bittner & Blatt, The Afeaning of Punishment, 2 ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY 79, 96

(1966).
52

1 See generally Mead, The Psychology of Punitive Justice, 23 AM. J. Soc. 577 (1918).
153 By far the most ambitious research project that has come to my attention is reported
in GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM (1964).
154 See, e.g., Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L.
REv. 949 (1966).
15 Another source should be briefly alluded to for expressions of major goals, viz., the
statutes speaking to the administrators, which to some extent are the expressions of
the administrators themselves. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (1951), which provides, in
part, as follows:
The Attorney General may establish and conduct industries, farms, and other
activities and classify the inmates; and provide for their proper government,
discipline, treatment, care, rehabilitation, and reformation.
A provision in the California Penal Code is parallel:
The supervision, management and control of the State prisons, and the responsibility for the care, custody, treatment, training, discipline and employment of persons confined therein are vested in the director.
CAL. PEN. CODE § 5054. Another provision from federal statutes is even more
particularistic:
The Federal penal and correctional institutions shall be so planned and limited in size as to facilitate the development of an integrated system which
will assure the proper classification and segregation of Federal prisoners
according to the nature of the offenses committed, the character and mental
condition of the prisoners, and such other factors as should be considered in
providing an individualized system of discipline, care, and treatment of the
persons committed to such institutions.
18 U.S.C. § 4081 (1951) (emphasis added).
156
The loss of the right to vote is a statutory penalty for conviction of felony in
three-fourths of the states. It is doubtful that any state permits a prisoner to
vote. . . . In half a dozen states conviction is a statutory disqualification for
jury duty.
RUBIN, WEIHOFEN, EDWARDS & ROSENZWEIG, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION
614 (1963).
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be directly affected by the levy of fines and indirectly affected by
denial of access to paying employment during confinement.' 57 Respect
may be taken away in part by the conviction alone. Affection also is
involved implicitly if not explicitly by the separation of the prisoner
from wife and family. Finally, it is still possible in most versions of
the system (state and federal) to take the offender's life, although
the use of the death penalty may be declining.
Indeed it seems meaningful to say that there are two basic
sanctioning modalities, (1) those reserved for certain kinds of
offenders and offenses where deprivations are relatively mild, and
(2) those reserved for certain other offenders and offenses which
are relatively more severe or coercive. The first is represented by
probation, the other by the prison-parole process.
From the perspective of the courts it would seem that the primary
sanctioning device for supporting a policy of pure retribution is confinement. Its linear dimension across time is its functional, dynamic
expression.
Length of prison commitment can be seen as a principal sanctioning strategy primarly, but not solely, used in support of nonrehabilitative goals.'"" The duration dimension of the prison process
is manipulated not only by the sentence to prison per se, but also by
the opportunity for parole, a sanctioning outcome which is contemplated as possible in most individual cases. However, competence to
decide this outcome rests in other decision-makers, looking at other
criteria than the offense itself and the background of the offender
at the outset of the sanctioning process. Perhaps in no other phase of
decision-making in the adult general system is discretion so vast as in
the parole board or commission. Most state statutes do not list guidelines and courts will not review their decisions. The polar star,
however, seems to be a prediction as to the success of parole; that no
criminal offenses or violations of parole conditions will occur. "Even
with predictive devices and elaborate parole success studies, determination of the probability of recidivism is virtually a matter of
intuition based on experience but unaided by rules or even firm
guidelines." 5 9
157 The work-release plan represents a modification in the direction of ameliorating this

older trend. Often it is justified on grounds of economic benefit to the state and to
society by virtue of reduced expenses of maintenance of the prisoner or in welfare
payments to the prisoner's family.
158 Most observers and participants in the sanctioning process insist that some minimum
of confinement is necessary to effectuate other policies through the less coercive strategies or modes. This is reflected in the nearly universal trend of enactment and use
of the indeterminate sentence.
159 Dawson, The Decision to Grant or Deny Parole: A Study of Parole Criteria in Law
and Practice, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 243, 299.
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Presumptively the rational decision to release on parole is related
to three major factors (other than the eligibility date typically set
by statute): (1) the social, psychological background of the inmate;
(2) his prison performance; and (3) some assessment of such variables as the category of the offense and its surrounding circumstances.
However, the background file may be woefully incomplete. The
prison record may only indicate the superficial "high-points," like
presence or absence of infractions and courses of study completed.
Finally, the category of offense may be at cross purposes with probabilities (based on past statistical data). Thus, a murderer who
statistically has a high success probability has to face the board's
reluctance to "risk" this "kind of offender" in the community. The
largest single deficiency in the parole decision process seems to be
one of lack of contemporary communication with a variety of participants in the process of social interaction with the individual inmate.
Some of those individuals whose cases go through the adult
criminal system and are sanctioned are put into the prison-parole
process. 16 At any time the total number of persons in the United
States confined in prison, including federal and state institutions, is
approximately 250,000.161 These estimates do not include persons
confined in local jails, nor do they include juvenile centers. "No
figures are available on the numbers of persons on probation and
parole in the entire country, but one index is the fact that [as of
1966] there are more than 40,000 federal offenders under community
supervision. "162
While there may be a trend in the direction of increased use of
probation as a sanctioning device, the prison population increase is
quite pronounced, paralleling population growth. It also coincides
with the use of longer prison terms. The median time served in
state and federal prisons has increased from 17.3 months in 1936,
to 18.5 in 1940, to 21.9 in 1942, to 24.6 in 1944, to about 26 months
in 1960.113 This marked trend probably represents an impressionistic
160 See generally Alexander, Current Concepts in Correction, 30 Fed. Prob. 3, 7 (Sept.
1966).
Id. at 6. In 1958, Tappan estimated the total at about 200,000. See TAPPAN, CIIME,
JUSTICE AND CORRECTION 620 (1960).
162 Alexander, supra note 160, at 6. A survey conducted for the President's National
Crime Commission indicates that in 1965 about 1-1/3 million persons were under
correctional authority on an average day. The break-down was as follows: jails342,688; juvenile authority- 348,204; prisons- 591,494. THE CHALLENGE OF
161

CRIME IN

183

See

A FREE SOCIETY

TAPPAN,

CRIME,

160 (1967).

JUSTICE AND CORRECTION

447-48 (1960); U.S.

BUREAU OF

PRISONS, NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS, PRISONERS RELEASED FROM STATE AND
FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS 1960, reported in GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON
AND PAROLE SYSTEM 523 (1964)
(1960 statstics found herein). See also Bennett,

The Sentence and Treatment of Offenders, Annals 142-45 (1962).
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frustration of sentencing judges and parole boards rather than a
64
changed statutory sentencing structure.
On the other hand, there is a small trend discernable in the
direction of ameliorating the confinement strategy in three other ways.
We refer here to statutory authorization of "work-release" programs
for felons, "furloughs" or prison leaves for visitation to families or
in anticipation of release, for the purpose of securing employment,
and the creation of decentralized confinement centers called "halfway houses." Until 1965 only Wisconsin, North Carolina, Michigan,
and Maryland had programs whereby inmates of prisons were allowed
to pursue regular employment outside the prison during the day,
returning to the prison for nights and weekends.16 5
The federal government added impetus to the trend in 1965
when the Prisoner Rehabilitation Act was passed.1 66 This statute
provides for "work-release" as well as for the establishment of unescorted furloughs and for the building of half-way houses, several
16 7
of which have begun operation.
Since relatively few individuals have thus far participated in
these innovative institutions, it is not accurate to characterize them
as principal strategic devices for achieving specific rehabilitatve goals.
However, it is clear that even in this experimental state of their
development they are being looked upon precisely in this light.' 68
For the great bulk of the prison population the more significant
institutions and practices are those that are confined to the limits of
the prison.
The longer history of our prisons in this country discloses that
if a prison had a farm or an industry of some sort - even if it was
only soap making or stamping license plates - it was considered
advanced. If it had some form of elementary school program and a
Tappan characterized this attitude in terms of "the growing public and official concern with crime and, consequently, the increasingly conservative action of parole
boards." TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE AND CORRECTION 448 (1960).
165 None of these include the inmates of local jails except in North Carolina where
arrangements are made with local jails to house the work-releasees.
166 18 U.S.C. § 4082 (1965).
167 N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1967, p. 12, col. 4 (city ed.), announcing the planned opening
of the first two adult half-way houses in the federal system, one each for Atlanta and
Houston.
168 This perspective is shared both by correction administrators and by the legislators
who have initially made them possible. Consider, for example, what the current Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons has recently written:
Together with furloughs, work release is the best method yet devised for
bridging the traditionally wide gap between the correctional institution and
the communities from which offenders come and to which they will return.
These three recent developments - attempts at better sentencing; use of
half-way houses; and the implementation of work release and furloughs are the essence of current corrections. These concepts really are not so new,
but their emphasis is.
Alexander, supra note 160, at 6.
164
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modest library, it was even more progressive. These programs still
characterize much of the activity typically engaged in by large numbers of prisoners for perhaps the greater part of each day. What else
is going on in these walled communities, these "societies of captives,"
to borrow Gresham Sykes' compelling appellation? 6 9 Is it worthy of
the name rehabilitation, treatment, or corrections?
The difficulties in quantifying the participation in any of these
programs should be acknowledged, but the prevalence or incidence of
their employment as part of the national picture should at least suggest some contours of dimension and scope.
The principal sub-strategies employed in the confinement phase
of the prison-parole process seem to be the classification technique,
vocational counseling, group therapy (for of course smaller numbers
within the whole), and work or schooling, plus some form of
recreation. Classification is intended to be the key to the individualization which later follows by finding out as much about the individual inmate as possible. His educational achievement, work record
and skills experience, family pattern, religious orientation and insights into the basic personality structure and characteristics must be
garnered from incomplete sources by the testing of a hostile, or at
best rather indifferent subject, by a staff which in a professional sense
is far from adequate."70
The current trend appears to be away from reliance upon classification at a particular prison, where the diagnostic team may or may
not be complete, and toward the creation of "reception centers" where
all intake into the system is initially channeled for a period of
"quarantine" until the testing and data gathering is rather complete.
This is by no means a universal achievement in the various states;
and the trend is most noticeable in the sub-system dealing with the
youthful offender, roughly below age twenty-five.'
The significance of such a trend should be noted in several
respects. If at the same time specialized units or programs are made
169 SYKES, SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES (1958).

170

The ordinary prison lacks the personnel, space, and resources for conducting
the sort of intensive studies that are commonly deemed to be desirable for
planning the individual's treatment program. The diagnostic-reception center
has developed in response to the need felt in some states for more adequate
and appropriate information upon which to predicate treatment.
TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE AND CORRECTION 626 (1960).

171 Tappan reports that in the 1940's only New York and California had such centers,
the one in New York being for youths between sixteen and twenty-one, the one in
California being for adults. Now, in addition to California and New York, at least
ten other states have established the reception-diagnostic centers. Several are specialized for young adults or juveniles, some only for adults, and some without age limits.
The states are Illinois, Massachusetts, Kentucky, Washington, Alabama, Rhode Island,
Minnesota, New Jersey, Michigan and Pennsylvania. Furthermore, in recent years the
Federal Bureau of Prisons has set up diagnostic resources in the youthful offender
sub-system. See TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE AND CORRECTION 626 (1960).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL.

44

available, depending on factors peculiar to each case, then it represents a distinctly rational effort to make best use of these. On the
other hand, the trend in favor of establishing the diagnostic center
may be an end in itself, to be used for understanding what kind of
population is being received regardless of what programs are actually
17
implemented. 1
Finally, to the extent that authoritative participants outside the
prison programs themselves are involved, the trend may represent
increased opportunity for authoritative supervision of the prisonparole process. In Hawaii and Michigan, for example, the diagnostic
device is consciously regarded as a necessary step in the court-imposed
7
sentence.1 3
By and large, at the current state of evolution, the classification
device is still considered, not as a discrete and autonomous phase
or arena, but part and parcel of the correctional institutions themselves. Hence, what kind of program the inmate receives is still
largely a function of what the institution has to offer and a function
174
of what will "take" in the individual case.
After the classification phase, the inmate, assuming he is neither
a medical case nor an extreme custody risk, will be afforded opportunities to work (indeed he is expected to do some kind of work), to
play, and perhaps to learn a bit. Ideally, the work experience in
prison should be related both to future plans or prospects for employment as well as to past experience and level of skills. But, as in
nearly every other phase of the prison experience, what the individual
inmate does is a complex function of what facilities are available and
what level of education the individual possesses, together with his
attitudes and motivations. Today prison industries are limited in
the main to production of items like traffic signs, printing of forms,
etc., for use by governmental agencies, although formerly prisons
produced a much wider range of items for public marketing. Prison
172

See, e.g., Hannum & Warman, The MMPI Characteristicsof Incarcerated Females,
1 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQUENCY 119 (July 1964).

173

See

PAULSEN & KADISH, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 185 (1962).

Under the Hawaiian system, the sentencing court is required to sentence...
for the statutory maximum .... Within three months the parole board is
required to conduct an intensive presentence investigation and in-confinement study of the prisoner's character and background and to fix the
minimum term of imprisonment to be served before he shall become eligible
for parole. Such minimum must then be submitted to the sentencing
court ....
174 The subtle power of the interaction between the inmate and his culture, including not
only the perspectives of his keepers but also his peers, to influence certain decisions
to involve oneself in the prison team, newspaper, or "shrinker sessions" has been
noted by more than one scholarly observer. CLEMMER, THE PRISON COMMUNITY
(1958); SYKES, SoCIETY OF CAPTIVES (1958). But Glaser's recent research suggests

that inmate-to-inmate pressure negating cooperation with staff is not immutable.
Rather, it tends to vary according to how authoritarian in attitude and practice the
the staff is vis-a-vis the inmates. GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND
PAROLE SYSTEM 119-28 (1964).
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operated farms have become commonplace today but mainly for those
prisoners with low-risk designations. The pressures of organized
labor and business have combined to challenge the prisons to undertake meaningful work for the inmates, which means in many instances
vocational training such as auto mechanics, appliance repair, carpentry and masonry - activities without production goals.' 5
To a large extent prison labor is still characterized by the
patronizing traditions of its origins (work gangs being contracted to
state highway and forestry departments and the like), although without many of the older evils of the "leased labor" system. 1 76 Even so,
there is not enough meaningful work available in prisons, even
though those in decentralized rural settings may get quite enough of
the physical sort, and idleness or over-assignment to projects is not
uncommon throughout the system.1 77 Where there is some work

available wages are quite low by free market standards, varying between five and fifty cents per day, the federal system being at the
upper ranges.' 7 8
From the point of view of the correction specialist, the most
significant recent trend is represented by the work-release scheme,
whereby the inmate is released daily to pursue his normal employment or a substitute therefor in the community where the prisoner
finds himself.' 79 The particular advantages of this are seen to be
(1) the fact that the offender continues a meaningful tie with the
community; (2) that he actually performs a socially useful task; and
175 The

federal prisons' industrial program is perhaps the best developed. Some seventeen different lines of products and services valued in 1958 at over thirty million
dollars having been established. U.S. BUREAU OF PRISONS, FEDERAL PRISONS: 1958,
A REPORT OF THE WORK OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 1959.

176 For a comprehensive view, see TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE AND CORRECTION 681-90

(1960).
Glaser's research shows that even in the best of prisons the median working day is
apt to be less than eight full hours actually spent at the assignment and the time
actually spent working is frequently six hours and in some cases as low as three
hours, particularly at the beginning of the sentence. GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM 229 (1964). The typical prison job is not an industrial one, since
less than a fourth of inmates in federal or state prisons are employed in
prison industries. This is partly because the maintenance and sanitation of
the prisons and the care and feeding of inmates requires the employment
of a considerable number of prisoners in kitchens . . . laundries . . . and
supply storage and distribution ....
Id. at 226.
17 8
TAPPAN, CRME, JUSTICE AND CORRECTION 690 (1960). In a few states, about 12,
the practice is to bestow "industrial good time," or credit toward service of sentence
in lieu of wages. An international congress of correction administrators has recommended the eventual parity payment of inmates for their work, "provided output is
the same both in quantity and quality." SECOND U.N. CONGRESS ON THE PREVENTION OF CRIME AND THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS, London, August 1960, at 41
(A/Conf. 17/20).
179 See generally Carpenter, The Federal Work Release Program, 45 NEB. L. REV. 690
(1966).
177
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(3) that he is paid for it at a competitive rate, resulting not only 180
in
greater self-esteem but continued non-public support of his family.
Education, at least through the elementary grades combined with
opportunities for correspondence courses and special courses offered
by visiting teachers, is a typical feature of the contemporary prison
scene, although as might be expected the quality of instruction and
materials, to say nothing of inmate motivation, is spotty. 8 ' Recreation, particularly team sports, while they are highly lauded by outside
enthusiasts as particularly useful in "character building," seem to
play a relatively minor part in most prison programs, unless one
includes the relatively passive activities of TV viewing, reading
magazines, gambling, and making marketable craft items like handstitched wallets.
Although they are not yet prevalent strategies in this general
criminal system in the United States, there is enough actual employment and professional comment (accompanied by some research) to
make mention of several related topics. These concern the deliberate
manipulation of factors most vitally related to the inmates' opportunities for self-expression and the gaining of insight into his own distorted
life style or personality structure. These attempts are most clearly
related to respect, rectitude and psychological well-being, while the
strategies or program content discussed above most clearly relate to
other values such as skill, enlightenment, and wealth. I am referring
to group psychotherapy, the social milieu, and experiments in limited
self-government.
It is apparently not known with any degree of accuracy how
many adult penal institutions, federal and state, actually employ proInstead of having
fessionally guided psychotherapy programs.'
specialized units for such an approach, the typical experience is for
the prison to have available, in most instances on a part time basis,
a psychiatrist, clinical psychologist or a social worker to meet regularly with volunteers from the general inmate population. The group
may not be very homogeneous (for the obvious reason that a wholesale collection of personality or emotional distortions will be represented), but sometimes it is reported that the group will have some
success in revealing aggressions, defenses, and anxieties of many of the
participants not always explicitly related to the particular offense
180 Such an offender is typically also expected to defray at least part of his own expenses
in living as a "guest of the state."
181 For a sampling of the trends in this category of prison program see MACCORMICK,
THE EDUCATION OF ADULT PRISONERS: A SURVEY AND A PROGRAM (1931).
18 A New Jersey experiment dealt with juvenile offenders. It is described in McCORKLE,
ELIAS & BIXBY, THE HIGHFIELDS STORY: AN EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENT PROJECT
FOR YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS (1958).
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or style of life which is more or less directly responsible for their
commitment to the institution.
In any event, relatively few penal institutions employ psychologists, psychiatrists, or trained social workers in any kind of group
treatment programs- therapy or "counseling."' 18 8 Group-centered
activity in prison does not always take the explicitly therapeutic cast,
but may extend to less ambitious tasks than full self-awareness and
understanding. Group counseling, for example, may aim at simple
release of tensions or the providing of shared experiences of a positive
sort with secondary gains of identification with others, and this
appears to be more widely used than any other variant.'1 4 Indeed, it
has been suggested that group psychotherapy contributes "little to
attainment of change goals and... actually 'may increase' negative
client attitudes toward these goals and the staff."""
On the other hand while the less individual-therapist oriented
approaches, represented by the social milieu, group counseling, and
guided group interaction concepts, may superficially have more easily
obtainable short-run tasks (especially as they are thought to depend
less on the high level of training necessary for the deep-probing
psychotherapy), they depend to a larger degree on concern with every
facet of the group and individual's social relationships, a scope not
yet considered feasible in most adult prisons."8 6 One inhibiting factor
from outside the system is the imprecision in workable models for
87
group interaction, therapy, or counseling.'
Nevertheless, it does seem to be agreed that efforts to achieve
even modest levels of participation in inter-personal, intra-group
There has been little systematic reporting, but see McCorkle & Elias, Group Therapy
in Correctional Institutions, 24 Fed. Prob. 57 (June 1960), for a survey of the trends
in the decade 1950-59. One reporter estimates that only nine states had full time
psychiatrists for prisons in 1954; and the general ratio over-all between psychiatrists
and inmates was something on the order of 1 to 1600, including part time personnel.
The time of most of these is spent largely in classification work and in preparing prediction reports for parole board use. TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE AND CORRECTION 706
(1960) (relying on a Massachusetts study).
184 Sarri & Vinter, Group Treatment Strategies in juvenile Correctional Programs, 11
CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 326, 330 (1965).
185 Id. at 333. The reasons for this, these investigators suggest are several.
First, therapists interacted with client members of their groups almost exclusively in the therapy section, where relations were structured and formalized. Second, the content of group sessions was unrelated to daily life or to
the problems of clients as they perceived them. Third, the group served only
a context for therapist-client exchanges, there was no attempt to mobilize its
forces to achieve client change. Fourth, the group experiences did not facilitate meaningful interpersonal relationships relevant to other aspects of
institutional life.
See also Hadden, Group Therapy in Prisons, 1948 PROC. AM. PRISON ASS'N 178.
186 See Empey & Rabow, The Provo Experiment in Delinquency Rehabilitation, 26 AM.
Soc. REv. 679 (1961) ; Konopka, The Social Group Work Method: Its Use in the
CorrectionalField, 20 Fed. Prob. 25 (March 1956).
187 Cressey, Contradictory Theories in Correctional Group Therapy Programs, 18 Fed.
Prob. 20 (June 1954).
183
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identification with goal-directed activity containing behavior models
(e.g., former inmates who have "graduated" to the larger community
or other persuasive staff types) are distinctly worthwhile, though too
much should not be expected of them, certainly not in the short run
when so many other variables in the prison-parole equation are not
drastically altered.'
Some of these other factors are now receiving appropriate research attention, for example to discover what
kind of institutional setting, training and class of staff, related to
categories of offenders determine estimates of goals and goal achievement. 8 9 Furthermore, it seems that it is now being recognized that
strategies of correction and treatment involve not only dynamic interaction to achieve stated goals, but also, at a more elemental level, that
research itself into the innovative strategies which may be appropriately adopted is or must be a function of staff and inmate participation.' 90
3. Outcomes and Effects
Whatever the general adult criminal law system professes to be,
it is clearly a social funnel through which human beings are constantly passed, from and to the society at large. It may interrupt life
styles, careers, and drives, but not for long. To what extent does
this funneling or detour system work to change individual life-styles,
expectations and attitudes? The impact of the sanctions previously
discussed, in light of policies of varying clarity and precision is the
remaining phase to be considered in this overall view of the trends
in the system.
Of course, from one point of view the most important value outcome will be the one most immediately significant for society.
Looking to the system for certain generally stated goals, this is the
rectitude value. By giving the system a larger context it becomes
meaningful to account for impacts on values of the participants along
a larger range. Thus, we will briefly consider sanctioning outcomes
in familiar terms of the human values mentioned earlier, grouped for
188 See, e.g., Grosser, The Role of Informal Inmate Groups in Change of Values, 5 CHILDREN 25 (Jan.-Feb. 1958) ; Metton, The Social-Cultural Environment and Anomie,
in WITMER & KOTINSKY, NEW PERSPECTIVES FOR RESEARCH ON JUVENILE DELIN-

QUENCY 32 '(Children's Bureau Publ. No. 356, 1956) ; Schein, InterpersonalCommunication, Group Solidarity, and Social Influence, 23 SOCIOMETRY 148 (1960).
189 In a fairly recent California study, for example, it was found that pessimism among
staff is characteristic of prisons with young, rather than old, offenders; that the
higher the job status in prison the less authoritarian, pessimistic and socially distant
from inmates were the staff (whether simply "custodial" or "treatment") ; and that
the same correlation was found with reference to education. Kassebaum, Ward &
Wilner, Some Correlates of Staff Ideology in the Prison, 1 J. RES. IN CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 96 (1964).
190 Grant & Grant, Staff and Client Participation:A New Approach to CorrectionalResearch, 45 NEB. L. REv. 702 (1966) (brief description of some of the experiments

to date).
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emphasis into (1) wealth, skill and enlightenment, and (2) rectitude,
respect, affection and well-being.
Wealth. In most states and in the federal system the parolee or
discharged prisoner will leave the prison with a new suit of clothes,
travel money to a certain destination, and either a gratuity of about
$20.00 or his own required prison savings (of less than $50.00 in
about half the cases), or both. Only fifteen per cent will have any
savings outside the prison.' 9 '
A pre-parole arranged job frequently fails to materialize. The
reason most frequently cited is that the prospective employer's needs
have changed in the intervening weeks or months. As many as onethird of such released individuals fail to receive any employment
during the first month following release. Furthermore, perhaps as
many as one-half will not work full time during the first three months
after release.
The typical kind of employment will be that of a shipping or
stock clerk, packing house worker, helper, truck driver, or semi or
unskilled factory worker. Median incomes will be quite low in the
initial post-release jobs, ranging from about $80.00 in the first month
to about $250.00 after the third month, although many will have
partial support of some kind such as meals or low-rent housing in this
period. Debt will not be uncommon among the post-release inmate.
In sum, the picture is one of marginal economic viability which
does not change drastically over the years in the typical case.' 92
Furthermore, it seems clear that prisoner expectations are not correlated to this predictable pattern. 9 '
Skill and Enlightenment. Considering the work experience of
adult inmates noted above, it should not be surprising to find that
few inmates leave prison with either newly acquired skills or others
sufficiently maintained to command an impressive range of skilled
jobs on the outside.194 One recent project suggests strongly that the
191 These approximations are based on surveys reported in the compendious study by
Professor Daniel Glaser's Ford Foundation supported project at the University of
Illinois. See GLASER, THE EFFECrIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM 316-20
(1964).

192 Id. at 327-58.
193
Our interviews with prisoners at various stages of their sentence, and
shortly after release, predominantly supported the proposition: Prisoners
have expectations of extremely rapid occupational advancement during the
years immediately following their release, expectations which are unrealistic in the light of their limited work experience and lack of vocational
skills.
Id. at 358.
194
[I~n about one-tenth of inmate postrelease jobs there are benefits from new
learning acquired in prison work, in about three or four per cent of these
jobs there are benefits from the preservation of old skills through practice in
prison, and in about five or six per cent of the post-release jobs the prison
provided useful physical or psychological conditioning.
Id. at 252 (italics in original source).
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skill level attained before prison is most significant in determining
what the post-release position will be. 9 '
This is not to suggest that the prison experience does not produce
some positive features with respect to skills, work attitudes, and
individual expectations. One of the most interesting features of
Glaser's research report is the finding that for most inmates the work
in prison was the longest and most continuous employment experience
that most prisoners, especially the younger ones, have had.'9 6
Furthermore, those inmates who were fortunate enough to be in
a skills supervision enterprise in prison, such as machine shop, printing or electronics were, in the cases studied by Glaser, far better
rewarded in terms of helpful interaction with a staff member. On
the other hand, there is apparently a good deal of "dead end" kind
of work in prisons, stemming from the shortage of real labor, in
which attitudes were poorly shaped and no preparation for outside
work was given. Such jobs as office orderly, runner, or maintenance
men are examples.' 97
While their average intelligence does not differ substantially
from that of the general population, prison inmates typically have
median formal education which is about two years lower, a majority
never having finished high school. Superficially at least, many inmates reach higher levels of formal education, but there is some
evidence to suggest that one paramount motivation involved is to
achieve the record of completing some level of school, evidenced by
a school completion diploma, and not to acquire knowledge itself.
Account has to be taken of the use by the prisons of a mixed
system of inmate teachers and some paid staff teachers, together
with the wide use of correspondence courses duplicated for profit
within the prison. The most significant gain to be noted anywhere
in the system is the improvement of reading skills of the youthful
offender, many of whom enter as functional illiterates.
Glaser's research indicates that not many post-release employment opportunities are significantly enhanced by the prison educa195

Those who were salesmen . . .return to sales .. .; those who were agricultural workers return to agricultural work or unskilled labor .... All of
this suggests the hypothesis that, whatever the underlying factors may be,
the intervention of institutional work experience or vocational training has
a negligible impact on the level or type of work inmates go to upon release.
U.S.

BUREAU OF PRISONS, THE FINANCIAL AND EMPLOYMENT RESOURCES OF PERSONS RELEASED FROM FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS 13 (Jan. 1962), reported, id. at 253.

196 Id. at 232. "Regularity of prior employment is more closely related than type of work

previously performed to the postrelease success of prisoners in avoiding further felonies." Id. at 233.
197
The highest failure rates were in those inmate positions which are
conducive to the most influence in the inmate community. These are the
prisoners who were personal assistants to officers, as clerks, orderlies ....
Id. at 256.
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tional experience. Indeed, for some the experience appears to have
distinctive negative features, such as raising unrealistically high expectations about vocational chances.' 9 s
Rectitude. Estimates of how many released prisoners commit
further serious crimes and return to the system have been difficult to
obtain, although it had until quite recently become fashionable to
place the figure at about sixty per cent, suggesting a rather wholesale
failure of one of the chief goals of the system.' 9 9 Statistical surveys
and analyses in Minnesota, Washington, Pennsylvania, California,
Wisconsin, and New York, as well as in the federal system, provide
estimates of the rate of return to prison ranging from 31% to 44o
for adult parolees and from 31% to 49% for youthful offenders.20 0
This estimate is based primarily on crude figures of return to prison
by all former inmates regardless of the reason for return - violation
of some parole condition or the commission of a new crime, whether
felony or misdemeanor.
A much larger proportion of released inmates has "some brush
with the law" - something on the order of fifty per cent - but not
all infractions of parole are reported or used as the basis for revocation. Neither do all new convictions of discharged former inmates
result in a return to prison. These are functions of the parole supervision process and the sentencing phase of the overall sanctioning
2 01
process.
Accounting records are not yet sufficiently well developed or
coordinated to permit conclusive generalizations about recidivism in
the population of the adult prisons. Nevertheless, Glaser is willing to
offer the following hypotheses, which will bear testing in the future:
The proportion of releasees returned to prison tends to be higher:
a. where probation is used extensively, so that only the worst risks
go to prison (although this use of probation may make the
long-run recidivism of all felons lower);
b. where parole is used extensively , so that many poor-risk parolees
are released on a trial basis;
c. where a large proportion of parolees are returned to prison when

they have violated parole regulations but have not been charged
with or convicted of new felonies;
198 Id. at 289. See generally Schnur, The EducationalTreatment of Prisonersand Recidivism, 54 AM. J. Soc. 142 (1948).

199 One observer who questioned this figure is Sol Rubin of the National Council on
Crime and Delinquency. See Rubin, Recidivism and Recidivism Statistics, 4 NAT'L
00

2

PROB. & PAROLE ASS'N J. 233 (1958).
See GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM 21-24 (1964)
(statistical studies of parolee recidivism) ; Zuckerman, Barron & Whittier, A Follow-

Up Study of Minnesota State Reformatory Inmates, 43 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 622
(1953).
201 See generally Ohlin & Remington, Sentencing Structure. Its Effect Upon Systems for

the Administration of Criminal justice, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 495 '(1958)
(factors commonly influencing a sentencing structure).
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d. where there is a high overall crime rate in the communities to

which prisoners are released, so that there is high prospect of the
releasee coming from and going to highly criminogenic circum20 2
stances.

Such generalizations of course say something about the prisonparole program, but they do not by any means take account of a whole
aggregate of variables, some of which are directly related to the
content of the prison-parole program and others of which are not yet
so directly related. For example, the age at which a person commits
his first offense has been shown to have a strong influence on predicting success after release. Likewise, the character of the offense
is important.20 On the other hand there is not yet much evidence to
suggest that race, intelligence, or biological factors, such as body build
have important determinant positions in relation to recidivism.20 '
There is little in the corpus of reported research to indicate
specific correlations between particular features of the prison program and the successful releasee, or negatively to suggest concretely
a nexus between features of the prison experience and a failure on
parole or discharge. 20 5 Nevertheless, Glaser's recent research into
the attitudes of inmates about the total impact of prison on them and
their fellow inmates suggests that the prospect of loss of liberty,
"thinking about being locked up," particularly among older prisoners
or ones with prior confinement, is an important ingredient in the con20 6
scious support one could give toward a decision "to go straight."
Among a majority of "successful releasees" interviewed, it was during
confinement that they thought they changed most permanently from
an interest in crime. 7 Of course, participant attitudes are not
decisive of basic questions about real causation in behavior changes,
202 GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM 24-27 (1964).
203

204
205
206
207

Id. at 44, wherein the following broad conclusion is offered:
Felony offenses fall into three broad rankings of recidivism, as follows:
a. The most recidivistic category consists of economic offenses not involving
violence (larceny, burglary, auto theft, and forgery), and the most recidivistic single type of felony is auto theft. b. Consistently intermediate in
recidivism rate are several common but diverse types of crime, such as narcotics offenses, robbery, and kidnapping. c. The lowest recidivism occurs
with those offenses most associated with unusual circumstances in the
offender's life rather than with offenses pursued as vocations; notable here
are murder, rape, and embezzlement.
Id. at 51-53.
See, however, the stylized description of certain categories of the successful release
career as well as the marginal and the failure careers in id. at 54-83.
Id. at 481.
When we asked them how this change came about, 62 per cent made reference to their deterrence by the unpleasantness of imprisonment. This was
the most frequently mentioned type of abstract influence in their reformation.
In addition, 54 per cent referred to their maturation, and 30 per cent to
their learning a trade or acquiring good work habits.
Id. at 482.
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but such indications do have implications for other values closely
related to rectitude.2 0 8
Respect, Affection and Well-being. Despite estimates of prison
life which characterize it as a subculture or self-contained community,209 this does not necessarily imply a kind of solidarity which
carries over into the post-release life of the adult offender. Ties with
the outside may be more important than formerly suspected in
allowing the individual to adjust to his custodial environment. While
inmate relationships in many prisons may be characterized as relationships in which a premium is placed on independence, aloofness or
limited engagement both between prisoners themselves and between
inmate and staff (the "do your own time" ethos), it seems clear
that inmates do receive wholesome support from each other, particularly younger inmates by first-term older inmates.2 10
The process of interaction among prisoners and staff is admittedly a complicated one. However ambivalent such relationships
may be, the social world in which the inmate apparently sees himself,
as well as the whole class of his fellow inmates, is one of considerable
pessimism. It is one characterized by relatively high expectations of
failure in various pursuits. 21 '
Such attitudes may be a function of the time remaining before
release. As release date approaches, Glaser's evidence suggests, ties
with relatives tend to improve, although particular friendships and
even marriages may have long since dissolved. Most releasees return
to their home communities, and for a time at least live with their
families. 2 2 Those who live alone apparently have less chance of
staying out of criminal activities.
Old friends will be encountered, but most will know of the
releasee's record. In most instances, new friends will be made and
they too will learn of the prison record. In those situations where the
record is not known the releasee will have a better chance of not
returning to prison. Although former prison acquaintances will be
2N08

209

T]here is evidence that the extent of any deterrent effect does not increase
at a uniform rate in proportion to increments in the severity of a sentence.
.. . This does not eliminate the possibility of major deterrence occurring
from a certain minimum sentence, the most effective minimum probably
being much less for first offenders than for advanced offenders. This is a
matter on which the F.B.I. may throw some light from extensive statistics
on recidivism rates for different lengths of confinement, for various types
of offender.

Ibid.

CLEMMER, THE PRISON COMMUNITY
(1958).

(1958);

SYKES. THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES

210 GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM 89-118

(1964).

211 This point is not without its contradiction in selected cases of inmates who not in-

212

frequently see certain aspects of their prison experience in inflated terms, such as
their level of attainment in education or skills. See note 193 supra.
See GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM 378, Table 15.6
(1964).
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encountered, most releasees will not maintain contact with them. 2 18
The picture which emerges is one of a fairly dependent economic
relationship for some time, with kinship ties strengthened, some new
friendships established, but haunted by fears of being regarded as
different and an outcast. This is particularly true with regard to the
police, who not infrequently "watch" and harass the releasee, frequently arresting him on mere suspecion. 1 4 In view of his low selfimage, his relatively uncompetitive position economically, his precarious social relationships and the fact that in many instances the
local police know the ex-inmate as "undesirable," it is perhaps surprising that return rates are not higher.21 5
II.

SUMMARY APPRAISAL OF SYSTEMS

First it should be emphasized that the events which occur in the
arenas of authority and power which make up our systems of human
control are not isolated from parallel events that take place in the
daily lives of the millions of individual human beings whose constant
interactions in pursuit of the same value set (albeit with varying
emphasis) constitute a process of social interaction. Consequently,
comprehensive analysis of a decisional process should take account
not only of rule, but also of outcome, and the variables contributing
to the evolution of both. While this degree of comprehensiveness
has not been attempted in the foregoing descriptions of trends in order
that sharper focus could be maintained on other features of the
process, it should not be understood that such things as personality,
culture, class of major participants and level of crisis are not relevant
to a full understanding of the real dynamics of such processes. It
should suffice for this abbreviated analysis to indicate preferred
perspectives to be assumed by sanctioning decision-makers. Thus,
the sanctioning decision-maker should be oriented in time to the
future events which major goals of the system attempt to govern,
213
214

Id. at 388-93.
It would have been helpful if the Glaser research had undertaken to sample attitudes
of friends and associates of the releasee with regard to his criminal record, since many
releasees who subsequently are returned to prison cite prejudice as well as lack of
employment opportunity and family discord as reasons for their failure to stay out
of trouble. In any event, one of the most interesting revelations of the research
actually undertaken is that family accord, the strengthened family tie, where it is
present, can be one of the most important factors in determining likely success in the
post-prison experience. In this respect the work of the Gluecks and McCords is
confirmed. GLUECK & GLUECK, UNRAVELING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (1950) and
MCCORD & MCCORD, ORIGINS OF CRIME (1959), cited in GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM 381 (1964).

215 While such an appraisal might suggest the desirability of the released prisoner
routinely going to a new community upon release, there are competing considerations
in that often the most immediate support available anywhere is with family and
perhaps others such as former employers genuinely interested in the individual's reintegration into his community. This paradox may suggest appropriate remedial steps
not yet attempted in the post-release phase.
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be identified with the largest community possible in which the value
processes operate, and be committed to the larger goals of the public
order system supporting these value processes.
Contextuality and policy oriented perspective aside, what then
of basic policy of the public order systems under consideration?
In its most abstract formulation the overriding goal of our legal
system is the achievement of human dignity. While a public order
system may achieve a high degree of success measured in one dimension (behavioral conformity to given norms), a public order system
committed as well to human dignity must find expression in other
less simplistic dimensions. In the field of unauthorized deprivations
(crimes) this preference takes two forms: the culturally determined
list of situations thought to be disordering (our criminal codes), and
the procedures for assaying particular disordering events. Principles
of content and procedure are both relevant. Given an overriding
commitment to the achievement of human dignity in the context of
some normative prescriptions about human conduct for the good of
the community, four principles of content, suggested by the late
Professor George Dession, 216 are applicable.
First, an Equality Principle says that the prime value in our best
traditions, is placed on the individual, "be he citizen or alien, useful
21 7
or harmful, sane or mad."
An Economy Principle, founded on a premise that application of
any coercion by the state has no essential worth or legitimacy in and
of itself, suggests that only proportional sanctions will be employed,
and only in a hierarchy of least depriving-most indulging to most
depriving-least indulging. Instead of maximum use of power at the
disposal of the community for all threats of disorder, a policy of
terror, our sanctioning policies will, so far as possible, be based on
restraint and minimal use of that power, consistent with the largest
identifiable goal in the largest identifiable community. It follows
that a "sloppy" application of power which allows wider margins
for possible error to official sanctioners is inconsistent with this
principle of economy in service of the central goal of preserving
individual human dignity.
A third content principle relates to the sharing of the power of
decision in sanctioning matters, and may be called the Democratic
Principle. This is not meant to suggest that in a large, representative
governmental system like ours there should be an absolute parity of
influence among all citizens. However, it is meant to suggest that,
consistent with an underlying goals of effectiveness in decision taken
216

Dession, The Technique of Public Order: Evolving Concepts of Criminal Law, 5
BUFFALO L. REV. 22 (1955).
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Id. at 31.
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for and in behalf of the community, there should be a wider, not a
narrower spread of authoritative persons involved in the process of
sanctioning decisions.
Finally, but closely allied to the other principles, there is a
principle which allows our sanctions to be evaluated in terms of their
impact and sub-goals with respect to the whole community of mankind, and not simply those who at any one point in time are found
within certain geo-political boundaries. This is the Humanitarian
Principle. Such a principle of course emphasizes the common attributes of mankind everywhere, regardless of cultural differences. It
suggests the relevance of comparative research to decision-making
and reduces to some extent the influence of provincial positivism.
It should not be understood that restraint and other value deprivations on individual human beings by the community have no place
in a public order of human dignity. No serious commentator suggests
that our sanctions should all be positive and indulgent. There is not
yet that kind of understanding of human behavior and social dynamics. Yet, while carefully designed negative sanctions do have such a
place, it should be seen that the place is only complementary to other
dimensions of total policy to achieve community ends. Professor
Dession made the point this way:
The special attribute of negative sanctioning behavior is that it
consists in the infliction of value deprivation for the purpose of
achieving a net value gain.... [U]nder proper conditions negative
sanctions may serve positive and productive ends.... They are considered destructive only when the deprivation
2 18inflicted appears insuf-

ficiently compensated by any realized gain.
If this sounds like the Holmesian sacrificial sheep, it should be
recalled that not all the value gain referred to is in others than the
person sanctioned. What then of the dilemma posed for us in the
ultilitarian notion of "less eligibility"? Dare we make the threats of
the criminal law so inviting that the least of our members will be
attracted or induced to do what they might not otherwise?
If one assumes that the notion is addressed to the problem of
organized crime, the highly nonconforming world of the mobster, and
assumes that only fine or modest jail terms as modes of sanctioning
are realistically involved, some viability must be conceded.
On the other hand, if one assumes neither of these two conditions, or assumes that we wish to sanction even in the most disordering of situations in which deviant personalities seek to establish
essentially a subversive subculture, we are not powerless to experiment and find suitable expression of authoritative condemnation and
effective control of such cultures. Under such conditions the notion
2 18

1d. at 30.
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loses a great deal of force. Couple this with the expectation that
whenever the community seeks to interfere affirmately in the life of
any individual because of his past conduct and indications that it will
continue unless redirected, the process necessarily implies a stigma
which should in the more rational individual be regretted because of
its obvious suggestions of diminution of self-fulfillment.
In the individual who is less adequate, either in endowment or
conditioning, and in whom one may find a total absence of such
regret, the need for interference should dismiss completely the notion
of using the individual to achieve collective ends. Professor Dession
would find support among those whose vocabulary and analysis
might be traditional, yet whose insights are valuable. Consider, for
example, this testament from Professor Henry Hart:
Social resources for providing the satisfactions of life and
human capacities for enjoying them... are always susceptible of
enlargement ....
Man realizes his potentialities most significantly
in the very process of developing these resources and capacities-

by making himself a functioning and participating member of his
community.... What is crucial in this process is the enlargement of
each individual's capacity for effectual and responsible decision.
For it is only through personal, self-reliant participation, by trial
and error, in the problems of existence, both personal and social,
that the capacity to participate effectively can grow. Man learns
wisdom in choosing by being confronted with choices and by being
made aware that he must abide the consequences of his choice....
Seen in this light, the criminal law has an obviously significant and,
indeed, a fundamental role to play in the effort to create the good
society. For it is the criminal law which defines the minimum conditions of man's responsibility to his fellows and holds him to that
responsibility. The assertion of social responsibility has value in the
treatment even of those who have become criminals. 219

The first part of this statement - that man learns by participating in the system he is expected to know about and conform to more
or less- is substantially justified by empirical evidence. The latter
part must stem only from an ideal. It comports with the Equality
Principle. But the more important question remains - how will you
hold him responsible? In what dynamic ways related to the larger,
real world of social interaction? This is the point most frequently
ignored in the traditional literature, which continues to place considerable reliance on faith. For example, Professor Hart follows the
statement above with this sentence: "It [referring to the assertion of
social responsibility which criminal law makes] has far greater value
as a stimulus to the great bulk of mankind to abide by the law and
22 0
to take pride in so abiding."
219

Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23
(1958).

20 ld. at 410.
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Account should be taken of the major principles supporting
major social goals touched upon in this section by recalling the
outstanding features of the trends in decision and decisional outcomes
described above. Looking back over the description of these trends
of the various criminal law systems, one of the strongest impressions
the observer receives is that we have rather deliberately set out to
build institutional inequality, that is, to devise preferred processes for
preferred categories of offenders. One must hasten to add that it
seems doubtful whether in fact the effort has succeeded when the
sanctioning modes of the juvenile system, the insanity and mental
defective system, and until quite recently the addict system as well
are considered. There is, however, a certain realization of this on
the part of some decision-makers, accounting in large measure for the
wholesale use of probation or even "unofficial" release in the juvenile system.
In part, this trend toward preferment owes something to what
were perceived by some at the time as breakthroughs in understanding
of the human psyche, which gave rise to the feeling of justification
in differential treatment. It seems equally likely that such developments were spawned by public fear fed by political leadership which
would not make any effort to see particular provoking events in
larger perspective and context.
More fundamental, however, than the disparate treatment envisioned, yet perhaps not forthcoming in the actual working of the
various systems, is the regard in which the individual is held. By
indulging in the parens patriae theory of the juvenile system, or the
civil commitment concept of the newer version of the addict system,
or the dangerous capacity notion of three "mental" systems, we have
obviated much of the "cumbersome" procedure required to convict a
citizen. It is not at all clear that, of all the labels available in these
control systems, the penal label is the most reprehensible in our
society, yet the manipulation of such a set of labels allows us to
deceive ourselves in thinking that for the individual who needs it
we are giving help, but for the "bad guy" we are not.
In return for this alienation of the criminal, we bestow a kind
of ceremony - the whole guilt-determining process with fundamental
safeguards like the right to precise charging, counsel, cross-examination, etc., and a definite sentence (albeit with ill-defined content).
For the others, since "they are being helped," they cannot insist on
such elaboration.
Such a characterization, I believe, is fairly accurate for the longer
history of these systems. Most recently, however, it seems that a
certain reaction even in highly authoritative arenas has begun to
develop which now begins to insist upon a demonstration-of-effective-
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ness-of-the-treatment approach which will justify the short-cuts. At
the same time there is a certain perspective emerging which sees this
approach as a long-time thing and sees the intermediate loss in personal dignity too great to sacrifice longer. Illustrative are the Supreme
Court's discussion in Baxstrom v. Herold,221 and the Circuit Court
of Appeals' discussion in the District of Columbia in Rouse v.
2 22

Cameron.

Such developments may be seen as consistent with the Equality
Principle. And they seem to be outgrowths not only of changed
perspectives of these decision-makers but also of changing expectations about what is possible in dealing with the disordered personality - expectations to which the work of the professional correctional
staff itself has contributed.
Both the Equality Principle and the Economic Principle are
seemingly involved in the trends discernable in the adult criminal sanctioning system. The first has not yet received the kind of judicial
support referred to immediately above in the case of other systems.
The content of the program is still thought to be of little or no
concern to the courts. At the same time these same decision-makers
involve themselves increasingly in probation, its granting, supervision
and termination. On the other hand, there has been for some time
now in the United States a willingness to sentence to increasingly
longer prison terms. One effect of this is to generate more custodial
problems for the prisons; another is to confront the parole authorities
with a more complex equation for decision.
This trend, however, is not premised on any shared expectation
concerning the likelihood of greater success rates after imprisonment
due to the longer sentence. On the contrary, it seems reasonably clear
that the administrators, prison and parole, do not welcome the longer
sentences. To a great extent they may be viewed as a function of the
frustration of courts felt in the absolute rates of the incidence of
crime. If both rates have gone up rather steadily since World War II,
as some evidence suggests, then it would clearly seem that the resort
to longer periods of incarceration is distinctly antithetical to the
Economy Principle, representing a distinctly more coercive mode than
is warranted by the circumstances.
This is not to conclude that the prison-parole system is a failure.
Glaser's research suggests very strongly that it is not, that the
recividism rates are not nearly as high as previously thought. However, our experience suggests that we do not yet have a very satisfactory definition of post-release success. Neither we do have
383 U.S. 107 (1966).
= 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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systematic ways of relating the details of the prison experience to the
post-release life of the individual.
In this light the independent observer must see the indiscriminate
dumping of all categories of persons for great periods of time into
the prison-parole system as highly uneconomic in the preservation of
various human values unless differentation on the basis of their needs
along a full value spectrum is made. Indeed, considerable evidence
suggests that such a process is positively destructive of human values.
Furthermore, the persistent failure of courts to involve themselves in appraising the outcomes of this process in terms of what is
done with the inmate must be seen as a violation of the Democratic
Principle. Decisions effecting vital attributes of personal liberty and
dignity have long been thought to involve many levels of "expertise,"
not a few. Penology is no more an esoteric and precise science, the
province of a few highly trained specialists, than economics. Yet our
courts have not declined to help supervise a highly regulated modern
market place through various strategies like the anti-trust laws.
The general doctrines for judicial intervention are not lacking
where the inclination is present; and the inclination has been most
evidently present in those cases where positive threat to physical well22 3
being, the practice of religion, or access to the courts is suggested.
This peripheral involvement or interaction with other sanctioning
agencies will probably expand. Eventually the courts will be asked to
decide whether the lack of staff, or a deficiency in imagination, or
too high a regard to "security" should prevent an inmate from participation in a planned graduation of activities (work, school, and group
therapy) logically leading to greater self-reliance through increased
contacts with the larger community. Without such interaction responsible participation will remain only a cynical ideal for the outputs of
the system.
One factor which suggests this expansion of judicial involvement
is the authoritative experimentation with work-release, furloughs,
223 In the case of threats to physical well-being the courts' inclination or willingness to
intervene in the decisions of prison authorities is supported by the presence of a
rather specifically relevant constitutional provision against "cruel and unusual" punishments. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII. See generally Sutherland, Due Process and Cruel
Punishment, 64 HARv. L. REV. 271 (1950) ; Note, ConstitutionalRights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 985, 1003 (1962). In the case of
religious practice again there is a clearly relevant constitutional provision. U.S.
CoNsT. amend. I. The most critical contemporary context in which this provision is
being considered is the Black Muslim cases. See generally Brown, Black Muslim
Prisonersand Religious Discrimination.The Developing Criteriafor Judicial Review,
32 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1124 (1964).

Finally, with regard to the cases claiming denial of free access to the courts the
judicial response has been one of impliedly protecting this vital link between authority at the center of the whole sanctioning process and the individual inputs of it whatever the state of progress through it by various participants. See generally Comment, The Rights of Prisoners While Incarcerated, 15 BUFFALO L. RaV. 397, 414
n.149, 414-16 (1965).

1967

PENAL SYSTEMS

half-way houses (for adult offenders now, after earlier implimentation in some of the other systems) and the group interaction efforts
coming of age in the juvenile, addict, and insanity systems. Wider
community involvement characterizes these developments and represents, whether consciously or not, a willingness to incorporate at least
marginally some dimensions of a previously alienated sub-community
into the law-abiding, conformity-inducing greater community. This
comports with the ideal of a wide shaping and sharing of values; and
to the extent to which there is a conscious sharing of particular
decisions effecting outcomes (like the time of release from total
institutionalization) among the participants of related social processes, there is also support for the Democratic Principle.
There is, in these observable trends of decision in the adult
criminal system, a considerable reluctance on the part of decisionmakers in both the judicial and administrative arenas to appraise
the impact of decisions in terms broader than predictions about return
to criminal behavior.
This is essentially a security-oriented perspective, which, while
it may not be explicitly and consciously "punishment" directed, does
have the effect of diminishing the real social viability potential of
the inmate. In other words, adequate contextuality, in terms of a full
range of human values at stake, is lacking most often in the series of
decisions that first commits the individual to several months or years
in prison and, consequently, to routinized, cautious and remote proc224
essing into the parole phase.
CONCLUSION

Authoritative efforts to modify attitudes of deviant members of
society and to control the behavior of these and other individuals who
threaten deprivations of values protected by our criminal codes have
met with only partial success, even considering only one principal
indicator. Yet "success" is not a word which has been given very
precise meaning in our sanctioning decision process. It remains an
unfinished, and perhaps unfinishable, task for a policy-oriented and
contextual jurisprudence to elaborate sub-goals for decisional outcome in a host of categories of situations and personalities subject to
sanctioning.
2M

See generally Brown v. Kearney, 355 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1966); Curtis v. Bennett,
351 F.2d 931 (8th Cir. 1965); Jones v. Rivers, 338 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1964);
Richardson v. Rivers, 335 F.2d 996 (D.C. Cir. 1964). But see McCreary v. Kenton,
190 F. Supp. 689 (D.Conn. 1960), indicating that the parole board must have a
'reasonable basis" for its decision; that it cannot act "arbitrarily." The reasonable
basis is in most instances merely a judgment based on information the board alone
considers relevant as to the "prisoner's ability to maintain lawful existence in society."
United States ex tel. Hancock v. Pate, 223 F. Supp. 202 (N.D. 111. ;1963).
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The large goals are clear: to protect society and at the same
time promote individual human dignity. The description of the trends
discernable at present suggests that the major control systems are not
adequately supporting either goal. Even so, it is becoming increasingly clear that more intelligence is needed properly to evaluate all
relevant systems, that experimentation in specific modes of sanctioning is indicated, and that the more we learn the more we are moved to
moderate our reliance on traditional assumptions, concepts, and procedures. Most of all, our most relevant experience has suggested to
us that conformity to social norms is not simply a function of authoritative prescription - that is of enunciating and applying rules of
behavior to individuals and then relegating the individual to limbo." 5
Creating conditions in which individual rehabilitation or correction becomes probable and general prevention effected in perceivable
ways requires a great deal more. It requires, minimally, that account
be taken of the inter-relation of social and authoritative processes, of
the roles played by all participants in the sanctioning process, those
who are targets of as well as those who impose the sanctions. It
requires the willingness of those situated in central arenas of community power and authority, such as the courts, to become involved in
continuing appraisal, and re-appraisal, of particular decisions taken
by others which directly affect the value aggregates of those who are
being subjected to the power and authority of our various control
systems.
Editor's Note:
After Professor Penegar's article was prepared for publication, the
United States Supreme Court handed down In Re Gault, 35 U.S. Law Week
4399 (May 15, 1967). This decision should have a profound impact upon
the procedures by which juvenile courts determine whether a juvenile is
"delinquent" and consequently, whether institutional sanctioning strategies
should be applied. The Court held that due process in such proceedings
requires adequate and specific notice of charges, the right to appointed
counsel, opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses,
and observation of the privilege against self-incrimination. Many of the
previously followed procedures, described in notes 9-44 supra and accompanying text, fell far short of these due process requirements. - Editors.
2 5 Of course few thoughtful observers see the ideal in such terms as these, but even
those who would bring about needed "reforms" in corrections are sometimes the ones
whose conceptualizations are inadequate to move in desired directions. Consider, for
example, the following passage from Professor Gerhard Mueller:
Everything I have described above is opinion, not law. Strictly speaking, there is no law of retribution or of vindication, of penitence or of
deterrence, of neutralization or of resocialization ....
Strictly speaking, the
common law codifies no principles or theory of corrections.
Mueller, Punishment, Corrections and the Law, 45 NEB. L. REv. 58, 83 (1966).
What is it, then, that keeps men confined for long periods of time out of contact with society and its wholesome interactions if not "the law"? Mere abstractions
of course are not responsible for purposive action. Such an abstraction may, however, serve as a short-hand expression for the many decision-makers possessed of
varying perspectives, situated in different arenas of power and authority, more or less
following general social goals, and poorly clarified sub-goals, making particular
choices, with varying impacts on individuals, etc., which together make up a process
of decision which combines authority (or expectations about how power will be
wielded) with actual power to produce particular results.

THE UNITED STATES AcTIoN IN THE
1965 DOMINICAN CRISIS:
IMPACT ON WORLD ORDER-PART II
By VED P. NANDA*
Professor Nanda projects the United States action in the 1965
Dominican crisis against the background of the United Nations and
OAS Charters. He concludes that under contemporary international
law norms, the unilateral use of force in a primarily internal conflict
situation cannot be considered a legitimate self-defense measure.
In a discussion of the relative competence of a regional versus a universal organization to deal with a regional conflict, Professor Nanda
analyzes the trend toward a greater reliance on the regional organization. The Dominican crisis is seen as an attempt to counteract past
trends. To avoid unilateralintervention in internal conflicts, Professor Nanda recommends the formulation of procedures which will
enable regional and universal organizations, rather than the individual nation-state, to regulate the use of force.

preceding article in this series examined two grounds on
which the United States relied to justify its original dispatch of
HE

Marines during the 1965 Dominican conflict - to protect United
States nationals and to serve humanitarian purposes.'
This article will examine the validity of the United States claim
that forces were sent to prevent a threatened Communist take-over
in the Dominican Republic. It will also discuss the merits of the
United States claim regarding the competence of the OAS vis-a-vis
that of the United Nations to deal with the Dominican crisis.
I. THE PREVENTION OF "ANOTHER CUBA"
The Dominican conflict had hardly entered its second week
when the United States declared that its objective had changed from
the protection of its nationals and other foreigners to the prevention
of a Communist take-over in the Dominican Republic. 2 It therefore
sent more troops to the Dominican Republic, their total number at
one time exceeding 20,000. 3 Subsequently, these troops formed the
*Assistant Professor, College of Law, University of Denver. The author wishes to
acknowledge, with gratitude, the kind assistance of Miss Margaret L. Hayes, Head,
Documents Division, the Denver Public Library; Mrs. Martha S. Peacock, Assistant
Librarian, University of Denver College of Law; and Miss Helen S. Clark of Mary
Reed Library, University of Denver, in making available the necessary documents
and materials.
143 DENVER L.J. 439 (1966).
2 See notes 6-16 infra.
3

See, e.g., 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 912 (1965)
Assistant Secretary General of the OAS).

(Ambassador Bunker's note to the
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bulk of the Inter-American Peace Force that was established by the
Organization of American States (OAS) , and the last units of which
stayed in the Dominican Republic until September 1966.
After presenting the official United States position and that of
its critics, the present study will assume the accuracy of the official
United States position for lack of a definitive conclusion on this
controversial but crucial point. Accepting the existence of the threat
of "another Cuba," the paper will test the validity of the United
States action on the principles of international law. The discussion
will center primarily on the treaty obligations of the United States
under the United Nations and the OAS Charter.
A. The Official United States Position
A glance at the views of United States decision-makers will
indicate their preoccupation with the possibility of a Communist controlled Dominican Republic. A meeting at the White House on
April 30 between President Johnson and administration leaders at
the higher policy making echelons, sheds light on the United States'
perception of the danger of a Communist take-over in the Dominican
Republic. One of those leaders present, special presidential envoy
during the Dominican crisis, John Bartlow Martin, reported:
The President said he foresaw two dangers - very soon we would
witness a Castro Communist-dominated government in the Dominican Republic, or we would find ourselves in the Republic alone
without any support in the Hemisphere. He didn't want either one

to happen.6

Martin quotes the President as having further said that, while
he had every intention of working for peace through the OAS or any
other channel, he did not intend
to sit here with my hands tied and let Castro take that island. What
can we do in Vietnam if we can't clean up the Dominican Republic?
I know what the editorials will say but it would be a hell of a lot
4Id. at 862-3, per Resolution adopted on May 6, 1965, in the Plenary Session of the
Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs by a vote of 15 to 5
with one abstention.
5 See N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1966, p. 3, col. 1 (city ed.), for a report that the last unit

of the Inter-American Peace Force had left the Dominican Republic on September
21, 1966.
See U.N. Doc. No. S/63'16 (1965), for a letter from the Permanent Representative
of the Soviet Union to the Security Council President requesting him to convene
an "urgent meeting" of the Security Council to consider the question of "armed
interference by the United States in the internal affairs of the Dominion Republic."
See also U.N. Doc. No. S/6314 (1965), for the text of a note addressed by the
Cuban Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary General of the United Nations
denouncing the "illegal action" of the United States and drawing attention to "the
threat to peace which this criminal action entails."
6
MARTIN, OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS 661 (1966). Those present at the meeting included
Rusk, Ball, McNamara, General Wheeler and Martin.
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worse if we sit here and don't do anything and the Communists take
that country. 7

On May 2, 1965, two days after his arrival in Santo Domingo,
Martin said at a press conference that, in his opinion, the purpose of
the presence of the United States Marines now was or ought to be
"to prevent a Castro/Communist takeover, because what began as a
PRD revolt had in the last few days fallen under the domination of
Castro/Communist and other violent extremists.'8 The same evening, President Johnson declared in a national radio-television broadcast that
The revolutionary movement [in the Dominican Republic] took a
a tragic turn. Communist leaders, many of them trained in Cuba...
joined the revolutions. They took increasing control. And what
began as a popular democratic revolution.., very shortly moved
and was taken over and really seized and placed into the hands of a
band of Communist conspirators.9

The President was quite emphatic in his warning that "the American
nations cannot, must not, and will not permit the establishment of

another Communist government in the Western Hemisphere." 10 14
8
2
Similar statements by Rusk," Stevenson,1 Bunker,' Ball,
Meeker,' " and several members of Congress' 6 were made to the
7 Ibid.
8 MARTIN, OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS

676 (1966). See also, Communist Subversion in

The Dominican Crisis (Dep't of State Publication 7971, Inter-American Series 92,

Oct. 19, 1965).
9 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 744, 745 (1965).
10Id.at 746.
11See, e.g., 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 843-44 (1965), wherein Secretary Rusk stated that,
What began in the Dominion Republic as a democratic revolution was
taken over by Communist conspirators who had been trained for, and had
carefully planned, that operation. Had they succeeded in establishing a
Sovernment, the Communist seizure of power would in all likelihood have
een irreversible, thus frustrating the declared principles of the OAS. We
acted to preserve the freedom of choice of the Dominican people until the
OAS could take charge and insure that its principles were carried out.
It is now doing so.
See also id. at 939-40 (statement by Rusk at a press conference held May 26, 1965).
In a more recent address made before the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention on
August 22, 1966, at New York, Rusk has reiterated that "'We cooperated with the
OAS .. .in preventing chaos and a possible Communist takeover in the Dominican
Republic .. " 55 DEP'T STATE BULL. 362, 367 (1966).
12

See e.g., 52

DEP'T STATE BULL.

869, 871, 880-82 (1965)

(statements by Stevenson

before the U.N. Security Council).
13 See e.g., id. at 908-10 (statements by Bunker before the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs).
14 Id. at 1042, 1046 (address by Ball on June 6, 1965).
15Meeker, The Dominican Situation in the Perspective of InternationalLaw, 53 id. at
60.
IOSee, e.g., 111 CONG. REc. 8778 (daily ed. April 30, 1965), for remarks by Senator
Stennis that "We cannot afford to wait for the OAS to act first .... We cannot
permit a Communist regime to set itself up in the Dominican Republic .... See id.
at 8838 (daily ed. May 3, 1965), for remarks by Representative Andrews that the
President's "expressed determination to prevent the establishment of another
Communist regime in this hemisphere [as indicatd by the United States action]
is the most encouraging announcement in America's foreign policy since January
1961."
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effect that the United States decision to send in additional troops to
the Dominican Republic and to maintain them there was in response
to the Communist danger to take over the rebel leadership.
It is difficult to establish an evidentiary basis for the official
United States view of the Dominican crisis. Official statements
He further urged the President "to quickly announce that the liquidation of Cuba's
Communist government is a definite aim of American foreign policy, and that no
pressures from any source . . .will dissuade us from that goal." For more remarks
made in the Congress on May 3 on the Communist take-over in the Dominican
Republic, see id. at 8809, 8840, 8882. See also id. at 9000-10 '(daily ed. May 4,
1965), for Senator Lausche's statement that "we cannot suffer the existence of
another Cuba at our shores in the Caribbean . . .. [T]he overwhelming evidences
are that the Communists have taken hold." See id. at 9038, for Senator Long's
remarks; id. at 9722 (daily ed. May 10, 1965), for remarks by Senator Gruening
that "The United States, having intervened to stave off a Communist dictatorship,
cannot now abandon the Dominican people." See id. at 11029 (daily ed. May 24,
1965), for remarks by Senator Dodd that,
The Communists began to infiltrate and take control of the insurrection
almost from the moment it was launched on the morning of April 24.
By April 26, they already exercised a serious degree of control. By April
27, their control had reached such alarming proportions that virtually all
of the authentic non-Communist leaders had abandoned the revolution .
. . . By his action, President Johnson has prevented the emergence of a
second Castro regime in the Americas.
See id. at 11585 (daily ed. May 28, 1965), for remarks by Representative Gallagher
that,
I believe the action that the United States took at the end of April probably saved the Dominican Republic from a Communist takeover. The exact
degree of Communist control over the rebel movement at that moment
can never be measured accurately, of course. But the fact remains that the
risk was grave; it left this Government with no alternative but to arrest
the threat.
See id. at 13468 (daily ed. June 17, 1965), for remarks by Representative Rogers
that,
It is clear that had the United States acted as swiftly in Cuba as was done
in the Dominican Republic Castro and communism would not be in Havana
today. It is also clear that we must pursue a firm policy in the Dominican
Republic to curb Castroism in the Caribbean.
See id. at 20720 (daily ed. Aug. 24, 1965), for remarks by Senator Lausche that
"the proof before that Committee [Senate Foreign Relations Committee] was clear
that within 3 days after the violence broke out, groups connected with Peiping,
Moscow, and Castro took over." See id. at 22427 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1965), for
remarks by Representative Flood when he talked of the "attempted Red takeover
of the Dominican Republic on April 24, 1965, requiring armed intervention by the
United States to prevent the establishment of a second Soviet satellite in the
Carribbean." He further said that that was a key element "in the strategy of the international revolutionary conspiracy for world domination." See id. at 24076 (daily ed.
ed. Sept. 23, 1965), for remarks by Representative Selden, Chairman of the House
Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs: "U.S. intervention not only prevented a
Communist takeover, but there is every reason to believe it also will provide the
Dominican people another chance to let their wills be known at the ballot box."
See Dubois, Report from Latin America, id. App. A at 2684, 2685 (daily ed. May
26, 1965), wherein Dubois says, "Lt. Gen. Bruce Palmer, Jr., commander of
American land forces here, said earlier that part of his mission was to prevent a
Communist takeover and establishment of a government inimical to the interest of the
United States." See also id. at 20505-48, 20562-63 (daily ed. Aug. 23, 1965), for an
extensive record of reports by press correspondents who thought that the danger of
Communist take-over was not a myth but a reality. These reports were introduced
into the Congressional Record by Senator Dodd. See also the OAS Special Committee Report at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Document 46 (provisional) May 7-8, 1965),
recorded id. at 20551-62.
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repeatedly referred to classified information which formed the basis
for their decisions. On October 12, 1965, Undersecretary Mann said:
All those in our Government who had full access to official information were convinced that the landing of additional troops was
necessary in view of the dear and present danger of the forcible
seizure of power by the Communists. The evidence we have indicates that at that stage the paramilitary forces under the control of
known Communists exceeded in military strength the forces con17
trolled by the non-Communist elements within the rebel movement.
He went on to say that:
The strength of the Communist component of the rebel side must
be measured not only by its men and arms and its superior discipline but by the weakness, the divisions, and the lack of leadership
within the rebel movement. It needs to be measured in light of the
fact that the Communists were operating in a total political vacuum
during the early days of the crisis. 18
In a statement made in the Senate on September 16, Senator
Dodd reviewed some of the information which had "convinced the
administration that the Communists had seized control of the revolt
and that any serious delay in intervening was bound to result in
another Cuba in the Carribean.. . ." ' Senator Dodd went on to
assure his colleagues that "the U.S. Government knew much more,

which for a variety of reasons, cannot be documented publicly." 20
The Administration, on several occasions, made public lists of
known Communists in the rebel movement. 21 These lists have, however, been so thoroughly discredited 22 that not much credence can
be put on their accuracy. Moreover, to measure the degree and extent
of the control of a rebel movement by counting the number of known
17Mann, The Dominican Crisis: Correcting Some Misconceptions, 53 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 730, 736 (1965). (Emphasis added.)
18 Ibid.

1l 111

CONG. REc. 23297 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1965).
20Ibid.
21 See 111 CONG. REc. 23007 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1965) (statement by Senator Smathers that there were approximately fifty-eight Communist leaders active in the rebel
movement) ;id. at 24079-81 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1965) (a list of seventy-seven such
Communists) ; id. App. A at 3071-72 (daily ed. June 14, 1965), article by O'Leary,
reprinted in the Congressional Record from Washington Star, June 13, 1965, entitled, U.S. Documents Red Attempt to Seize Revolt...). See 52 DEP'T STATE BULL.
816 (1965), to the effect that Johnson had declared as early as May 4 that the
United States intelligence reports showed that several rebels had been trained by
Communist forces, saying "up to yesterday they had the names and addresses and
experiences and numbers and backgrounds of some 58 .... They ...took increased
leadership in the movement.... Id. at 821. See also id. at 745 (President's statement
of May 1, 1965).
22See, e.g., Draper, The Dominican Crisis, COMMENTARY 33, 54-55 (Dec. 1965);
(expos6 of the lists of Communists said to be involved in the Dominican Conflict);
Goodsell, Christian Science Monitor, May 19, 1965, p. 1, col. 1; Geyelin, Dominican
Flashback: Behind the Scenes, Wall Street Journal, June 25, 1965, p. 8, col. 3.
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Communists participating in the movement is to apply a criterion of
doubtful validity. 8
B. Criticism of the United States Position
Several critics have suggested that the United States over-reacted
to the situation and disproportionately magnified the danger of a
Communist coup. These critics argued that while Communist participation in the rebel movement should be acknowledged, this participation should be carefully distinguished from the degree of
Communist control of the movement. They dismiss any possibility
of Communist control by pointing to the weakness of the Communist
movement within the Dominican Republic coupled with the lack of
any evidence of significant external assistance to the rebels from the
International Communist movement, especially from Cuba. 4
Senator Fulbright led the attack on the official United States
position regarding the degree and extent of Communist control in
the rebel movement. His observations were based on the conclusions
he drew from the Dominican hearings before the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations. He declared on the Senate floor that
The weight of the evidence is that Communists did not participate
in planning the revolution.... The evidence does not establish that
the Communists at any time actually had control of the revolution.
There is little doubt that they had influence within the revolutionary

23

See, e.g., 52
stated:

DEP'T STATE BULL. 876, 882 (1965), wherein Ambassador Stevenson

But I would remind you that only 12 men went to the hills with Castro in
1956 and that only a handful of Castro's own supporters were Communists.
I would also remind you that Castro, too, came into power under cover of
constitutionalism, moderation, and cooperation with others.
See also MARTIN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 706: "I would point out that in such a
situation a few leaders can exert great leverage on large numbers of uninformed
people." See also note 28 infra (statement by Senator Smathers) ; 111 CONG. REc.
23296 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1965) '(statement by Senator Dodd). Senator Dodd, is
however, emphatic that:
Criterion No. 1 in determining whether a movement or uprising is simply
supported by Communists or controlled by them, is the number of identifiable Communists, many of them with training in Castro Cuba, who occupied
command positions in the rebel movement.
Criterion No. 2 is the general political composition of the revolt.
Ibid. Applying these criteria, Senator Dodd asserts that the Communists were in control of the Dominican revolution. Id. at 23297.
24 See e.g., former President Juan Bosch's statement, in Bosch, Communism and Democracy in the Dominican Republic, Saturday Review, Aug. 7, 1965, inserted in 111
CONG. REc. 18922 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1965). See also id. App. A at 5376-78 (daily
ed. Sept. 22, 1965) (statement by Bosch) ; id. at 18131 (daily ed. July 29, 1965)
36; id. at 23366 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1965) (statement by Senator Clark) ; id. at
26423 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1965) (editorial from the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 14,
1965, entitled Lame Rebuttal, saying in part that "The administration appears to
contend that any Communist activity in Latin America must by definition represent
intervention by a Communist state. But no evidence has been presented of any substantial involvement in Santo Domingo of Cuba, China, Russia, or any other Communist government.").
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movement, but the degree of that influence remains a matter of
25
speculation.

Further, maintaining that there is a crucial distinction between
"Communist support" and "Communist control" of a political movement, Senator Fulbright argued that since the Administration had
acted on the premise that "the revolution was controlled by Communists - a premise which it failed to establish at the time and has
not established since," the burden of proof was on the Administration "and the administration has not proven its assertion of Com'26
munist control.
Senator Fulbright's views were vehemently challenged by some
of his colleagues in Congress, including the members of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations. Senators Long, 27 Smathers, s
Dodd, 29 Lausche,80 and Representative Selden, 81 were notable in
disagreeing with his position. Equally strong views were expressed
25 111 CONG. REC. 23001 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1965).

26Ibid.
27 Id. at 23005 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1965):
So far as I am concerned, this was simply a matter of whether this country
was going to stand aside and risk another Cuban type Communist takeover,
or whether we were going to move on the theory that this looked very much
as though it might be a Communist takeover, and that we would rather take
the chance of moving when it might not be necessary, than take the risk as President Eisenhower did - that this would be a Communist takeover.
We have information now that the Communists in the Dominican Republic
are stronger than Castro was when he started out to take Cuba.
We have information, available to the Senator from Arkansas, to lead us to
believe there is a real threat of Communist subjugation and conquest of that
island. That we do not wish to see take place.
See also id. at 23617 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1965).
28111 CONG. REc. 23006 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1965):
[F~or a certainty they sought to take over the Dominican Republic just as
they did Cuba, and that was a matter of grave concern to us when the
President sent in our troops to Santo Domingo .... What is wrong with
trying to save a country from Communism?
We had already lost Cuba to Castro. It has been admitted that there were
only about 12 known Communist leaders in Cuba with Castro when he
started his revolution.
29Id. at 23294, 23296-97 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1965). See also id. at 23296, where
Dodd suggests certain criteria to determine "with a reasonable degree of accuracy"
the extent of Communist control; id. at 23297, Dodd applies the set criteria to the
Dominican situation to prove that the Administration was convinced "that the Communists had seized control of the revolt and that any serious delay in intervening was
bound to result in another Cuba in the Caribbean." For statements by several Latin
American ambassadors conceding the threat of a Communist take-over and introduced
into the Congressional Record by Senator Dodd, see id. at 23295-96.
30
Id. at 23345-46 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1965):
[T]he proof was clear and convincing that unless we had stepped in we
would have at our shores another Cuba....
When the coup began, they [the Communists) immediately sprung to
the forefront, and within a few days they were occupying the leading positions in what was happening....
I am firmly of the conviction that if the President had not acted as he
did.., we now would have practically at our shores another Cuba.
31
Id. at 24073 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1965).
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in support of Fulbright's position, notably by his colleagues, Senators
34
Clark," Morse," and Young of Ohio.
Thus we are left with two conflicting contentions by the proponents and the opponents of the official United States position as to
the threat of a Communist take-over. In the absence of an independent fact-finding agency whose conclusions might be acceptable
to all concerned, 5 we have perhaps no other choice but to rely upon
the official United States position that not only did the Administration perceive the Communist threat as imminent but that it also had
sufficient evidence to prove it, and that security reasons alone prevent the Administration from divulging secret information on Com3
munist participation and control of the rebel movement. 1
Granting then that the danger of a Communist take-over in the
Dominican conflict was a real one," 7 the next section will test the
See, e.g., Clark's comment that the Committee on Foreign Relations was given a
whole sheaf of classified information on alleged Communist domination of the
Dominican revolt but that
[I)t was completely unconvincing as to any control of the revolution by
Communists except that it indicated that after, but not before, the massive
American intervention, a number of Communists did raise their heads and
take an active part in the revolution.
Id. at 23541 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1965) (emphasis added). See also id. at 23366
(daily ed. Sept. 17, 1965). For the criticism of the United States action by some
prominent Latin American leaders - Presidents of Venezuela, Peru, Chile, and
Mexico-see id. at 23540-41 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1965). See also id. at 10209
'(daily ed. May 14, 1965), N.Y. Times editorial entitled The Dominican Morass,
which reads in part:
Whether there was or was not a genuine threat of a Communist coupand U.S. correspondents are emphatic in casting doubt on Washington's
assertions that there was - it is clear that Dominican and Latin American
communism has been strengthened in reaction against the American intervention.
33 See, e.g., Morse's remarks that "the contention of the State Department that the
revolution was Communist-controlled was never substantiated by the State Department before our committee [Senate Committee on Foreign Relations]." Id. at
26184 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1965).
34 See id. at 23846 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1965), to the effect that there was "no evidence
of any Castro-like takeover." Young contends that "No communist was a leader in
the revolt. . . [T]here was no preponderance of the evidence available or adduced
that such a Communist takeover was even remotely in prospect."
35 See OEA/Ser. L/X/II, at 4-5 (Nov. 10, '1965), for the Report of the Special Consultative Committee of the OAS on the Dominican Situation, PAU, Special Consultative Committee on Security, Report of the Special Consultative Committee on Security
on the Work Done during its Fifth Regular Meeting.
36 See, e.g., Olsen, U.S. Holding Back Dominican Paper, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1965,
p. 34, col. 1 (city ed.), for a report that a State Department White Paper, about 60
manuscript pages, "is said to contain heretofore unpublished evidence supporting the
Government's appraisal of the Communist menace inherent in the April 24 revolt."
37 See, e.g., MARTIN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 705: "I have no doubt whatsoever that
there was a real danger of a Communist takeover of the Dominican Republic." Com32

pare HALPERN, BAD NEIGHBOR POLICY (1966),

The New York Review of Books,

Dec. 29, 1966, p. 10, 11, col. 2:
The only guiding principle of Washington's present Latin American policy
appears to be an obsession with the danger of a Communist takeover in
some Latin American country where things are not kept firmly enough
under control ....
[Slince the missile crisis of October 1962, Latin Americans tend to regard it as a mere pretext for interference in the internal
affairs of their countries.

1967

DOMINICAN CRISIS

validity of the United States action against the norms of international law.
C. Validity of the United States Action
Translated into legal terms, the United States' claim that it was
sending forces to prevent another Cuba implies that the situation
warranted self-defense measures by the United States. Thus, to
justify the United States action, one must first determine the boundaries of legitimate self-defense in international law. One could
point to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, Articles 3 and 6
of the Rio Treaty, and various OAS resolutions declaring Communism to be incompatible with the Inter-American system,"8 to indicate
what those boundaries are.
The United States did not base its claim on Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter which, notwithstanding the restrictions on
the use of force by a member state as contained in Article 2 (4) of
38

On

the general question of the Communist "intervention" in the hemisphere, the
Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, at Punta del Este,
decided per its Resolution 11(1) to request the OAS Council "to maintain all necessary vigilance" regarding the Communist interventionist activities in the hemisphere,
both to warn the governments of such actions and to recommend appropriate measures with regard thereto. Subsequently the Council, on October 9, 1962, resolved to
entrust the task to a Special Committee to deal with Resolutions 11(1) and VIII of
the 8th meeting. See also Report of the Special Consultative Committee on Security,
"The First Tricontinental Conference," Another Threat to the Security of the InterAmerican System, (study prepared by the Special Consultative Committee on Security
at its Sixth Regular Meeting) ;OEA/Ser. L/X/II. 12 (April 2, 1966) (regarding a
study on the First Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Conference Havana,
Jan. 3-15, 1966). Id. at 240-241, the Conference adopted a resolution condemning
the United States. House of Representatives Resolution of September 20, 1965 (notes
87-91 infra). Id. in operative paragraph 1, the Conference rejected "the pretensions
of the House of Representatives of the United States that arbitrarily intends to abrogate the right of intervening in the internal affairs of the Latin American countries."
Id. in operative paragraph 4, the Conference proclaimed "the right of the peoples
and governments of Latin America to request the assistance of any other state in the
world in case the imperialists intervene in their internal affairs, and the right and
duty of all countries to offer moral and material support to the peoples of our continent." Id. at 242-44, resolutions condemning the "so-called Inter-American Peace
Force and the Governments that support it," alleging that its purpose was to intervene in the national liberation movements. See also id.at 239, for criticism of the
OAS for creating the Inter-American Peace Force; id. at 238-39, for resolutions on
the OAS. Id. at 239, the Conference proclaimed that:
Neither the peoples of Latin America nor the governments that may come
into power as a result of the victory of the national liberation movements
in this continent are bound by any agreements or treaties of the Organization of American States, particularly the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, ad those that deny in practice the principles of non-intervention, self-determination, sovereign equality and independence.
See also Council of the OAS, OEA/Ser. G./IV, C-i-769 (Pan Am. Union 1966) for
the November 28, 1966 Report of the Special Committee to Study Resolutions 11.2
and VIII of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on
the First Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Conference and its Projections (Tricontinental Conference of Havana) -New Instrument of Communist Intervention and Aggression. For an earlier report of the Special Committee, see Council
of the OAS, OEA/Ser. G/IV, C-i-605 (Pan Am. Union 1963). See also the Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American
States Against the Intervention of International Communism at the Tenth InterAmerican Conference, Caracas, 1954. On the Caracas conference, see generally Tenth
Inter-American Conference, Caracas, Venezuela March 1-28, 1954 (Report of the
Pan Am. Union on the conference, PAU 1955). For a recent report on the "trouble-
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the United Nations Charter, 9 leaves the "inherent right of individual or collective self defense" of a member state unimpaired in case
of an "armed attack" occurring against it. 40 A brief discussion of
the nature and scope of article 51 will, however, be helpful in
putting the question of self-defense in a proper prospective.
It may be recalled that the Cuban Quarantine in November
1962, had reopened the debate on the import of "armed attack"
within the context of article 51. Challenging the legality of the
United States action, Professor Quincy Wright reiterated his earlier
stand that the use of force by a nation state must be in response to
an "actual armed attack."'" More recently, in his discussion on the
Viet-Nam conflict, Professor Wright has again asserted that
it is true that traditional international law permitted military action
if in self-defense there were an instant and overwhelming necessity
some resurgence of guerrilla activity" in Latin America, see Goodsell, New terrorist
acts called Castro's work, The Christian Science Monitor, April 1, 1967, p. B7, col.
1-3. See also Gonzalez, Guerrilla Groups in Latin American Countries, 112 CONG.
REc. 25977 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1966). See also Goodsell, Dominican backlash touched
off, The Christian Science Monitor, May 11, 1967, p. 5, col. 3, reports on terrorist
activities and "mounting political tension" in the Dominican Republic. See also
Goodsell, Civil War Echo.' Dominican Republic Terrorism Mounts, id. May 16, 1967,
p. 11, col. 4-5; Reuter's report Dominican sees plot by Hundreds: Balaguer charges
Reds are fomenting a revolution, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1967, p. 10, col. 1;
an editorial entitled, Violence in Santo Domingo, id. May 13, 1967, p. 32, col. 1-2,
and a new item from Hong Kong reportedly based on a commentary in Hsiahua, the
Red Chinese news agency and entitled Peking Acclaims Dominican Reds: says Mao's
ideas help them make giant strides, id. p. 9, col. 1. On the recent activities of reportedly Castroite guerillas in Bolivia, see id., May 11, 1967, p. 9, col. 1. On the
"increasing tempo of the activities of the Havana-based Tri-Continental Congress"
that was reportedly resulting in unrest in Latin America, see Senator Thurmond's
remarks entitled Latin American subversion, a collection of several articles dealing
with the "plan of the international Communist conspiracy," 113 CONG. REC. S 7181
(daily ed. May 19, 1967).
39 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4, provides:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.
40 U.N. CHARTER art. 51, provides in part:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security.
41 Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 546 (1963). Wright concludes:
It cannot be doubted that the United States Government acted skillfully to
obtain the removal of the long-range missiles from Cuba. ...It cannot be
easily argued, however, that the United States has lived up to its legal
obligations to respect the freedom of the seas, to submit threats to the peace
to the United Nations before taking unilateral action, and to refrain from
use or threat of force in international relations except in individual or collective self-defense against armed attack, under authority of the United
Nations, or with consent of the state against which the force is used.
The episode has not improved the reputation of the United States as a
champion of international law....
The Cuban quarantine, like the Suez and Hungarian episodes of 1956,
demonstrates the reluctance of a great Power to observe its legal obligations
when dealing with unpalatable action or attitudes of a small state, especially
when that small state is located in a position of strategic importance to the
great Power.
Id. at 563-64.

1967

DOMINICAN CRISIS
permitting no moment for deliberation, i.e., if hostile forces were

about to attack. It seems clear, however, that the San Francisco Conference, by limiting self-defense to cases of 'armed attack' intended
to eliminate all preventive or pre-emptive action in order to maintain
to the utmost the basic obligation of Members of the United

Nations to 'refrain
42 in their international relations from the threat
or use of force.'
Professor Myres McDougal, on the other hand, would construe
article 51 to honor "appropriate responses to threats of imminent
attack. ' 48 He would consider article 51 to safeguard the customary
right of self-defense and not to restrict it. This would mean that
anticipatory self-defense measures by a nation state, once it had met
the customary standards of necessity and proportionality, would be
considered permissible." Commenting on the Cuban Quarantine
controversy, Professor Brunson MacChesney concluded that nothing
in the history of article 51 required "a construction limiting selfdefense to a response to an armed attack." 4 5 He warned that realism,
common sense, and the destructive nature of modern weapons demand the retention of this customary right under adequate safeguards
until the community system makes its use no longer necessary.4 6
Perhaps by "realism" and "common sense" Professor MacChesney refers to the need to meet the pressing challenges of what have
often been described as acts of "indirect aggression" in the present
world. One such case in point was that of Lebanon which, in June
1958, had claimed the application of provisions of article 51 to
justify the landing of United States forces on its soil. Lebanon said
that the United States forces in Lebanon were in response to its
request for assistance against what it termed was the indirect aggres47
sion of the United Arab Republic.
In the Security Council debates the United States representative,
Ambassador Lodge, urged the United Nations to support the efforts
" Wright, Legal Aspects of the Viet-Nam Situation, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 750, 765
(1966.)
43 McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantineand Self-defense, 57 Am. J. INT'L L. 597,
600 (1963).
4Ibid:

There is, further, nothing in the subsequent conduct of the parties to the
agreement expressed in the United Nations Charter which would indicate
genuine shared expectations that they had in Article 51 given up their customary right of self-defense; indeed, again, the most relevant official utterances would suggest the exact opposite.
Professor McDougal refers to Mallison, Limited Naval Blockade or QuarantineInterdiction: National and Collective Defense Claims Valid Under InternationalLaw,
31 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 335 (1962); McDevitt, The UN Charter and the Cuban
Quarantine, 17 JAG J. 71 (1963) (collection of relevant official utterances).
45 MacChesney, Some Comments on the 'Quarantine' of Cuba, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 592,
594 (1963).
46 Ibid.
4 See U.N. Doc. No. S/4007 (1958), for letter dated May 22, 1958 from the Lebanese Representative addressed to the Security Council President; U.N. SEcuRITY
COUNCIL OFF. REc. 13th year, 823d meeting 1-22 (S/PV.823) (1958) (Lebanese
Representative's address before the Security Council).
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of a democratically elected government to protect itself from indirect
aggression. He recalled the United Nation's handling of the Greek
question in 1946 and the "Essentials of Peace" and "Peace Through
Deeds" resolutions 4" adopted by the General Assembly to show that
the United Nations' duty extended to cases of indirect aggression. 9
President Eisenhower and several representatives at the United
Nations also held that since Lebanon's appeal had been made in
accordance with the provisions of article 51,50 the United States was
justified in responding to the appeal. It was claimed that: "The
armed attack referred to in Article 51 need not be direct attack.
Article 51 was intended to cover all cases of attack, direct or indirect.
11' It was asserted by other United Nations representatives that
since no "armed attack" had occurred against Lebanon, article 51
did not apply and that the United States action was in violation of
article 2 (4).5 The Council debates left the issue unresolved."
It
may also be recalled that the United Nations' efforts to define
"aggression," "armed aggression," "self-defense," ' 54 and "armed
55
attack" have thus far remained futile.
Contemporary political conditions would perhaps demand that
"armed attack" in article 51 not be read to mean "actual armed
attack.'"'5 Revolutionary changes in science and technology with
their impact on armaments, the so-called "wars of national liberation," and highly sophisticated and refined mechanisms of carrying
on subversive activities might, after all, prove as dangerous to the
"political independence" and "territorial integrity" 57 of a nation state
48

49

See U.N. GEN. Ass. Res. 290 (IV) 1949 and Res. 380 (V) 1950, the last of which
denounces as a form of aggression and international crime, the "fomenting of civil
strife in the interest of a foreign Power."

See U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 13th year, 827th meeting 6-11 (S/PV.827)
(1958) (statements by Ambassador Lodge).
50 See GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 3d Emer. Sp. Sess., Plenary 733, at 7-10 (A/or/ES.
III/PV.733) (1958). See also id., Plenary 737, at 51-53 (statement by the Repre-

sentative of New Zealand, it being a typical statement of a similar plea made by
several other representatives).
51 2 REPERTORY

OF PRACTICE

OF UNITED NATIONS

ORGANS,

Supp.

No. 2,

at 467

(1964).
52 See id. at 467-68 (summary of this viewpoint).

53See id. at 468-69. See also Wright, The United States Intervention in the Lebanon,
53 AM. J. INT'L L. 112 (1959).
54 See generally BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1958)

defense) ;

BROWNLIE,

INTERNATIONAL

LAW AND

(on self-

THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES

(1963)
(on self-defense); JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS, AN INTRODUCTION 163-69 (1948) (on self-defense).

5 See, e.g., U.N. GEN. Ass., Report of the 1956 Special Committee on the Question
of Defining Aggression, Supp. No.

16

(A/3574)

(1957);

U.N. GEN. Ass.,

Report of the 6th Committee, (A/3576) (1957), for a wide range of views presented therein. See generally STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER (1958).
58 For a strong plea for this position by Professor McDougal, see note 43 supra.
57 See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4, which, as a major principle of the United Nations,
prohibits "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state."
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as an open armed attack." It is no surprise that such a strong advocate of restricting the right of self-defense to cases of "actual armed
attack" as Professor Quincy Wright, has recently observed that:
There can be no doubt but that bodies of armed 'volunteers' crossing a frontier or cease-fire line, such as the Chinese in the Korean
hostilities of 1950, or ostensibly private 'military expeditions' or
'armed bands' leaving one country for the purpose of attacking another, as the Cuban refugees in the Bay of Pigs affair of 1961,
constituted, if of considerable magnitude, an 'armed attack.' 59
Even if one assumes that the provisions of article 51 concerning
armed attack are to be construed to apply to a situation such as that
of Greece in 1946 and Lebanon and Jordan in 1958, wherein it was
claimed that subversive elements fomented and assisted by external
participants threatened the political independence or territorial integrity of a nation state, would the 1965 Dominican conflict qualify
as a similar situation? Or would it qualify as a situation similar to
the one created by the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962
which, it was claimed, posed an imminent threat to the security of
the United States, thereby making anticipatory self-defense measures
justifiable?
To answer the latter question first, even given Professor
McDougal's broad interpretation of article 51, and the official
United States view of the "facts" of the Dominican conflict, the
United States action in sending armed forces could not be sustained
as having complied with the provisions of article 51. To argue that
the presence of Communists in the rebel movement or that a Communist threat to take over the movement presented a situation similar to that of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, thereby constituting an
"armed attack" against the United States and giving the
United
States the right to take anticipatory self-defense measures, would be
a futile attempt in reasoning and logic.
The first question, i.e., whether or not indirect aggression
threatened the political independence of the Dominican Republic
and thus justified collective self-defense measures, will be answered
not merely within the framework of article 51 but within the broader
5 See, e.g., Meeker, Viet-Nam and the International Law of Self-defense, 56 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 54, 59 (1967), stating:
I have heard and read arguments by some that Viet-Nam does not
present a situation of "armed attack" because invading armies were not
massed at a border and did not march across it in broad daylight. To be
sure, that is the way armed attacks occurred in 1914, at the beginning of
World War II, and even in Korea. But strategies and tactics have changed.
. . . The judgment whether North Viet-Nam has engaged in "armed
attack" against the South cannot depend on the form or appearance of its
conduct. The crucial consideration is that North Viet-Nam has marshaled
the resources of the state and has sent instrumentalities of the state, including units of its regular armed forces, into South Viet-Nam to achieve.
state objectives by force- in this case to subject the South to its rule.
9 Wright, supra note 42, at 765.
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perspective of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance
(Rio Treaty),6" the OAS Charter,"' and other community prescriptions as evidenced by declarations and resolutions of the United
Nations and the OAS.
Article 3(1) of the Rio Treaty provides that "an armed attack
by any State against an American State shall be considered as an
attack against all the American States... ." In such a situation each
member state "undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense
recognized by Article 51 of the United Nations."
If we consider the provisions of this article in conjunction with
article 2(4) of the United Nations, prior OAS declarations, the
recent reaffirmation by the United Nations General Assembly that
"armed attack by one State against another or the use of force in
any other form contrary to the charter of the United Nations constitutes a violation of international law giving rise to international
responsibility," 6 2 and the earlier discussion on the import of armed
attack in the contemporary world, one might come to a tentative
conclusion that the threatened Communist take-over of the Dominican Republic constituted an armed attack against the country, and
hence, the United States was exercising its right of collective selfdefense. After all, the Tenth Inter-American Conference of the OAS
had, in a resolution adopted at Caracas in 1954,3 declared that the
domination or control of the political institutions of any American
state by the international Communist movement constituted a threat
to the sovereignty and political independence of the American states
and would call for a Meeting of Consultation to take appropriate
measures. Again, in 1962, the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, meeting at Punta del Este,6 4 declared
that Marxism-Leninism was incompatible with the principles of the
Inter-American system. The meeting excluded "the present Government of Cuba" from participation in the Inter-American system because of this "incompatibility.''65 It also urged upon
the member States to take those steps they may consider appropriate
for their individual or collective self-defense. . . to counteract
60 Signed at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace

and Security, Rio de Janeiro, Aug. 15-Sept. 2, 1947.
"5Signed at the Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogota, in 1948.
62 Resolution adopted on Nov. 30,
1966, by a vote of 98-2-8, U.N. Doc. No.

A/2160/XXI (1966).
63 Resolution adopted at the Tenth American Conference, Caracas; see Resolutions
XCIII, Declaration of Solidarity for the preservation of the political integrity of
the American states against the intervention of international Communism, and XCV,
Declaration of Caracas, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN STATES 433,
436 (2d Supp. 1942-54).
64 Final act, Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 1962.
65 O.A.S., ser. F/11.8 (Resolution VI).
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threats or acts of aggression, subversion or other dangers to peace
and security resulting from the
66 continued intervention in this hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers.
Subsequently, the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs was even more specific in suggesting measures to
meet the danger of Communist subversion. After finding Cuba
guilty of attempting to subvert Venezuelan institutions through sabotage, terrorism, and guerrilla warfare, the Meeting adopted a resolution warning the Cuban Government that, if it persisted in carrying
out aggressive and interventionist acts against one or more member
states of the OAS, the member states "shall preserve their essential
rights as sovereign States by the use of self-defense in either individual or collective form, which could go so far as a resort to armed
forces. .... "67

However, even if the United States qualified, under article 3 (1)
of the Rio Treaty, to take collective self-defense measures, a prerequisite for taking such unilateral action contained in article 3 (2)
is that the state attacked must first make a request for help. The
responding state could render aid "in fulfillment of the obligation"
contained in article 3(1) which aid might continue until the Organ
of Consultation took appropriate measures to meet the situation.
There was no established government in the Dominican Republic to
ask for United States assistance. Ambassador Stevenson asserted
that the United States had sent forces to the Dominican Republic
because on April 28, "the only apparent responsible authority in
Santo Domingo addressed a request to the United States Government
to send in armed forces." 6 But it should be noted that in view of
the prevailing chaotic conditions in the Dominican Republic, and in
view of the almost evenly balanced competing claims of the rebels
and the military junta for the control of the people and resources of
the country, the military junta could not be said to have the authority
to speak for the state. Furthermore, the request for armed forces was
initially made to protect United States citizens and other nationals.6"
In the days to follow, the United States was never asked to send in
more troops or to keep those that were already there for the new
purpose of preventing a Communist take-over which might endanger
Resolution 11, Pan. Am. Union, Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance
Applications 1960-64, 70, 72 (1964).
67See op. cit. supra note 63, at 186.
68
U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 20th year, 1200th meeting 5 (S/PV.1200)
(1965) (Ambassador Stevenson's statement).
69See, e.g., 52 DEPT STATE BULL. 742 (1965), for the President's statement of
April 30, 1965:
We took this step when and only when, we were officially notified by
police and military officials of the Dominican Republic that they were no
longer in a position to guarantee the safety of American and foreign nationals and to preserve law and order.
68
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the political independence or territorial integrity of the Dominican
Republic.
The 1965 Dominican crisis would therefore present a situation
different from the ones in Lebanon and Jordan in 1958 or in Greece
in 1946, and could not be justified under Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter. And, since the conditions of Artide 3(2) of the
Rio Treaty were not met, the United States' action would not be
justified under Article 3 of the Rio Treaty.70
Article 6 of the Rio Treaty7 ' applies to a situation wherein the
"inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or
political independence" of an American state is affected by "aggression which is not an armed attack," but which might "endanger the
peace of America." In view of the earlier discussion on Communist
participation in the rebel movement, could the Dominican Republic
be said to have been a victim of such an aggression?7" If so, the
strict prohibitions of Articles 15 and 17 of the OAS Charter against
intervention in the internal affairs of another member state, no matter for what reason, would be modified by Article 19 of the OAS
Charter which authorizes measures undertaken for the maintenance
of peace and security in accordance with existing treaties.
However, Article 6 of the Rio Treaty expressly provides the
procedure for remedial measures, and these should be undertaken
only by the Organ of Consultation. Although the United States'
See Friedmann, United States Policy and the Crisis of International Law, 59 AM.
J. INT'L L. 857, 868 (1965). Compare Thomas & Thomas, The Dominican Republic Crisis 1965: Legal Aspects, HAMMARSKJOLD FORUMS 32-34 (1966). They
justified the United States action under the Rio Treaty on the theory that:
[A) third state may act in self-defense to assist another state in repelling
an aggression when there exists a close relationship between the two
states based on solidarity for the legal interests of both states would be
violated by an armed attack against either one of them.
Id. at 33-34, they would justify the United States action on the basis of the
doctrine of "necessity" which, they admit in the footnote, is "often disputed
and is generally limited to the necessity to act in self-defense only." Id. at 33-34
n.86. There may be some question as to the application of the customary prescriptions to conditions of anarchy and as to whether such conditions might demand the
application of a different set of prescriptions. See BROWNLIE, op. cit. supra note 54,
at 321.
71 FENWICK, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES App. B, Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, art. 6, at 574-75 (1963):
If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty
or political independence of any American State should be affected by an
aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or intracontinental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger
the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately
in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures
which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance
of the peace and security of the Continent.
7 See notes 6-20 supra and accompanying text. See also 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 744,
747 (1965), containing the President's statement of May 2: "[R]evolution in any
country is a matter for that country to deal with. It becomes a matter calling for
hemispheric action only . . . when the object is the establishment of a Communist
dictatorship."
70
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action did not meet with the procedural requirements of article 6,
could it perhaps still be argued, since the time factor was crucial, and
the initial United States action was undertaken to preserve the status
quo until the OAS took over, that the United States did not violate
the spirit of the law? Prior to taking any unilateral action had not
the United States asked the OAS to meet?7 3 And, subsequent to its
action, did it not willingly agree to follow the OAS mandate? 7 4 To
illustrate, the official United States memorandum outlining the legal
basis for the United States' action was quite explicit in its pronouncement that the continued presence of the United States forces in the
Dominican Republic was
for the additional purpose of preserving the capacity of the OAS to
function in the manner
and justice by securing
processes within which
ment, free from outside

intended by its charter-to achieve peace
a cease-fire and by reestablishing orderly
can choose their own governDominicans 75
interference.

7
Similar statements were made by, among others, Secretary Rusk,'

79
78
77
Ambassadors Stevenson and Bunker, and legal advisor Meeker.

This justification for the United States action would be further
supported by the subsequent action of the OAS. By establishing an
Inter-American Peace Force,8 ° the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of
Foreign Ministers perhaps implicitly approved of the United States
action. Thus it could be argued that the United States took preliminary measures to preserve the situation for collective action,
which eventually followed, thereby ratifying the initial unilateral
action by the United States. Furthermore, the Security Council of
the United Nations had also given implicit approval to the United
States action by rejecting the Soviet resolution to condemn the United
73The United States had asked the Peace Committee of the OAS to meet on the
twenty-seventh. On the morning of the twenty-eighth it again called upon the OAS
Council to meet and discuss the Dominican situation. See 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 941
(1965) (Secretary Rusk's statement).
4
7 See, e.g., 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 874-75, 879-80, 883-85 (1965) (Ambassador
Stevenson's statements made in the Security Council debates).
75 111 CONG. REc. 10733 (daily ed. May 20, 1965). The Memorandum further said,
"The action of the United States has given the organs of the OAS the essential time
in which to consider the situation in the Dominican Republic and to determine
means of preserving the rights that country has under the Inter-American system."
76 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 842 (1965).
771d. at 879-80.
78

Id. at 859.
79 Meeker, The Dominican Situation in the Perspective of InternationalLaw, 53 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 62 (1965).
80
See U.N. Doc. No. S/6333 (1965); U.N. Doc. No. S/6333/Rev. 1 (1965); 52
DEP'T STATE BULL. 862-63 (1965), for the text of the resolution adopted in Plenary
Session by the Tenth Meeting on May 6, 1965, regarding the formation of an InterAmerican force as recommended by the Special Committee. The vote was 15-5 (Chile,
Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay) with Venezuela abstaining. See also 17
AMERiCAS 41-43 (May 1965).
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States armed intervention in the internal affairs of the Dominican
Republic.8 1
The conclusion, however, is inescapable that since the United
States had unilaterally used armed forces in a primarily internal
conflict situation, it did not comply with the spirit of the law.8 2 This
conclusion follows regardless of the ex post facto vindication of the
United States claim by the OAS and the United Nations,8" and regardless of the distinctions forwarded to contrast this action from
the prior "gunboat diplomacy" of the nineteenth and early twentieth
84
century.
The reaction of the United States Congress following the Dominican conflict gives an interesting insight into its members' perception of the relevance of international law to such a situation.
A House Resolution adopted on September 20, 1965,5 provides that,
81 See U.N. Doc. No. S/6328 (1965)

(draft resolution by the Soviet Union).

Even an ardent critic of the United States action in the Dominican Republic, Senator
Fulbright, concedes that pursuant to the United States action there has been stability
in the country. See generally FULBRIGHT, ARROGANCE OF POWE, 83-92 '(1967).
Those of us who criticized the American intervention must concede that a
degree of order and stability in the Dominican Republic was restored more
quickly than seemed likely in the spring and summer of 1965 and that
credit for this properly belongs to United States diplomacy, to the Organization of American States, and to the Inter-American Force which remained
in the Dominican Republic until the summer of 1966, as well as to the
provisional government which held office from September 1965 to July
1966 and to the elected government which succeeded it.
Id. at 84. For recent reports on the political situation in the Dominican Republic,
see Rodman, Belaguer: The First Nine Months - An interim report on the Dominican Republic, The New Republic, March 25, 1967, at 19-23; Meagher, Belaguer's
Progress gives reasons for Hope, The National Observer, March 13, 1967, p. 12,
col. 3.
8 See U.N. Doc. No. S/6328 (1965), for the text of the Soviet resolution condemning
the United States action and asking for withdrawal of United States forces from
the Dominican Republic. The resolution asking for United States condemnation was
lost in the Council, with the Soviet Union alone voting in its favor and four
members, France, Ivory Coast, Jordan and Malaysia, abstaining. See U.N. SECURIT
COUNCIL OFF. REc. 20th year, 1214th meeting 22-23 (S/PV.1214) (1965), for
voting on the withdrawal part of the Soviet resolution which was lost with only two
Union and Jordan. See also id. 1204th meeting 1-2 (S/6346/Rev.
in favor -Soviet
1) (rejection of the Soviet amendments to the Uruguayan resolution); id. 1214th
meeting 10-12 (to the same effect) ; id. 1216th meeting 10-11. See also Comment,
The Dominican Crisis:An Examination of Traditionaland Contemporary Concepts of
InternationalLaw, 4 DUQUESNE U.L. REv. 547, 565 (1965-66):
It is further argued that prior Security Council authorization was not
required, this evidenced by the fact that the Security Council did not
approve any of the censure motions submitted to the Council against the
United States or the Organization of American States, individually or
collectively.
It is submitted that this conclusion does not follow from the Council's rejection of
the Soviet resolution condemning the United States' action; non-condemnation does
not necessarily mean approval. As is suggested later, in notes 128-38 infra and
accompanying text, the Council did not resolve the issue.
(Under84 See, e.g., The New Diplomacy, 52 DFP'T STATE BULL. 1042, 1045 (1965)
secretary Ball's address of June 6, 1965), wherein Ball contrasts prior United States
interventions in the Dominican Republic with the "new diplomacy" adopted in the
1965 crisis. Compare FENWICK, op. cit. supra note 71.
85 See 111 CONG. REC. 23458-73 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1965) (discussion of the H.R.
560). For voting on the resolution (312 for, 52 against, three answering "present"
and 65 not voting), see id. at 23473-74.
8
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since any Communist domination or threat of it violates the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, 6 and of collective security as
declared by the OAS resolution and acts,17 and is dangerous to the
peace and safety of the Western Hemisphere, any member state can,
in the exercise of individual or collective self-defense, which could
go so far as to resort to armed force.., take steps to forestall or
combat intervention, domination, control, and colonization in whatever form, by the subversive forces known as international
Commu88
nism and its agencies in the Western Hemisphere.
The resolution apparently disregards well-established community
norms contained in Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the United Nations
Charter, and Articles 15 and 17 of the OAS Charter.
As expected, some Latin American countries were unfavorably
disposed toward this resolution. While Peru's Chamber of Deputies
voted to protest against it, and reject it, Colombia's Congress called
it "openly aggressive and contrary to the jurisdiction and political
system of Latin America." 8 9

II.

THE COMPETENCE OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN
STATES vis-a-vis THE UNITED NATIONS 90

The Dominican crisis reopened the debate on the proper delineation of competence and responsibility between the Organization of
American States and the United Nations to deal with regional conflicts in the Western Hemisphere. This section will examine the relevant provisions of the charters of the OAS and the United Nations
and past trends in similar situations, and then appraise the problem
in the light of the Dominican experience.
8 See THE MONROE

DOCTRINE (Dozer ed. 1965) (recent study on the Monroe
Doctrine).
87 The Resolution especially referred to the declaration made by the Ninth Meeting of
Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, serving as Organ of Consultation
at Punta del Este in 1962.
8 111 CONG. REc. 23458 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1965). See Id. at 24710 (daily ed. Sept.
30, 1965) (criticism by Senator Fulbright) ; id. at 25322 '(daily ed. Oct. 7, 1965)
(criticism by Senator Clark).
89 DENNIS, DOMINICAN DILEMMA 270 (Editorial Research Report 1966).
90CAYNES,

THE ORGANIZATION

OF AMERICAN STATES AND

THE UNITED NATIONS

(6th ed. 1963);

CONNELL & SMITH, THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 214-19, 312-15
INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, THE

(1966);
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM (1966). See generally Claude, Jr., The OAS, the UN,
and the United States, 547 INT'L CONC. (March 1964); Halderman, Regional

Reform Measures and the United Nations, 52 GaO. L.J. 89, (1963); MacDonald,
The Developing Relationship between Superior and Subordinate Political Bodies at
the International Level: A Note on the Experience of the United Nations and the
Organization of American States, 2 CAN. YB. INT'L L. 21 (1964); Whitaker,
Development of American Regionalism, 469 INT'L CONC. (March 1951); Wilcox,
Regionalism and the United Nations, 29 INT'L ORGN. 789, 797-803 (1965); Wood
& Morales M., Latin America and the United Nations, XIX, 29 INT'L ORGN. 714
(1965).
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A. The Charter Provisions
Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, dealing with
"Regional Arrangements," was a compromise between "regionalists""' and "universalists" 92 and was adopted at the United Nations
Conference on International Organization at San Francisco. 93 As
such, it is capable of varying and even conflicting interpretations.
One interpretation would be that regional organizations should be
used to settle local disputes before bringing them to the United
Nations. Article 52(2) of the United Nations Charter for instance,
specifically provides for such an arrangement,9 4 and article 52(3)
provides for the encouragement of pacific settlement of local disputes through regional machinery. Articles 33 and 51 support the
argument that regional arrangements have priority to deal with disputes of a local nature. Article 33 calls upon the parties to a dispute
to seek, among other means, pacific resort to "regional agencies or
91 Proceedings at the 1945 Inter-American Conference in Mexico City (February 21
to March 13) and the resulting resolution VIII on "Reciprocal Assistance and
American Solidarity," also known as The Act of Chapultapec, show the strong
feelings of the Latin American countries toward regionalism. In large measure, this
attitude stemmed from their misgivings about the effectiveness of a veto-ridden
Security Council as anticipated in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. See generally
INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, op. cit. supra note
90, at XXIX- XXXI. See also id. at XXXI:
The American Republics were particularly concerned by the fact that within
the world structure for the maintenance of peace the privilege of the veto
was established for the so-called "great powers," which, they felt, might
retard or even completely paralyze regional action. [The adoption of Ch.
VIII and the acceptance of the formula incorporated in Article 51 recognizing the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense.] Acceptance was thereby given to the legitimacy of regional action with respect to
the pacific settlement of disputes as well as with respect to collective
security and, therefore, to the compatibility of such action with the principles and procedures governing both matters in the United Nations
Charter.
See also CAYNES, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AND THE UNITED
NATIONS (5th ed. 1960).
On the Chapultapec Conference, see INMAN, INTERAMERICAN CONFERENCES 1826-1954: HISTORY AND PROBLEMS 210-20 (1965)
'(Chapultapec Conference) .
At San Francisco, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, among others, was a strong
supporter of regionalism. See generally THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF SENATOR VANDENBERG 186-93 (Vandenberg, Jr. ed. 1952), wherein Senator Vandenberg seems
primarily concerned with the protection of the Monroe Doctrine and regionalism
from the possible inroads made by the United Nations.
92 At the higher echelons of the United States decision makers, Secretary Hull's name
should be especially mentioned as a strong proponent of universalism. At the earlier
stages of discussion on the establishment of an international organization, he was
instrumental in formulating the United States preferences toward the subordination
of regional organizations to the projected United Nations. See generally 2 THE
MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HULL 1640-46 (1948). See also RUSSELL & MUTHER, A
HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER 121, 255, 398-99 (1958).
93The conference was held from April 25 to June 26, 1945. See generally 12 Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Fran.
cisco, 1945 663-866 '(1945) (debates in Commission III, Committee IV).
94 U.N. CHARTER art. 52, para. 2 provides:
The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or
constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such
regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

1967

DOMINICAN CRISIS

arrangements" for its solution, and article 51 recognizes the "inherent right" of collective self-defense. Several provisions in the
Inter-American instruments would further strengthen this contention.
Article 20 of the OAS Charter stipulates that international disputes
between American states "shall be submitted to the peaceful procedures set forth in this Charter, before being referred to the Security
Council of the United Nations." Article 2 of the Rio Treaty provides
for the settlement of "every controversy" between member states
through the Inter-American machinery "before referring it to the
General Assembly 9 5 1 or the Security Council of the United Nations."
Article II of the 1948 Pact of Bogota 9 6 has a similar provision.
Articles 52 (4), 34 and 39, read in conjunction with Articles 103
and 24 of the United Nations Charter, Article 102 of the OAS
Charter and Article 10 of the Rio Treaty, support a contrary view.
While Article 34 of the United Nations Charter authorizes the
Security Council to investigate any dispute or situation "which might
lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute," and article 35
confers upon member states the right to bring before the United
Nations any dispute or situation "of the nature referred to in Article
34," article 39 provides that the "Security Council shall determine
the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act
of aggression" and take appropriate measures to maintain or restore
international peace and security. Article 103 states that the obligations of a member state under the United Nations Charter take
precedence over its obligations "under any other international agreement" and if there is a conflict between those obligations, article 24
assigns to the Security Council the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. Similarly, by declaring that
nothing in the Inter-American agreements would be construed as
impairing the rights and obligations of member states under the
United Nations Charter, Article 102 of the OAS Charter and Article
10 of the Rio Treaty establish the subordination of regional to universal obligations.
Other pertinent articles in the United Nations Charter are
Articles 36, 41, 43, 53 and 54. While article 36," dealing with pacific
settlement, may be construed to support either position, article 41 and
95No other Inter-American instrument mentions the General Assembly in this context.
96
See STOETZER, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES 98-115 (1965) (text

of Pact of Bogota, also called the Inter-American Treaty on Pacific Settlement).
97U.N. CHARTER art. 36 provides in part:

(1) The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature
referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend
appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.
(2) The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted
by the parties.
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42, referring to appropriate measures to maintain or restore international peace and security, are especially important in the context
of article 53, which prohibits regional organizations from taking any
"enforcement action" without prior authority by the Security Council.
Article 54 calls upon the regional organizations to keep the Security
Council fully informed at all times of their "activities undertaken or
in contemplation" for the maintenance of international peace and
security.
Any attempt to reconcile the conflicting interpretations which
the charter provisions pose must consider the key words in these
articles, "disputes" and "enforcement action." First, to what kinds
of disputes are the Charter provisions prescribing procedures and
priorities for regional organizations applicable? Second, does the
prior seizing of a local "dispute" by a regional organization preclude
its discussion, investigation, and disposal by the Security Council?
Finally, what does the term "enforcement action" encompass?
Unlike other parts of the United Nations Charter, Chapter VIII
makes no distinction between "disputes" and "situations," 98 and
neither does any Inter-American instrument. Similarly, the term
"enforcement action" is nowhere defined in the United Nations
Charter or in the Inter-American instruments. Thus, the only discernible guideline for clarification, if any, will be available through
a study of the past trends.
B. Past Trends
It would seem that the charter provisions contemplate no definable limit to the scope of "dispute." Different types of disputes,
both in terms of participants and the nature of the dispute, have
been brought before the United Nations. While participants have
ranged from a Latin American state against the United States or
against another state to a member state against the OAS, the nature
of disputes has varied from outright armed conflicts and conflicts
involving diplomatic and economic sanctions to those alleged to
cause a threat to the peace or breach of the peace. In this section,
a summary review of some selected regional disputes before the
United Nations will show that their prior seizure by the regional
organization has not been considered a strong enough reason to preclude a member state from raising the controversy before the United
Nations, thereby indicating that the obligation of member states to
bring local disputes before the OAS does not bar their access to the
international arena. The following discussion will also show that the
term "enforcement action" has consistently been given a narrow con98 See INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, op. cit. supra

note 90, at 183-89 (an elaboration).
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struction, thereby recognizing the autonomy of the OAS to deal with
most regional disputes without prior United Nations authorization.
1. Access to the United Nations
The 1954 Guatemalan crisis,"9 for the first time, raised the
question of the relative competence of the United Nations and the
OAS to deal with a regional dispute.
Following the crossing of the Honduras-Guatemala border by a
rebel army on June 18, 1954, the Government of President Arbenz
appealed simultaneously to the President of the Security Council'..
to take appropriate measures
and the Inter-American Committee'
to meet the situation. Subsequently, Arbenz asked the Inter-American
Committee to suspend consideration of Guatemala's complaint and
requested its complete withdrawal since the case was already before
the Security Council.'
In its complaint before the Security Council, Guatemala invoked
Articles 34, 35 and 39 of the United Nations Charter, seeking the
Council's assistance to "put a stop to the aggression in progress"
against it.' 0 8
The Security Council met on June 20 to consider the complaint.104 The Guatemalan representative contended that there was
no dispute between Guatemala and any other state, but that it was a
case of aggression and therefore articles 33 and 55(2) giving priority to the regional organizations did not apply. He accused Honduras,
Nicaragua, and the United States of conspiring to overthrow the
Guatemalan government and asked the Council to send an observation team to Guatemala and to warn the states named against continuing to support the rebels. The Brazilian-Colombian draft
resolution, which would have referred the complaint to the OAS for
urgent consideration,' 0 5 was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The Council then unanimously adopted the French draft calling upon the
member states to refrain from assisting the belligerents and urging
99

PRELUDE
(1954);
RED DESIGNS FOR THE AMERICAS: GUATEMALAN
JAMES,
MECHAM, THE UNITED STATES AND INTER-AMERICAN SECURITY 1889-1960 445-53
(1961); SILVERT, THE CONFLICT SOcITY: REACTION AND REVOLUTION IN LATIN
AMERICA 113-41 (1961); TORIELLO, LA BATALLA DE GUATEMALA (1955); Dreir,
The Organization of American States and United States Policy, 17 INT'L ORGN. 36
(1963); Grant, Guatemala and United States Foreign Policy, 9 J. INT'L AFF. 64

(1955); Taylor, The Guatemalan Affair- A Critique of United States Foreign
Policy, 50 AM. POL. ScI. REV.787 ('1956).
100 U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 9th year, Supp. May-June 1954, at 13(S/32)
(1954).
101See Report of the Inter-American Peace Committee to the Fifth Meeting of Consultation, App. D (1959).
10
2 See INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, op. cit. supra
note 90, at 89-90 (brief report).
103 See note 100 supra.
1

N U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF.

105

id. at 15.

REC. 9th Year, 675th meeting (S/PV.675)

(1954).
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an immediate termination of hostilities. Thus, the Council assumed
competence to discuss the case, notwithstanding assertion by some
Latin American states and the United States that it should not do so.
Five days later, the Council again met to discuss Guatemala's
complaint that Honduras and Nicaragua were not complying with
the Council's resolution.'0 6 Guatemala invoked Article 103 of the
United Nations Charter in support of its right to obtain access to the
Security Council instead of resorting to the OAS. The vote on placing
the Guatemalan issue on the Council agenda was four in favor, five
against and two (France and the United Kingdom) abstaining. The
outcome, however, did not reflect the Council's verdict against its
competence to deal with a regional conflict but rather was a recognition of special political and ideological undertones of the SovietUnited States confrontation in an area of primary United States
10 7
influence.
Since the Security Council and the OAS did nothing to prevent
the fall of the Arbenz government and Guatemala's take-over by
Colonel Castillo Armas, at the next General Assembly session several
Latin American representatives severely criticized the failure of the
Security Council to act. To illustrate, the Argentine representative
asserted that:
The existence of regional arrangements does not mean that they or
the agencies created under them take precedence over the United
Nations, or that the United Nations should refrain from discussing
or endeavouring to settle problems submitted to it by a government
representing a member state.... To hold that the regional organization has exclusive jurisdiction would in our view lead to the
absurd position that a State Member of the United Nations which
was a party to a regional agreement would be at a disadvantage as
compared with other States... not members of regional agencies. 108

In his annual report the Secretary General seems to endorse
this view:
[I]n those cases where resort to such (regional] ... arrangements
is chosen in the first instance, that choice should not be permitted
to cast any doubt on the ultimate responsibility of the United
Nations. Similarly, a policy giving full scope to the proper role of
regional agencies can and should at the same time fully preserve the
right of a Member nation to a hearing under the Charter. 0 9
As the following discussion would indicate, since then, the right
of a member state to obtain access to the international arena has
1o6Id. 676th meeting (S/PV.676).
1c7 See Claude, supra note 90, at 28-33 (elaboration of this point).
GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 9th Sess., Plenary 488, at 174. See also id. Plenary 481,
at 98; id. Plenary 485, at 148; id. Plenary 486, at 150 (similar arguments by representatives of Uruguay, Ecuador and Brazil, respectively).
1
09See U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 9th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 11 (A/2663) (1954),
cited with approval later in the 1965 Dominican crisis by the Cuban representative

108U.N.

in U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. Rac. 20th year, 1198th meeting 16-17 (S/PV.1198)

(1965).
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never been denied. But with the exception of the Dominican crisis,
no significant action has been taken by the United Nations in the
area of OAS competence.
In July 1960, responding to a Cuban complaint against the
alleged United States intervention in Cuba's domestic affairs and its
economic aggression against Cuba, 110 the Security Council discussed
the situation on July 18 and 19."' In the Council debate, the issue
was joined on the right of a member state to bring a dispute directly
before the United Nations without first exhausting the "local" remedies. While the United States contended that Cuba was under an
obligation to resort to the Inter-American machinery,"' the Soviet
Union challenged this position, asserting that not only did a member
have a right of access to the Council but that the Council had a responsibility to deal with a Cuban type complaint." 3 The ArgentineEcuador draft resolution, approved by the Council,"' expressed the
Council's concern about the situation and, noting that the situation
was under consideration by the OAS, adjourned its consideration of
the matter pending the receipt of a report from the OAS. The following remarks by the United States' representative on the draft
resolution are helpful in clarifying the purpose of the draft. He
asserted that the resolution would not
deny the Council's competence in the matter, or even settle the legal
question of which organization should act first. What is suggested
is a noting of the concrete circumstance that the regional organization is dealing with the question, and a recognition that, for a better
evaluation of the issues, it is useful to have before us the considerations at which the regional organization may arrive. This preliminary measure cannot prevent the Council from... [ensuring]

that the existing situation does not deteriorate before the report of
the Organization of American States is transmitted to us." 15
At the next General Assembly session, Cuba requested the inclusion of the item of the alleged United States interventionist activities
and acts of aggression against Cuba on the agenda for urgent attention in the plenary session." 6 However, after the inclusion of the
item on the agenda," 7 but before its discussion in the Assembly,
Cuba again sought the Security Council consideration of an impend110 Id. 15th year, Supp. July-Sept. 1960, (S/4378) (1960).
111 Id. 874-76th meetings (1960).
112Id. 874th meeting 28 (1960).
113 Id. 876th meeting 17 (1960).
114U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 15th year, Supp. July-Sept. 1960 (S/4392)
(1960) ; U.N. Doc. No. S/4395 (1960)

(voting was 9-0-2).

115 U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 15th year, 874th meeting (S/PV.874) '(1960).
116 U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 15th Sess., Gen. Comm. (1960).
1 7 Id. Plenary 909th (1960).
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ing United States invasion of the island. The Council discussed the
matter but took no formal action." 8
Following the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion, the First Committee of the General Assembly discussed the pending Cuban complaint"' and in a plenary meeting adopted a modified version of a
joint draft resolution that had been recommended by the First Committee.12 0 The first operative paragraph of the draft resolution,
which would have recognized the role of the OAS to solve the Cuban
question was rejected in the plenary meeting. And in the only
operative paragraph adopted, the General Assembly, without any
special reference to the OAS procedures, exhorted member states to
take such peaceful action as was open to them to remove existing
12
tension. '
At the Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly, representatives of Ecuador and Peru reopened the debate on their twenty-yearold boundary dispute. Ecuador denounced the alleged Peruvian
aggression of 1941-42,2 and the Peruvian representative denied the
charges.'
Although the Assembly took no formal notice of Ecuador's accusations, another precedent of a Latin American state seeking an international forum to air its dispute with a second Latin
American state was set.
Prior to the 1965 Dominican crisis, two more conflicts were
discussed at the Security Council - the Haiti-Dominican Republic
dispute in May 1963, brought before the Council by Haiti, 2 and
the United States-Panamanian dispute in January 1964, brought before the Council by Panama.1 5 In both instances, the Council
assumed competence and since the parties concerned had in each case
voluntarily agreed to find a peaceful settlement of their disputes
through the OAS procedures and the OAS was already appraised of
16th year, 921st-923d meetings (S/PV.921923) (1961).
119 U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 15th Sess., 1st Comm., 1149th-1161st meetings (1961).
120 See id. 1161st meeting at 108-109 (1960) (voting on the draft resolutions in the 1st
Committee). See U.N. GEN. Ass. res. 1616 (XV) (text of the resolution adopted
by a vote of 59-13-24).
121 See Claude, supra note 90, at 43. Professor Claude concludes that "The Cuban case
suggested that Guatemala had not provided a precedent, but had produced a reaction."
121U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 15th Sess. Plenary 878, at 238 '(1960); id. at 242-244
(speech by the representative of Ecuador).
121 Id. at 244-46 (speech by the representative of Peru) ; id. at 260 (reply by the representative of Ecuador). See also N.Y. Times, March 13, 1967, p. 30, col. 4 (city
ed.) (recent report on the conflict).
12 U.N. SECUPITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 18th year, 1035-1036th meetings 8-9 (S/PV.10351036) (1963). See U.N. Doc. No. S/5302 (1963) (Haitian telegram to the President of the Security Council).
125 U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 19th year, 1086th meeting (S/PV.1086) (1964).
See U.N. Doc. No. S/5509 (1964) (letter dated Jan. 10, 1964 from the permanent
representative of Panama to the President of the Security Council).
118U.N. SECUITY COUNCIL OFF.' REc.
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the situations, the Council endorsed the OAS efforts without making
any formal decisions.12 The Council, nonetheless, kept these items
2 7
on its agenda.1
2.

Meaning and Scope of Enforcement Action

Article 53 of the United Nations Charter prohibits regional organizations from taking "enforcement action" without prior authority from the Security Council. The limits thereby placed on regional
organizations must be sought in the definition of "enforcement
action." The first occasion for the Council debate on the meaning
and scope of the phrase "enforcement action" as contained in Article
53 of the United Nations Charter arose after the Sixth Meeting of
the Organ of Consultation found the Dominican Republic guilty of
interventionist and aggressive acts not amounting to overt military
attacks against Venezuela. On August 20, 1960, the Organ of Consultation resolved to apply diplomatic and economic sanctions envisaged by Article 8 of the Rio Treaty." 8 The resolution simply
authorized the Secretary General of the OAS "to transmit to the
Security Council of the United Nations full information concerning
the measures agreed upon in its resolutions," and the Secretary Gen1 29
eral complied with these instructions.
The Soviet Union requested a Security Council meeting to consider the OAS resolution,'
and moved that pursuant to article 53,
the regional measures be approved by the Council.'
The Council
considered the question at the three meetings,1 2 and adopted a joint
draft resolution by which it merely took note of the information
transmitted by the Secretary General. 88 Did the Council impliedly
6

2

The Organ of Consultation which had been studying the Haitian-Dominican Republic situation declared its action concluded on August 12, 1966, since the situation
had considerably improved. 17 AMERICAS 42 (Oct. 1966).

127 INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL

LEGAL STUDIES, op. cit. supra note

90, at 186-88 (summary of the Council's action).
128Rio TREATY art. 8 provides:

For the purpose of this Treaty, the measures on which the Organ of Consultation may agree will comprise one or more of the following: recall of
chiefs of diplomatic missions; breaking of diplomatic relations; breaking of
consular relations; partial or complete interruption of economic relations or
of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and radiotelephonic or
radiotelegraphic communications; and use of armed force.
12U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 15th year, Supp. July-Sept. 1960 (S/4476)
(1960).

130 See U.N. Doc. No. S/4477 '(1960) (the Soviet note).
1

' U.N. Doc. No. S/4481

(1960).

See also U.N. Doc. No. S/4481/Rev.1 (1960)

(draft resolution).
132U.N. SECurrY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 15th year, 893d-895th meetings (S/PV.893895) (1960).
133U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 15th year, 895th meeting 5 (S/4484) (1960)
(jointly moved by Argentina, Ecuador and the United States and adopted by 9-0-2).
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approve the United States position that only coercive, military measures constituted "enforcement action" needing prior Council authorization under article 53? Since the Soviet draft resolution was never
voted upon and the adopted resolution had taken note of the regional
action, it could be argued that the United States position was not
that of the Council and that the meaning of "enforcement action"
was still an open question.
Thus, but for laying down the rough guideline that intense
coercive measures involving the use of military force may not be
employed by a regional organization without prior Council authorization, the Security Council debates did not clarify the concept "enforcement action" any further.
In February 1962, Cuba requested a Council meeting 13 4 to discuss the illegality of the alleged enforcement measures undertaken
against her by the Eighth Meeting of the Organ of Consultation in
Punta del Este in January 1962. Those sanctions included the exclusion of the Cuban government from the OAS, the imposition of trade
restrictions and partial economic sanctions against her.'3 5 After a
lengthy debate on February 27, 1962, the Council decided, by a vote
of four in favor and seven abstentions, against inclusion of the
Cuban note on the Council agenda. 13 However, one reason forwarded for this rejection was that the General Assembly had already
debated substantially the same Cuban charges without taking any
formal action.13 7 Another rationale for inaction, forwarded in
Council debate, was that the Council decision in the prior Dominican
debate had set a precedent that non-military measures could be under1 38
taken by a regional organization without prior Council approval.
The United States' conception of the limited scope of "enforcement
action" was reinforced.
The Dominican precedent was again invoked a few days later
when the Council included on the agenda the Cuban request for an
advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on three
legal questions. One question was addressed to the scope of the
expression "enforcement action" in article 53, that is, if it included
134U.N.

OFF. REC. 17th year, Supp. Jan.-March 1962, at 82
(Cuban note dated Feb. 22, 1962).

SECURITY COUNCIL

(S/5080)

(1962)

135 INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, op. cit. supra note
136

90, at 159-62.

U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 17th year, 991st meeting (S/PV.991) (1962).

137U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 16th Sess., 1st Comm., Plenary 1231st-1243d (1962)
38

1

id. Plenary ii04th-il05th (1962).
CAYNES, THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS

58

(5th ed. 1960): "The action taken by the Security Council in this [Dominican] case
has established a precedent of great significance in the operation of the InterAmerican system of collective security." Compare Claude, supra note 90.
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the article 41139 measures and if the list of those measures in article

41 was exhaustive.

4

By a vote of four in favor and seven against,

the Council rejected the Cuban bid for resort to the International

Court of Justice.' 4' At the Council meeting the Soviet Union reiterated its earlier argument that if the Security Council did not nullify
the Punta del Este sanctions against Cuba,
then tomorrow similar action may be taken against any other country of Latin America, Africa, Asia or any continent whose neighbors, upon some pretext or other, having assembled at a regional
meeting, arbitrarily decide to apply to it the machinery of coercion
in the form of enforcement
action, thus usurping prerogatives of
14 2
the Security Council.

However, as the voting indicates, the opposing argument that it was
a disguised Soviet move to extend its veto over the OAS activities
which would eventually be extended to all regional organizations
evidently appealed to Nationalist China and all the Western and
Latin American member states. 43 Thus, the Council action, stemming basically from a fear of uncertainty of the Court's opinion,
perhaps strengthens the prior United States stand in the Dominican
case. After the Council voting, the United States' representative
declared that by rejecting the Cuban proposal, the Security Council
had "forthrightly, resolutely and decisively upheld the integrity and
independence of regional organizations." 144
A few months later, in October 1962, in the face of the Cuban
missile crisis,145 the initial measures taken unilaterally by the United
States were endorsed by the regional organization, after the Council
of the OAS acting as a provisional Organ of Consultation recommended in a resolution that "the member states, in accordance with
articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, take all measures, individually and collectively including the
139 U.N. CHARTER

art. 41, provides:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of
armed forces are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may
call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.
These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations
and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

140

See generally U.N.

SECURITY COUNCIL OFF.

REC. 17th year, 992d-998th meetings

(S/PV.992-998) (1962). See U.N. Doc. No. S/5086 (1962); U.N. Doc. No.
S/5088 (1962) (Cuban letters) ; U.N. Doc. No. S/5095 (1962) (draft resolution
as contained in March '19 letter from the Cuban Representative).
141U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 17th year, 998th meeting 21, 28 (S/PV.998)
(1962).
142Id. 991st meeting 10 (S/PV.991).
1'3Id. 993d meeting 14-15 (S/PV.993); id. 998th meeting 14-15, 29 (S/PV.998)
(United States position); id. 994th meeting 10 (S/PV.994) (Chilean position);
id. 995th meeting 13 '(S/PV.995) (French position) ; id. 6-7 (Chinese position).
1' Id. 998th meeting 30 (S/PV.998).
145See generally ABEL, THE MISSILE CRSISs (1966).
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use of armed force.""'4 When the Security Council convened in an
emergency session to consider the question,'1 47 the uppermost concern
of the members was naturally with the utmost gravity of the situation. Therefore the question of the OAS-United Nations relationship was virtually cast aside in favor of finding a solution to the
explosive situation. The outcome was that although military measures had been undertaken and at the Council debate the question of
prior Security Council authorization had also been raised, the OAS
action was not seriously challenged by any member state. 4 8
Finally, following the decision of the Ninth Meeting of Consultation 49 to apply even more severe diplomatic and economic
measures than had been previously imposed against the Cuban government,' the Secretary General of the OAS, pursuant to article 54,
informed the Security Council of this decision, and the Council never
even discussed the issue.
C. The Dominican Case
On May 1, 1965, the Soviet representative addressed a letter to
the President of the Security Council asking for an urgent Council
meeting on the Dominican situation.' 5 ' The Security Council started
discussing the Dominican situation on May 3. It held more meetings
on this question (twenty-eight in all, from May 3-25, June 3-31, and
6

14 See INTER-AMERICAN

INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL

LEGAL STUDIES, THE INTER-

AMERICAN SYSTEM 164-65 (1966) '(text of the resolution).
147U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 17th year, 1022d-1025th meetings (S/PV.10221025) (1962).
48
1 See MacDonald, The Developing Relationship Between Superior and Subordinate
Political Bodies at the International Level: A Note on the Experience of the United
Nations and the Organization of American States, 2 CAN. YB, INT'L L. 21, 45-49
(1964).

Cf. INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, op.

cit. supra, note 146, at 165:
The express mention of Articles 6 and 8 might lead to the impression that
this was a collective action, by the Organ of Consultation ....
However,
this was not the case. Rather it was a sui generis way of exercising selfdefense.... Above all, it [this view] is corroborated by the fact that the
Organ of Consultation limited itself to "recommending" the measures to be
adopted by the member states; that is, it did not "agree" to apply measures
in this case of self-defense, as it had in other cases. In reality the only
collective action discernible in the October 23 resolution is the decision to
recommend the exercise of self-defense.
14 Held in Washington, D.C. on July 21-26, 1964.
15 0 See INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, Op. Cit. supra
note 146, at 166-70, for the measures undertaken.
15 U.N. Doc. No. S/6316 (1965). See also U.N. Doc. S/6317 (1965) (another
letter) ; U.N. Doc. No. S/6310 ('1965) (letter from the permanent representative of
the United States to the President of the Security Council informing him of the
United Nations action); U.N. Doc. Nos. S/6313, S/6315 (1965) (OAS Council
Communications sent pursuant to article 54 of the United Nations Charter); U.N.
Doc. No. S/6314 (1965) (text of a note addressed by the Cuban Minister for
Foreign Affairs to the Secretary-General of the United Nations drawing attention to
the threat to the people caused by the United States' action).
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July 20-26, 1965) than on all the others pertaining to Latin America
discussed in the preceding section combined.
On the question of regional competence versus that of the
United Nations, the Council debates show an interesting but fairly
predictable pattern of alignments and positions. The Soviet Union,
supported by Cuba, championed the cause of the United Nations
whose authority, it asserted, should remain unimpaired by regional
actions. The United States, supported by Bolivia, contended that
since prior precedents had already recognized that OAS autonomy
extended to a wide range of activities as long as they were in conformity with the United Nations Charter, the Council should let the
OAS handle this situation and not disturb the existing relationship.
Nationalist China, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands took
a pro-regional position, while Uruguay joined the Afro-Asian states
-Jordan,
Ivory Coast and Malaysia -to
express concern at the
possible encroachment by regional organizations on member states'
rights, especially those of small states, were the Council not to safeguard their interests in the international forum. France was also close
to this position.
The Council discussion centered on three main issues: access to
the international arena; United Nations action in the specific case;
and the scope of "enforcement action" as it related to the establishment of the Inter-American Armed Force.
1. Access to International Arenas
Welcoming the Council debate on the Dominican question,
Ambassador Stevenson reminded the members of article 33 which
prescribed procedures and priorities for dealing with local disputes,
but did not "derogate from the authority of this Council.""' While
conceding that the Council had such competence, Ambassador Stevenson contended that the question of competence was not at issue in
the Dominican discussion. Even though it had competence, he said,
the Council
should not seek to duplicate or interfere with actions through regional arrangements so long as those actions remain effective and are
consistent with our Charter. The purpose of the United Nations
Charter will hardly be served if two international organizations are

seeking to do things in the same place with the same people at the
153
same time.

Notwithstanding the prior seizure of the Dominican question
152

U.N. SEcuarny COUNCIL OFF. REc. 20th year, 1196th meeting 17 (S/PV.1196)

(1965).
53

1 1d. 1217th meeting 6-7 (S/PV.1217).

See also id. 1213th meeting 4 (S/PV.1213).
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by the OAS, no member ever challenged15 4 the Council's competence
to consider it. Several representatives went on record to reinforce
their stand that no regional action could diminish or impair the
United Nations authority to consider a situation that might endanger
international peace and security or threaten the interests of small
states.' 5" Among those members asserting this position, Uruguay, a
Latin American state and an OAS member, was in the forefront.
Addressing the Security Council meeting on May 4, the Uruguayan
Representative said:
[My] delegation has no doubt as to the competence of the Security
Council to inquire now and in the future into any dispute or situa-

tion the continuation of which may be a threat to the maintenance
of peace and international security, even if the dispute is at the time

under consideration by a regional body. This authority, which the
provisions of article 52, paragraph 4, and articles 34 and 35 of the
Charter of the United Nations dearly confer upon the Council, is
even more appropriate when the situation involved appears prima
facie to contravene international law, and in particular, article 2,

paragraphs 4 and 7, of the Charter of the United Nations and articles
15 and 17 of the Organization of American States. 156

Intervening in the debate at a later date to submit a draft resolution,
he reiterated his position that articles 33 and 55(2) were not applicable to the Dominican type situation since they related to "the type
of international dispute amenable to conciliation and pacific settlement, and not to situations like this one, where charges of aggression
have been made." 157 Addressing himself to the broader question of
access to the international arena, the Uruguayan Representative
quoted with approval from his predecessor's speech to the General
Assembly in September 1954, on the Guatemalan case "about a
precedent created as a result of a negative attitude on the part of the
Security Council":"'
My country combines membership in the United Nations with
membership in the Organization of American States, in the belief
that the principles of the regional system and the safeguards which

it offers cannot be invoked in order to prevent States from having
direct and immediate access to the jurisdiction of the United
Nations or to deprive them, no matter how temporarily, of the pro54

See INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, op. cit. supra

note 146, at 171-79 (summary of OAS action); Organization of American States,
Annual Report of the Secretary General 1964-1965 (summary of OAS action). For a
brief chronology of the OAS activities in the Dominican crisis see 17 AMERICAS
42-43 (May 1965); id. at 42-45 (June 1965); id. at 39-40 (July 1965); id. at
40-41 (Aug. 1965); id. at 41-42 (Sept. 1965); id. at 41 '(Oct. '1965); id. at 43
Nov. 1965); id. at 41-42 (Dec. 1965); id. at 42-43 (March 1966) ; id. at 39 (April
1966) ; id. at 45-46 (June 1966) ; id. at 45 (July 1966) ; id. at 43 (Aug. 1966); id.
at 44 (Nov. 1966).
155 See, e.g., U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 20th year, 1200th meeting 1-2
,(S/PV.1200) (1965) (Jordanian Representative's
address).
56
1 Id. 1198th meeting 6 (S/PV.1198).
57
1 Id. 1204th meeting 5 (S/PV.1204).
58
' Id. 1198th meeting 7 (S/PV.1198).
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tection of the agencies of the world community. The legal protection afforded by both systems should be combined, never substituted
for one another.
The negative decision adopted by the Security Council constitutes a very serious precedent for the countries of America since
its result must be to diminish or delay, so far as they are concerned,
the respective applications of the jurisdictional safeguards against
aggression established in the Charter of the United Nations. 15 9

And once again he expressed his belief that all members shared 16"a
0
desire to examine unequivocally the authority of the Council."'
At various points in the Council debates representatives of Jordan,'"
Malaysia, 16 2 Cuba,16 3 the Soviet Union,' 6 4 Ivory Coast,' 6 5 and the
Netherlands,' 6 6 among others, supported this position.
2.

The United Nations Action

Unlike the past instances in which the Council had "taken note"
of the OAS action or endorsed the OAS moves to reach a pacific
settlement of the conflict, or asked for a report of its action and
outcome before taking any steps, in the Dominican crisis, the Security
Council unanimously adopted a resolution on May 14, 1965, which
invited the Secretary General "to send, as an urgent measure, a representative to the Dominican Republic for the purpose of reporting
to the security Council on the present situation."' 6 7 It further called
upon "all concerned in the Dominican Republic to cooperate with
the Representative of the Secretary-General in carrying out his
task."' 68 While similar to the Council's earlier resolution during
the 1954 Guatemalan conflict, the present one also called for a strict
cease fire. Pursuant to the Security Council resolution, the SecretaryGeneral appointed Dr. Jose Antonio Mayobre as his representative
to the Dominican Republic. Dr. Mayobre arrived in Santo Domingo
on May 18,169 but before that, on May 15, an advance United
Nations party had already arrived there 70 and the United Nations machinery was set in motion. 7 '. Sending a United Nations
59

1 U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 9th Sess., Plenary 481, at 16-17 (1954).

SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 20th year, 1214th meeting 10 (S/PV.1214)
(1965).
161Id. 1204th meeting 7 (S/PV.1204).
162 Id. 1216th meeting 17 (S/PV.1216).
163Id. 1198th meeting 16 (S/PV.1198) ;id.1213th meeting 9, 13 (S/PV.1213).
164 Id. 1198th meeting 29 (S/PV.1198).
165Id. 1223d meeting 3-5 (S/PV.1223).
166 Id.1216th meeting 17 (S/PV.1216).
160U.N.

167Id. 1208th meeting 3 (S/PV.1208)

(UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION 203)

(1965).

(adopted on Jordan's motion).
168 Ibid.
6
'1
U.N. Docs. Nos. S/6365, S/6369 (1965). These contain the Secretary General's
report on the activities of his Representative, Dr. Mayobre.
170U.N. Doc. No. S/6358 (1965).
171 See U.N. Doc. No. S/6365, Annex (1965), containing an appeal from the Secretary
General to allthe parties concerned for an immediate cessation of hostilities.
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representative into the Dominican Republic, thus asserting its
physical presence in a conflict that was being handled by the
OAS from its very inception, 172 was something new. It may be
recalled that not only was the OAS Secretary-General on the
scene, 17 but that the OAS had also dispatched a five-member special
committee to the Dominican Republic to find a peaceful solution to
the crisis17 4 and had from the outset kept the Security Council fully
informed of its activities. 1 75 The United Nations resolution did not
even mention the OAS and its efforts.
The United Nations action seems to have been prompted by
several compelling factors. To mention a few: more than two weeks
had already passed since the conflict started and its end seemed
nowhere in sight; the "Constitutional Government," a party to the
conflict, continued accusing the OAS of its inability to resolve the
Dominican crisis because of its domination by the United States and
its resulting bias against the rebels ;17 and finally, on May 14, the
Council was facing a serious and apparently deteriorating situation
in the Dominican Republic. 77 Thus, notwithstanding a parallel of
political and ideological confrontations in the Dominican Republic
with the prior 1954 Guatemalan crisis, the urgency in the Dominican
conflict was primarily instrumental in the unanimous adoption of
the Council resolution. 17 This urgency was created by the prolonged
struggle' 79 coupled with a possibility of a Communist threat in the
Dominican Republic. Had the threat been a certainty, as in the
Guatemalan situation, the United States might have been more
insistent in demanding that the issue be handled by the OAS.
172

See ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN

STATES,

op. cit. supra note 154, at 1-6, 18-19

(brief report of the OAS activities).
173 Id. at 19. On April 30 the Council of the OAS authorized its Secretary-General to go
to the Dominican Republic "to indicate the presence of the Oraiztion of American
States, which the serious Dominican situation requires," and to help the Dean of
the Diplomatic Corps. and others in finding a peaceful settlement.
74
1 See U.N. Doc. No. S/6319 '(1965), containing the May 1 resolution of the Tenth
Meeting establishing the Special Committee consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia,
Guatemala and Peru, and instructing the Committee to proceed immediately to Santo
Domingo to obtain "as a matter of urgency a ceasefire," and offer its good offices for
a peaceful solution.
175 See note 172 supra, where pursuant to article 54 of the United Nations Charter, the
OAS began informing the United Nations Secretary-General of the Council action,
and subsequently of the actions before the Tenth Meeting.
6
17 See, e.g., U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 20th year, 1208th meeting 2 (PU/1208)
(1965), which contains a telegram by Dr. Jottin Cury, Minister of Foreign Affairs
in the Constitutional Government, requesting an emergency meeting of the Security
Council, since "It must be acknowledged with regret that the Organization of American States has shown that it is incapable of resolving the Dominican situation and
of opposing the wishes of the United States."
7
7 Id. at 1-2.
178 See notes 6-16 supra and accompanying text on the alleged threat of a communist
take-over.
179 See, e.g., U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 20th year, 1216th meeting 17-18
(S/PV.1216) (1965) (Malaysian Representative's remarks implying that it was the
emergency situation that had brought about the United Nations action).

DOMINICAN CRISIS

1967

Pro-regionalists felt that the United Nations action was an
awkward and unnecessary move that might further complicate the
situation. Thus, while conceding that "the right of its member states
to resort to the world organization is explicitly recognized in its
Charter" and that "all participation by the world organization in
local matters" is not precluded, Garcia Amador, the director of legal
affairs of the Pan American Union, found the United Nations action
unjustified in the Dominican case.' s° He said that in consonance
with article 52, in the past instances "the world organization has
repeatedly abstained from intervening in local disputes and situations
when the regional agency has been taking action."'' Since it was a
case of concurrent jurisdiction,
intervention by the world organization while the regional agency
is making all possible efforts to reach a pacific settlement is a form
of "abuse of power." The Security Council could very well, as it
has done repeatedly in the past, have allowed time for the regional
action to produce results, especially inasmuch as some results have
already been obtained. Furthermore, by the date of the Security
Council's decision, the danger of the situation's affecting international peace and security had been averted. It is evident, then,
that the 2Security Council made premature and undue use of its
powers.18
In its second report submitted to the Tenth Meeting on May 19,
1965, i8' the OAS Special Committee went to considerable length to

criticize the United Nations action. In part it said:
this was the first time such an interference between the world
agency of the United Nations and of a regional organization of
American states had been recorded....

It is essential to mention or to emphasize that the United
Nations began a procedure of this significance without noting the
serious consequences that this step would have to the prejudice of
the action initiated by a regional agency.
It can be said that with the intervention of the United Nations
the progress of the negotiations conducted by the special committee
was greatly obstructed....
In order that the OAS may achieve its objectives within the
principles of the inter-American system, the Special Committee feels
it essential to request the United Nations Security Council to suspend all action until the regional procedures have been exhausted,
8 4
as established in article 52.2 of the United Nations Charter .... 1
180 Garcia Amador, The Dominican Situation: The Jurisdiction of the Regional Organ-

ization, 17 AMERICAS 1, 3 (July 1965).
181 Ibid.
182 Ibid.
1' U.N. Docs. Nos. S/6370, S/6370/Add. 1 (1965).
'"U.N. Doc. No. S/6370/Add. 10-14 (1965). See also U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF.
REc. 20th year, 1213th meeting 13 (S/PV.1213) (1965), where the Cuban Repre-

sentative was critical:
With the collaboration of the OAS... an attempt is being made to set the
seal on the aggression committed against a sovereign State Member of the
United Nations and establish a kind of arbitrary trusteeship, which is an
extraordinarily dangerous precedent for the countries of America and, in
general, for small nations throughout the world.
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On May 20, 1965, the Tenth Meeting adopted a resolution
thanking the Special Committee for its work, asking the SecretaryGeneral of the OAS to represent it in the Dominican Republic, and
instructing him to coordinate with the representative of the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, where appropriate to the attainment
of the objectives set forth in this resolution.' 8 5
The next day the United States proposed a draft resolution in
the Security Council containing in an operative paragraph, the request that:
the representative appointed by the Secretary-General, in carrying
out the responsibilities assigned to him by the Security Council...
co-ordinate with the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States in light of the resolution adopted by the Organization of
American States on 20 May 1965.186

On May 22 the United States' Representative criticized a draft
Uruguayan resolution for failing to acknowledge OAS efforts in
negotiating a cease fire, for not mentioning the OAS Secretary-General's appointment as its representative in the Dominican Republic,
for not recognizing the OAS decision to cooperate with the United
Nations and for not referring to United Nations reciprocity.' 8 7
Similarly, he criticized the French draft resolution 8 8 which would
recall the earlier Security Council resolution and, without any reference to the OAS activities or the Meeting decision, requested "that
the suspension of hostilities in Santo Domingo be transformed into
a permanent cease fire."' 89 He said: "We consider that ... a reference to the OAS decisions is the minimum necessary to reciprocate
the express desire of the OAS to work in cooperation with the
Council."'"9 The Bolivian Representative explained his abstention
in voting on the Uruguayan resolution:
simply because the Uruguayan draft resolution... does not explicitly mention the competence of the Organization of American
States to deal with the Dominican situation or the effectiveness of
its work and reduces it from its lofty position to the lowly status
185

Doc. No. S/6372/Rev. 1 (1965). However, the OAS Secretary-General's report does not even mention the United Nations Security Council action or the
presence of the United Nations observer in the Dominican Republic. See OAS, Tenth
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Report of the SecretaryGeneral of the Organization of American States regarding the Dominican Situation
-Activities
from April 29, 1965, until the installation of the Provisional Government, OAS OFF. REC. OEA/Ser. F/11.10, Doc. 405, 1 Nov. 1965 (Pan. Am. Union
1965).
18
6 U.N. Doc. No. S/6373 (1965).
187 U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 20th year, 1216th meeting 4-5 (S/PV.1216)
(1965).
188 Id. 1217th meeting 6 (S/PV.1217).
189 U.N. Doc. No. S/6376 (1965).
U.N.

90 U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. Rac. 20th year, 1217th meeting 5 (S/PV.1217)
(1965).
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of a fact-finding mission invited merely to co-operate with other
organizations.' 9

The French resolution was adopted by the Council with the United
19 2
States' Representative abstaining.
Subsequently, on May 25, in a letter to the President of the
Security Council, thirteen Latin American States said that:
In accordance with article 52, paragraph 3, of the Charter of the
United Nations, which Member States are bound to uphold, every
effort should be made to encourage action by regional agencies for
the pacific settlement of local disputes.'l9
At its Fourteenth Conference held in May 1965, the Inter-

American Bar Association also went on record declaring that:
the Organization of American States has original jurisdiction over
the situation in the Dominican Republic and no other international
until the O.A.S.
organization has competence to interfere in the case
9 4
submits it to the United Nations Security Council.'
In the United States Senate Senator Dodd was critical of the
United Nations' presence in the Dominican Republic. He said,
The governments of the Americas resent the intrusion of the
United Nations observers because they are convinced that it will only
undercut their position and complicate their task. They feel that this
is their problem, and that they are determined to deal with it on
their own.
This is a most wholesome and welcome reaction. "'7
Speaking later he said,
While the United Nations has shown itself to be completely ineffective in upholding the rule of law against the transgressions of
the Communist States on the one hand and the Afro-Asian states
on the other hand, while it has failed to intervene where it could
and should have intervened, the United Nations Secretariat and the
majority of the General Assembly apparently seem bent on intruding themselves into the affairs of the American states, where their
presence is not needed and not wanted. l9 6
Meanwhile, at the United Nations, the United Nations' pres-

ence in the Dominican Republic was generally considered a healthy
development. To illustrate, the Jordinian Representative felt that
the United Nations presence was useful in assuring the Dominican
people of the world community's concern and bringing moral pres191 Id. 1216th meeting 16 (S/PV.1216).
192 Adopted by a vote of 10-0-1 (Resolution 205) (1965).
'93

See U.N. Doc. No. S/6409 (1965)

(letter from the Representatives of Argentina,

Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and Peru).
94
1 The Conference was held in San Juan, Puerto Rico, May 22-29, 1965. For a report
on the said declaration, see Finch, Inter-American Bar Association, 60 AM. J. INT'L
19

L. 80, 81 (1966).
111 CONG. REc. 11029 (daily ed. May 24, 1965).

196
Id. at 14774 '(daily ed. June 30, 1965).
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sure to bear on opponents. 9" Speaking in the Council debate on
July 22, 1965, the French Representative said:
My delegation notes with satisfaction that the Secretary-General's
Special Representative does not remain a passive observer. In conformity with the spirit of this mandate, Mr. Mayobre has felt ithis
duty to be an active witness, moving about whenever necessary and
investigating personally or through his colleagues the incidents and
facts brought to his attention. 19 8

It may be recalled that the Security Council did not dispatch the
United Nations' Commission on Human Rights to verify the alleged
violation of human rights being committed by the "Government of
National Reconstruction" and to take appropriate measures to stop
them as requested by the "Constitutional Government."' 9 9 The
Council sent a special Secretary-General's Representative instead,
leaving the question of human rights to the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights," ° ' and leaving some question as to the
scope of the functions of the Secretary-General's Representative. The
Secretary-General clarified his task on June 11, 1965, when he said
in the Council meeting:
The present mandate [under resolution 203 (1965)] involves observation and reporting. This does not, in my view, or that of my
Representative, include the actual investigation of complaints and
charges about specific incidents and the necessary verification of
information concerning them which involves investigation, other
than incidents
of overt firing which constitute clear breaches of the
20
cease-fire. '

However, the United Nations' Representative did investigate
one specific instance of alleged mass executions by the officers of the
"Government of National Reconstruction" and sent a report of his
197U.N. SECUI TY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 20th year, 1213th meeting 14-15 (S/PV.1213)

(1965).
198 Id. 1231st meeting 5 (S/P.V.1231).
1'9Id. 1208th meeting 2-3 (S/PV.1208). Later, in two communications of May 25 and
May 29, the request was repeated. See id. 1220th meeting 4-5 (S/PV.1220), for the
United States Representative's remarks that they would not be a fitsubject for the
Security Council Meeting.
200
See U.N. Docs. Nos. S/6404, S/6404/Add. 1, 3 (1965), for a report on the arrival
of the Officers of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in Santo Domingo. The Soviet Representative still
insisted that the United Nations should conduct the inquiry itself and not transfer it to the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights. See U.N. SECURrT COUNCIL OFF. REc. 20th year, 1223d meeting
6 (S/PV.1223) (1965). See also U.N. Doc. No. S/6431 (1965), for the report
that both parties affirmed their intention to respect human rights and agreed to provide their facilities to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
2°'U.N. SECuRTY COUNCIL OFF. Rac. 20th year, 1223d meeting 2 (S/PV.1223)
(1965). But See id. 1227th meeting 5 (S/P.V.1227) (President's statement of
18 June 1965):
Some members would like to ...see the [Secretary-General's] representative take on a more intensive role in investigating complaints. Several other
members expressed themselves against itbecause they thought itwould cause
duplication. I have, therefore, not been able to detect a consensus in the
Council to the effect of giving the Secretary-General's representative a more
elaborate mandate of investigation than up to now.
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findings to the United Nations Secretary-General as well as the
20 2
chairman of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
The Inter-American Commission took appropriate action in the
matter.2 03 In his summary report to the Security Council's discussion
during July 20-26, 1965, the Council President at the last meeting
of the Council said that members had condemned gross violations
of human rights in the Dominican Republic and had expressed the
desire that such violations should cease. He also expressed the
Council's desire to continue watching the situation in the Dominican
Republic closely and to continue to receive the Secretary General's
reports to the Council on the Dominican situation.2 0 4
Finally, on October 14, 1966, the Secretary General informed
the Security Council that the foreign minister of the Dominican
Republic had, in a communication to him, expressed his country's
appreciation to the United Nations "for its interest in the restoration
of peace and harmony in the Dominican Republic" and had stated
that in the Dominican Government's view "the objectives of the
Security Council having been achieved, it would be advisable to
withdraw the United Nations' Mission from the Dominican Republic." 20 5 The Secretary-General therefore initiated arrangements for
the withdrawal of the United Nations Mission in the Dominican
Republic.
20 6
3. The Inter-American Peace Force

In the Council debates the Soviet Union 0 7 and Cuba 20 8 led the
attack against the dispatch of the American troops in the initial
stages of the Dominican crisis, contending that the article 53 requirement had not been met.
Doc. No. S/6432 (1965). See also U.N. Doc. No. S/6430 (1965).
U.N. Doc. No. S/6443 (1965).

202U.N.
23See
2 04

U.N. SECUITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 20th year, 1233d meeting 1-2 (S/PV.1233)

(1965).
205 U.N.Doc. No.S/7552 (1966).
206 See generally Thomas & Thomas,

The Dominican Republic Crisis 1965: Legal

Aspects,

HAMMARSKJOLD FORUMS 32 (1966) ;WARSCHAVER, THE INTER-AMERICAN
MILITARY FORCE (1966). The strength of the United States' force at its peak was

21,500. Other countries sent the following contingents to constitute the Inter-American Peace Force: Brazil, 1140; Honduras, 250; Nicaragua, 166; Costa Rica, 21
(policemen) ; El Salvador, 3. 17 AMERICAS 44 (June 1965). For the beginning of
the withdrawal of the peace force on June 28, 1965, see 18 id. at 43 (Aug. 1966),
and for its completion on September 21, 1966, see 18 id. at 44 (Nov. 1966).
07U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 20th year, 1196th meeting 44 '(S/PV.1196)
(1965) ; id. 1198th meeting 2 (S/PV.1198) ; id. 1200th meeting 32 (S/PV.1200) ;
id. 1202d meeting 10-11 (S/PV.1202) (where the Soviet Representative asked,
"where is the [Council's] mandate for the carrying out of military operations and
enforcement action against the Dominican Republic?").
208
id. 1196th meeting 24 (S/PV.1196): ("a special OAS mission left for Santo Domingo in an attempt to legalize the United States military occupation.") See also id.
1198th meeting 21 '(S/PV.1198).
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Following the OAS decision on May 6 to establish an InterAmerican Armed Force2" 9 and the steps it took later to implement
that decision,210 Cuba and the Soviet Union mounted their attack
on the alleged illegal nature of the United States and the OAS
action. 1 The Soviet Representative, for example, contended that:
The Security Council has still not been told on what basis the
occupation troops are in the Dominican Republic, or who instructed
the regional agency to engage in actions involving the use of armed
circumvent the Security
force.... No kind of effort to replace or212
Council in international affairs is justified.

Later in the debate, reiterating his earlier stand he asked,
"Where is the mandate which the United States requires under
Article 53 of the United Nations Charter?" 213 He characterized the
United States and the OAS actions as "an open challenge. . . to the
authority of the Security Council," that constituted "an act of unparalleled illegality and arbitrariness which will led to the undermining of the very foundation of the United Nations Charter. '14
He also criticized the OAS.15 resolution as having violated Articles
2, 39 and 53 of the United Nations Charter and Article 15 of the
OAS Charter.21
The Cuban Representative emphasized that the act of establishing the Inter-American Peace Force not only detracted from the OAS
objectives, because, he alleged, it was done in order to legalize the
United States action, but was "a flagrant violation" of Article 43
of the United Nations Charter which authorizes only the Security
Council to organize forces for maintaining international peace and
security. 17 He ridiculed the United States' contention that since the
OAS did not impose binding legal obligations on its members to use
See U.N. Doc. Nos. S/6333, S/6333/Rev. 1 (1965) (text of the resolution adopted
by the Tenth Meeting on May 6, 1965, on the formation of an Inter-American Force
as recommended by the Special Committee).
(resolution adopted at the Thirteenth
210 See U.N. Doc. No. S/6377/Rev. 1 (1965)
Plenary Session of the Tenth Meeting on May 22, 1965, on the working and function
of the Inter-American Armed Force, signed at Santo Domingo May 23, 1965).
211 However, note the argument that since the force was created "to provide a means for
preserving the peace," the OAS action to establish the force could be compared with
the United Nations creation of U.N.E.F. and U.N.I.C.Y.P. and thus could be termed
a "legitimate device." McLaren, The Dominican Crisis: An Inter-American Dilemma,
4 CAN. YB. INT'L L. 178, 186-87 (1966). See also Amador, supra note 180, at 3
(United Nations Secretary-General's reaction to the establishment of the force).
2 12
U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 20th year, 1208th meeting 13 (S/PV.1208)
(1965).
213
Id.1218th meeting 6 (S/PV.1218).
2
14Ibid. See also id. 1213th meeting 20 (S/PV.1213); id. 1216th meeting 11, 13, 15
(S/PV.1216) ;id.1220th meeting 22 (S/PV.1220).
215 The Soviet Representative referred to the OAS as the "so-called Organization of
American States," in id. 1227th meeting 12 (S/PV.1227).
21
GId. 1220th meeting 7-9 (S/PV.1220). See U.N. Doc. No. S/6411 (1965) (text of
the Soviet Government's statement).
217U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 20th year, 1219th meeting 5 (S/PV.1219)
W9

(1965).
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armed force, the Inter-American Force did not constitute an enforcement action. He called it merely a "euphemism" that had been
employed to flout obligations under Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the
United Nations Charter and Articles 15 and 17 of the OAS Charter.
He further argued that the very presence of foreign military forces
in a sovereign state constituted an act of a coercive nature and made
the measure "an enforcement action."

2 18

In response to the Soviet-Cuban attack, the United States' Representative reminded the Council that from a study of the objectives
of the Inter-American Peace Force, the OAS action could not be
termed an enforcement action. 21 9 He was referring to the "sole
purpose" of the force as declared in the OAS resolution establishing
it, which was to cooperate
in the restoration of normal conditions in the Dominican Republic,
in maintaining the security of its inhabitants and the inviolability
of human rights, and in the establishment of an atmosphere of
peace and conciliation
that will permit the functioning of demo220
cratic institutions.
The United States Representative emphasized that since the
Force was established voluntarily and solely for the purpose mentioned above and was not designed to act against the Dominican
Republic or the Dominican people, "the requirements of the United
Nations Charter are those set forth in Articles 52 and 54 rather than
in Article 53." 21 He went on to attack the Soviet motive in challenging the OAS action in these words:
the Soviet Government objects to peace-keeping operations under
the auspices of the OAS, but it also objects to such operations undertaken at the recommendation of the General Assembly. It insists
that only the Security Council, where it has a veto- used over a
hundred times- can take action to keep the peace. In short, the
Soviet Union is trying to establish a de facto situation where international peace-keeping operations can take place only at the pleasure of the Soviet Union. Having in mind the explosive and dangerous Soviet doctrine of so-called wars of liberation, we can imagine
how many and what kind of peace-keeping operations would take
2 22
place under these circumstances.
Earlier in the debate Ambassador Stevenson justified the OAS action
under article 52.223 He observed that since the issue of "enforcement
action" had been "considered exhaustively in the Security Council in
21BIbid.
2 19
1d. 1220th meeting 16-17 (S/PV.1220).
220 U.N. Doc. No. S/6333/Rev. 1 (1965).
22U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 20th year, 1220th meeting 17 (S/PV.1220)
'(1965).
Ibid.
lId. 1200th meeting 33-34 (S/PV.1200).
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the past" it hardly required reopening. 2 4 Commenting on the significance of the historic act - the creation of the Inter-American
Peace Force - the Secretary-General of the OAS said that the objectives for which the force was created "clearly come within the
broad provisions of the Charter of the OAS concerning matters
affecting the peace and security of the continent. ' 22 Referring to
the objectives of the Force he also implied that the Force did not
constitute "enforcement action."
It is perhaps ironic that in late July 1965, when the "Constitutional Government" requested that the Security Council to withdraw
the "so-called Inter-American Peace Force" from the Dominican
Republic "without further delay," 22 6 the "Government of National
Reconstruction" was making a similar plea for the immediate evacuation of the Force from the Dominican Republic." 7
The United Nations Secretary-General is said to have viewed
the OAS peace-keeping action "as possibly establishing an embarrassing precedent inasmuch as the League of Arab States or the
28
Organization of African Unity might invoke similar rights." 2
The Soviet Representative had the last say in the Council debate
when on July 26, 1965, he alleged that during the Council discussion
it had been "amply demonstrated" that the OAS action was taken
"in violation of clear-cut provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations forbidding regional organizations to take any enforcement
action without the authorization of the Security Council." 229
224 Ibid.
=U.N.Doc. No.S/6381, at 3-4 (1965).
226

U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 20th year, 1231st meeting 10 (S/PV.1231)
(1965). See id. at 2, for the communication of July 20, 1965, from the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the Constitutional Government to the Secretary-General:
The Constitutional Government reminds you, Mr. Secretary-General, and
the Security Council that it represents a State Member of the United
Nations and as such is entitled to call upon the competence of the Organization in respect to measures to guarantee respect for the sovereignty of
free peoples and to safeguard international peace and security, which today
are so endangered in the Dominican Republic through military intervention.
See also id. 1232d meeting 2-4 (S/PV.1232), for another plea from the representative of the Constitutional Government for the withdrawal of the Force.
227
Id. 1232d meeting 6 (S/PV. 1232). The representative of the Government of
National Reconstruction argued that since the Dominican conflict was a civil war,
pursuant to Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter and Article 17 of the
OAS Charter, neither of these organizations could "intervene." Thus the element
of consent which the International Court of Justice considered was an important
element in considering the U.N.E.F. activities as non-enforcement action was lacking
in the Dominican situation. See Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article
17, Paragraph 2 of the Charter), [1962) I.C.J. REP. 151, 170-71 (advisory
opinion).
228 Quoted by Amador, supra note 180, at 3.
229
U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 20th year, 1233d meeting 3-4 (S/PV.1233)
(1965).

1967

DOMINICAN CRISIS

III. CONDITIONING FACTORS

For a better comprehension of the problems posed in the preceding discussion it will be useful to keep a proper focus on the
conditioning factors in the Dominican crisis. Some of these factors
are: decentralized structure of the world community and its ideological bifurcation and nuances as reflected at the United Nations; conflicting and contending interests and preferences of member states
- the Latin American states' desire to retain their right to bring a
dispute before the United Nations untrammeled and at the same
time to escape the paralyzing outcome of the Council veto; the
United States' dominant role within the Inter-American framework
as contrasted with its ineffective position in the veto ridden Council;
the Soviet endeavor to extend the Council veto to the OAS actions;
and several member states' concern to balance these conflicting interests by a contextual analysis of a specific situation.
IV.

APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATION

The Dominican conflict did not resolve the question of the
delineation of competence, demarcation, and scope of authority
between the United Nations and the OAS. The tenor of the United
States' argument was that the OAS, "a recognized arm of the United
Nations," 23 0 and the United Nations should be mutually strengthening and reinforcing and not competing and conflicting, and that
OAS actions that are consistent with the purposes of the United
Nations should be encouraged. 23 While several Council members
preferred the concept of coordination and cooperation between the
two bodies, 281 to a possible conflict between them, they found it hard
to apply the abstract principle of cooperation and coordination to the
specific situation. The statement by the Representative of Uruguay
that he did not believe that this was the most "propitious occasion"
for resolving the question of competence between regional bodies
and the United Nations 23 3 sums up the majority view in the Council.
Ambiguities in the OAS and the United Nations Charter provisions, especially the lack of an authoritative interpretation of article
53, are bound to leave an observer uncertain about the way the next
case will be decided by the Council. Dr. Alberto Lleras Camargo of
230

Id. 1208th meeting 10 (S/PV.1208).

231See, e.g., id. 1217th meeting at 6 (S/PV.1217).

(Ambassador Stevenson's statement).
(statement by the Representative of
232See id. 1214th meeting 2, 17 (S/PV.1214)
Uruguay); id. at 17 (statement by the Representative of the United Kingdom);
id. 1216th meeting 17 (S/PV.1216) (statement by the Representative of The
Netherlands) ; id. at 18 (statement by the Representative of Malaysia) ; id. 1212th
meeting 26 (S/PV.1212) (statement by the Representative of Ivory Coast).
3
2Id.
1214th meeting 12 (S/PV.1214).
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Colombia, Chairman of the Commission which dealt with "Regional
Arrangements" at the San Francisco conference,2"' suggests that:
There is a dear distinction for the reader of the Charter between
the measures of Article 41 (enforcement action) which are not
coercive, in the sense that they lack the element of physical violence
that is closely identified with military action, and those of Article
42. Enforcement action, with the use of physical force, is obviously
the prerogative of the Security Council, with a single exception:
individual or collective self-defense. But the other measures, those
of Article 41, are not; it may even be said that it is within the
power of any State- without necessarily violating the purposes,
principles, or provisions of the Charter-to break diplomatic,
consular, and economic relations or to interrupt its communications
with another State. Thus the use of armed force by the American
States is subject to two limitations: they may not use it except in
self-defense, when there has been armed attack, or in other cases of
aggression and threat
of aggression, under the authority of the
235
Security Council.
The legal adviser to the United States Department of State,

Leonard Meeker, makes another distinction between "obligatory"
and "recommendatory" measures, contending that "enforcement
action" does not include action which is not obligatory on member
states. 30

The Council debates and decisions certainly endorse both Dr.
Lleras' and Meeker's interpretations. This restrictive interpretation

of "enforcement action" coupled with a broad interpretation of
"armed attack" in article 51 will give a regional organization unlimited autonomy to act without Council authorization. This position is

well reflected in a comment made by the then legal adviser to the
United States Department of State, Abram Chayes, in the aftermath
of the Cuban missile crisis. Chayes said that since the Security

Council's responsibility for dealing with threats to the peace is
"primary" and not "exclusive" the United States did not go to the
Security Council "before taking other action to meet the Soviet threat
in Cuba."

He explained this decision thus:
[E]vents since 1945 have demonstrated that the Security Council,
like our own electoral college, was not a viable institution. The
veto has made it substantially useless in keeping the peace.
The withering away of the Security Council has led to a
search for alternative peacekeeping institutions. In the United
Nations itself the General Assembly and the Secretary-General have
filled23the
void. Regional organizations are another obvious candi7
date.
234 12 U.N. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 663 (1945).
3 INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL
AMERICAN SYSTEM 190 (1966).

LEGAL STUDIES,

236Meeker, Defensive Quarantine and the Law, 57 AM. J.
27 47 DEP'T STATE BULL.

763, 765 (1962).
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This view would also find support in the recent advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice wherein the Court made a
distinction between "primary" and "exclusive" functions to maintain
or restore peace.23 The Court also declared that since the United
Nations operations in the Congo, initiated by the General Assembly,
"did not include a use of armed force against a State which the Security Council, under article 39, determined to have committed an act of
aggression or to have breached the peace," they were not enforcement actions.2 9 The Court said further that since the United
Nations armed forces in the Congo were not authorized to take
military action against any state, the United Nations operation "did
not involve preventive or enforcement measures against any state
under Chapter VII" and could not be termed "action" under
article 11.240
Given the stillborn United Nations collective security system,
and the grave financial problems before the United Nations,2 4 ' with
their enormous impact on the United Nations peacekeeping functions, the trend seems to be toward an increased regional autonomy.
The unpredictable Council alignments, uncertainty of the Council
action in view of the veto, the recent increase in the number of the
Council membership, and finally the fact that many regional problems may be best suited to a local settlement,2 42 have further
strengthened the trend.
Among the member states, the United States has, ever since the
1954 Guatemalan crisis, encouraged this trend. The trend may be
criticized on the ground that it detracts from acknowledging the
supremacy of the United Nations. However, since it meets the needs
of the time and can be justified on a reasonable construction of the
United Nations and the OAS Charters, it should be accepted as a
time gap measure, necessary and lawful, until or if collective security
under United Nations auspices becomes practical and real. Special
circumstances of the conflict and urgent situations such as presented
by the 1965 Dominican crisis might in the future, again bring the
238 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, supra note 227, at 163.
239 Id. at 177.
240

Ibid.

241 See generally Padelford, Financial Crisis and the Future of the United Nations,
3 THE STRATEGY OF WORLD ORDER 733 (Falk & Mendlovitz eds. 1966). See also
SINGER, FINANCING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: THE UNITED NATIONS BUDGET

PROCESS (1961); R.F. & H.J. Taubenfeld, Independent Revenue for the UN, 18
INT'L ORGN. 241 (1964).

2See, e.g., U.N. SECUITY COUNCIL OFF. REC. 20th year, 1198th meeting 12
(S/PV.1198) (1965) (Bolivian Representative's Speech); id. 1214th meeting 6-7
(S/PV.1214) (further remarks by the Bolivian Representative) ; id. 1202d meeting
5-6 (S/PV. 1202) (Chinese Representative's address).
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United Nations physical presence into a regional conflict. But as
long as the aforementioned problems at the United Nations and in
the world community exist and as long as extra-legal considerations,
mainly expediency, set the tone for formulating major policies by
national states in the international arena, this trend is almost
irreversible.
Based upon the discussion thus far a few further inquiries concerning basic community policies are pertinent here. The first question pertains to the proper decision-making authority to commit
armed force in response to an alleged "armed attack." Latin America
is known for military dictatorships, some of which often resort to the
magic device of dubbing their opponents "Communists" to suppress
them and thus strengthen their otherwise teetering political power.
Would the United States insist on making the initial decision to send
forces to a Latin American country when the incumbent regime asks
for assistance on the ground that it is the target of an "armed attack,"
and is likely to be taken over by Communists? 4 3 In a press interview
on May 8, 1965, Secretary Rusk responded to a similar question.
He said that since the United States action in the Dominican Republic was related specifically to the facts of that situation, it would
serve "no useful purpose to speculate on possible responses to any
future events elsewhere, particularly when we have no basis for
expecting them to occur. ' 244 Three weeks later, in another interview, he again said that one should not "generalize on a world-wide
45
basis on the experience of the Dominican Republic." 1
These statements do not provide a satisfactory answer to the
question posed. Furthermore, in view of the United States action in
the Dominican Republic and the subsequent House Resolution,
would not some unscrupulous military juntas justify their military
assistance to other juntas to quash their political oppositions on a
self-serving interpretation of the obligations of member states under
26
the Inter-American System? 1
2

43See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC.

26185 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1965) (remarks by Senator
Morse):
Suppose conditions should worsen in Bolivia, now ruled by a military
junta. Suppose groups of people in Bolvia should rise up to overthrow
that military junta. Suppose that military junta should make a plea to the
United States for military assistance and intervention. Are we going in,
Mr. Rusk and Mr. Mann?
See also id. at 8911 (daily ed. May 3, 1965) (earlier statements by Senator Morse)
Matthews, Santo Domingo and "Non-intervention", N.Y. Times, May 10, 1965,
p. 32, col. 5 (city ed.).

24 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 843 (1965).
Id. at 949.
246 See, e.g., Kent, New "Axis" is Eyed: Restless Neighbors Worry Uruguayans, Washington Post, Aug. 11, 1966, p. E6, col. 1-2.
245
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Perhaps the alternative is that the Organ of Consultation alone
must determine in the first instance whether there was an "armed
attack," and second, if the "armed attack" affected hemispheric
peace or threatened the political integrity of a member state before
allowing the commitment of armed forces in a Dominican-type situation. It should, however, be recalled that the OAS action in the
Dominican crisis was not taken under the Rio Treaty. The Tenth
Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers was convoked under
Article 39 of the OAS Charter, to consider the "serious situation"
created by armed strife in the Dominican Republic; 2 41 it was not
convened as the Organ of Consultation.
The second question pertains to the application of the doctrine
of sovereign equality of nation states,2 4 and the right of states to
self-determination,2 4 to which all member states have at least given
unqualified verbal adherence. This verbal adherence would certainly
demand that the right of a nation state to adopt its own political
institutions be respected. To illustrate, the United Nations recognized this right in the 1956 Hungarian crisis by upholding the specific right of Hungarian people to a government responsive to their
250
national aspirations and dedicated to independence.
The claim of a minor state to exercise its right of self-determination, that is, the claim to control the allocation of those values
which primarily affect its internal public order, might conflict with
the claim of a major power to use force for protection of its security
or with a regional claim to use force to maintain homogeneity of
ideology in all states within that region. Thus, the pertinent questions are whether international law can protect these diverse and
often competing claims, or whether some exceptions must be made
to the principles of self-determination and sovereign equality. Specifically, in the context of the western hemisphere, aims and aspira247

The Representative of Chile had called for the convocation of the meeting. See 52

DEP'T STATE BULL. 739 (1965).
248 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1, provides: "The Organization is based on the principle

of the sovereign equality of all its Members." Of course, compliance with the
principle of "Sovereign Equality" should not be equated with some mythical equality
of nation states to be reflected in the authority structures at the United Nations, or
with equality in their influence in the international arena.
24 9
See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2, dealing with the purposes of the United Nations,
especially mentioning "self-determination of peoples" as a principle to be respected
in developing "friendly relations among nations." For the General Assembly resolutions on non-intervention, see 54 DEP'T STATE BULL. 128-29 (1966); 56 id. at
32-33 (1967) (Res. 2160 (XXI) ). See also Morgenthau, To Intervene or Not
to Intervene, 45 FoR'N AFF. 452 (1967).
2" U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 2D EMER. Sass., Supp. No. 1, at 2 (A/3355)

(United Nations Resolution on Hungary condemning the Soviet action).

(1956)
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tions of "democracy" imbedded in the OAS Charter,2 5 ' Rio Treaty,2" 2
and declarations of the OAS Conferences,2 53 might conflict with the
The Preamble of the Charter of the Organization of American States reads in part:
"Confident that the true significance of American Solidarity and good neighborliness
can only mean the consolidation on this continent, within the framework of democratic institutions .... 119 U.N.T.S. 50 (1952). For revenue to democracy in the
OAS Charter, see Article 5(d). Compare Article 13. See U.N. SEcuRITY COUNCIL
OFF. REc. 20th year, 1219th meetting 3-4 (S/PV.1219) (1965) (Cuban Representative's comment) ; id. at 4, where the Cuban Representative said that vague political
ideas on democracy contained in the OAS Charter "do not insure their practical implementation by means of a legal obligation to organize in a certain manner."
252 The Preamble of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance reads in part:
"That the American regional community affirms as a manifest truth that . .. peace
is founded on ...the effectiveness of democracy for the international realization of
justice and security ....
" 21 U.N.T.S. 95 (1948).
253 See, e.g., the Resolution adopted by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation at its Third
Plenary Session, on May 6, 1965, to establish the Inter-American Peace Force, which
says in part:
[T~he Organization [OAS] is under even greater obligation to safeguard
the principles of the Charter and to do everything possible so that in situations such as that prevailing in the Dominican Republic appropriate measures may be taken leading to the re-establishment of peace and normal
democratic conditions.... (Emphasis added.)
OAS, Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Report of the
Secretary-General of the Organization of American States regarding the Dominican
Situation, Activities from April 29, 1965, until the installation of the Provisional
Government 7 (Pan Am. Union, 1965), OAS OFF. REc. OEA/Ser. F/11.10, Doc.
405, at 8, the resolution provides in its operative paragraph 2 that the Inter-American
Peace Force
will have as its sole purpose, in a spirit of democratic impartiality, that of
cooperating in the restoration of normal conditions in the Dominican
Republic, in maintaining the security of its inhabitants and the inviolability
of human rights, and in the establishment of an atmosphere of peace and
concilation that will permit the functioning of democratic institutions.
(Emphasis added.)
See also Special Consultative Committee on Security, Report of the Special Consultative Committee on Security on the work done during its Fourth Regular Meeting,
April 12 to May 7, 1965, OAS OFF. Rac. OEA/Ser. L/X/118, at 19 '(1965), the
section entitled The Need to Defend Democracy. id. at 19-20:
In the Americas, under the protection of democratic freedoms, communism
has successfully developed and has used with impunity all the techniques of
revolutionary warfare preached by Lenin.... As a basic measure of selfdefense, the communist problem must be erradicated [sic] in order to carry
out the reforms demanded by the peoples of the Americas.
Id. at 18:
In the opinion of the Committee, the events that have occurred in the
Dominican Republic should be the object of a careful investigation with a
view to clarifying their relation to international communism. If such a
relaitons exists, it would be one more proof of the grave danger that threatens the Americas.
The Committee reported at its Fifth Regular Meeting, October 18 to November 10,
1965, OEA/Ser. L/X/II10, at 4-5:
The events that began last April in the Dominican Republic, gave rise to a
typical case in which the communists attempted to take advantage of an
irregular internal situation in order to seize power. This maneuver was not
successful owing to the adoption of extraterritorial measures ....
Later, by means of a well-directed foreign plan, the communists took advantage of a series of circumstances such as ...the democratic opinion of
the Americas which favored the principle of nonintervention.
See id. at 15 ("In the Western Hemisphere, the position of the member states of the
OAS is in favor of the survival of democracy as is clearly expressed in its basic
documents.") ; id. at 36 ("As long as the present communist regime remains in
power in Cuba, the immediate threat of communism will continue in the Americas.") ;
id. at 16 ("Thus, it is essential that, for the purpose of strengthening and defending
democracy in the Americas, all the available means be applied for eradicating communism or, at least, for slowing the pace and restricting the extent of its infiltration.").
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decision in a Latin American country of a majority of its people to
live under non-democratic institutions. The United Nations Charter,
it may be noted, does not outlaw non-democratic governments or even
disapprove of them.
It is recommended that in the case of conflicting claims between
a regional organization and a state, pertaining to the state's right of
self-determination, an authoritative procedure should be established
by which the rest of the community can evaluate a region's policies,
vis-a-vis a state's right of self-determination, 2 4 to determine the permissibility or impermissibility of the limitation imposed by the region.
Furthermore, in case of conflicting claims between major and minor
powers, one possible solution would be for the community decisionmaker to recognize the capacity of major powers to cause deprivation
of values to other states and hence to accept "harsh realities" and
adopt and apply different standards to different participants in the
international arena. If this would not be a desirable solution, the
alternative would be for major powers to show restraint and voluntarily comply with international law norms. In this context, legal
adviser Meeker has made an encouraging statement in his recent
comment on the Viet-Nam controversy. He observes that:
We may feel the absence today of a law-giver outside national governments, who could... give and enforce law among the nations.
That absence does not relieve us of moral and political obligation.
..Let us remember, too, that the shape of things to come is in no
small way determined by the actions of great powers ...as we
consider the
needs and the possibilities for developing effective
255
world law.

The United States action in the 1965 Dominican conflict cannot
be said to have created a healthy precedent to strengthen international law. In the world of Nassers and Sukarnos, Duvaliers,
Stroessners and Somozas, amidst the tumultous outcry of such slogans
as "wars of national liberation" to justify the use of force, in the
presence of the still unresolved colonial conflicts and still more
threatened conflicts on the emotionally charged issue of apartheid,
and finally, in view of the inadequacies of international law - both
substantive norms and procedural safeguards - it becomes more
difficult and yet more compelling for a state to comply with law.
As the discussion in this paper indicates, the United States' action
detracted from strict compliance with law. It is in the interest of the
United States and the rest of the world community to strengthen
254

25

Cf. Plank, The Caribbean; Intervention, When and How, 44 FOR'N AFF. 37, 41-47
(1965). See also N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1967, p. 18, col. 3 (city ed.), for a brief
report on the defeat of the Argentine proposal to institutionalize the Inter-American
Defense Board as part of the formal structure of the OAS at the recent Buenos Aires
meeting. The voting was 11-6-3.
Meeker, Viet Nam and the InternationalLaw of Self-Defense, 56 DEP'T STATE BULL.
54, 57-58 (1967).
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the rule of law by substituting collective action for unilateral action,
and strict compliance with international law in its formative years,
for expediency.

AN ECCLESIASTICAL ROLE FOR THE LAWYER

IN A SECULAR SOCETY
By THOMPSON G.

MARSH

Dr. Marsh adds his comments to the growing inquiry re-

garding the nature of the lawyer's role in our worldly society. He
examines the common law pitfalls into which the "reasonably
prudent layman" may stumble when he bypasses the lawyer in
planning his estate. His analysis reveals the enigmatic role required

of today's lawyer - that of incorporatingthe secular with the divine

in his own earthly existence in order to mitigate the disenchantment
of these dead souls.

T

secularism imposes upon the lawyer a new role. He must
do what he can to alleviate the mental agonies of the dead. It
is a matter of common knowledge that when the reasonably prudent
decedent learns that he has died owning more property than he
thought he had, he is aghast.
After a brave life spent in defense of his property against the
tax gatherers, they now dig up an unsuspected addition to his taxable estate but they don't dig him up to defend it. To make matters
worse, any of this newly discovered property that is left after taxes is
liable to wind up in the hands of the very person to whom the decedent would not have given it if he had known that he had it. The
resulting frustration is so great that many godly souls develop persecution complexes and believe that they are in hell. Allen, Brock,
Craig, and Dixon are typical, pitiful victims of this fate.
Allen, a widower, owned a farm. His only child, Jane, and her
worthless husband, Jim, moved in on him. Allen wanted to make
sure that the farm would stay in the family and that Jim would never
get any part of it. He also wanted to avoid estate taxes. So, in 1920
he deeded the farm "to my daughter Jane for her life, and then to
her children in fee simple." The deed was delivered to Jane, who recorded it. She thereafter managed the farm and paid the taxes.
Allen died in 1921. Jane's only children, twins, were born in
1923. In 1945 Jane died intestate, survived by her husband Jim and
the twenty-two year old twins. Since the statute of descent and distribution was similar to the one in Colorado,' worthless Jim got half
the farm.
This is just what Allen had tried to prevent. He could not believe it when he heard that the judge had said that, in spite of his
ODAY'S

*Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
1 COLO. REV. STAT. § 153-2-1 (1963).
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deed, Allen had died owning the farm in fee simple. However, the
estate tax collectors believed it, and took their share.
It is perhaps unfortunate that Allen was a godly soul, because
where he is there are no lawyers, and he will never have the mystery
explained to him. When his deed was delivered to Jane she had no
children and so of course the estate in fee simple did not pass to them
at that time. The attempted conveyance to them merely created a
contingent remainder. Jane got her life estate in possession, but
Allen still retained his estate in fee simple in reversion, subject to
divestment upon the birth of a child to Jane.
No child was born to Jane during Allen's lifetime. Therefore,
his reversion descended to Jane, his only heir, and was a part of his
taxable estate.
The life estate which Jane had acquired by the deed merged
into the fee simple which she inherited and was thereby ended. Since
the contingent remainder had not yet vested it was destroyed, and
would not thereafter be restored by the subsequent birth of the twins.
Consequently, Jane died owning the farm in fee simple absolute.
All of this is a matter of orthodox common law.' The fact that Jim
inherited one half of her farm is a matter of statute.3
Brock, who had known of Allen's plans, was astonished at the
outcome; but he was told that Allen could have accomplished his
purpose if he had conveyed his farm in trust for Jane and her children, because the rule of destructibility of contingent remainders
does not apply to trusts.
Brock acted upon this suggestion, and in 1946, deeded his farm
to the Trust Company, to manage and pay over the net income
quarterly, as follows: "to me for my life, and after my death to my
wife Victoria for her life, and after Victoria and I are both dead,
to my son Paul for his life, and after Victoria and Paul and I are
dead, to convey the farm to my heirs."
Brock still had a few old books and pictures left, and in his will
he gave "all the rest and residue of my property to the University of
Pennsylvania." Victoria and Paul died in 1947, and Brock died in
1948, leaving his brother and his sister as his only heirs.
Brock rested peacefully because he loved his brother and sister
and knew that they would take good care of the old farm. However,
a Philadelphia lawyer persuaded a court to order the Trust Company
to convey the farm to the University of Pennsylvania.
Poor godly Brock. Where he is, he is not even permitted to
curse the court, but he has plenty of company. For centuries the
2

See Blocker v. Blocker, 103 Fla. 285, 137 So. 249 (1931).

3

COLO. REV. STAT. § 153-2-1 (1963).
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courts of the common law have held that no one, by trust or otherwise, can convey his own property to his own heirs by using the word
"heirs. ' 4 The attempt to do so is a nullity. Therefore, Brock still
owned the farm in fee simple when he died, and it passed under the
residuary clause of his will.
Craig was told that if Brock had used descriptive words such
as "children," "brothers," "sisters" or "nephews," rather than the
technical term "heirs," his trust would have been completely effective.
Craig was very much interested in this explanation, but he preferred the university to his dead-beat brother and sister, and he liked
the idea of a tax-free gift to charity.
In 1949, he deeded his farm to the Trust Company, to manage
and pay over the net income as follows: "to me for my life, and
after my death to my widow for her life, and after her death to my
son for his life, and after I and my widow and my son are dead, then
to convey the farm to such of my grandchildren as are then living,
and if there be no such grandchildren, to the University of Pennsylvania."
In 1950, Craig's wife and son died and there were no surviving
grandchildren. In 1952, Craig died leaving his unloved brother and
sister as his only heirs. They got the farm.
In a similar case, speaking of such a testator, Lord Dunedin
said, "He has used the words ...

and I am afraid he must take the

consequences." 5

What had Craig done? He had violated the Rule
Against Perpetuities. Craig might have remarried; his widow might
have been someone who was not in existence when the deed was delivered to the Trust Company. The contingent gift to such grandchildren as might be living at the death of the widow is void for remoteness, and so is the alternative contingent gift to the university.6
Craig had died owning the farm in fee simple. It was a part of his
taxable estate. The government took the estate tax, the brother and
sister took the farm - Craig took the consequences.
Dixon, having heard about Adams, Brock, and Craig, decided
not to run the risk of such a posthumously distressing distribution.
He would make sure that he didn't own anything when he died.
When he bought a farm in 1951, he saw to it that the land was not
conveyed to him in fee simple, but only for his life, so that when he
died there would be nothing in his estate. The deed to the farm was
in these words, "to Dixon for his life only, and then to his wife Mary
for her life only, and then to the heirs of Dixon."
4 In re Brolasky's Estate, 302 Pa. 439, 153 At. 739 (1931).
5

Ward v. Van Der Loeff,

(1924)

A.C. 653, 667.

6 See Perkins v. Iglehart, 183 Md. 520, 39 A.2d. 672 (1944).
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Mary died in 1954. Dixon in the meantime had accumulated
a few stocks and bonds. His only child was John, and the farm
would be more than enough for him. So as a gesture of loyalty in
1955, he willed "all of my property to the University of Pennsylvania."
In 1956, Dixon died. The University of Pennsylvania got the
farm and son John went on relief. There is no relief for Dixon nor
for any of the thousands of souls who, during their time on earth,
have brought themselves within the reach of the Rule in Shelley's
Case.
In spite of the plain meaning of the deed, its effect was to give
Dixon a life estate, Mary a life estate, and Dixon himself, not his
heirs, the remainder in fee simple absolute.7 He owned it when he
died. It was a part of his taxable estate, and it passed under his will
to the university.
Prudent laymen like Adams, Brock, Craig, and Dixon know so
much law that they will continue to follow the well-worn paths of
those many generations of property owners who have by-passed all
lawyers on their way to heaven. No doubt this is a sin of omission,
but should it be punished by eternal bewilderment? If only these
godly souls could talk to a lawyer. There would be plenty of time
for everything to be explained - over and over again - a sort of
posthumous psychotherapy.
It is therefore the responsibility of the legal profession and of
the individual lawyer to do whatever can be done to diminish the
discomforture of those deserving decedents who had determined to
die destitute. The challenge of this new role is perplexing. Lawyers
must become psychiatrists; they must live such pure lives that they
will go to heaven and there commune with the godly Aliens, Brocks,
Craigs, and Dixons throughout eternity; and yet withal they must be
lawyers.

7 See Seymour v. Heubaum, 65 Ill. App. 2d 89, 211 N.E.2d 897 (1965).

NOTES
PURGED VOTER LISTS
INTRODUCTION

T

HE

General Assembly amended the Colorado Election Code in

1963 to provide that:
Within ninety days following the general election,['] the county
clerk shall furnish to the county chairmen of the two major political
addresses, precinct numbers
parties[21 a list containing the names,
4
3
and party affiliations of the electors[ l whose names were removed[
from the registration
book["] for failure to vote at the last preceding
8
general election.
Although the legislature has the power to enact reasonable reg-

ulations regarding registration of voters when such regulations do
not violate constitutional provisions of the state7 or of the United
1 The term general election is defined as "the election held on the Tuesday succeeding
the first Monday of November in each even numbered year." COLO. Riv. STAT.

§ 49-1-4(1)

(1963).

2 A major political party is defined as "one of the two political parties whose candi-

dates for governor at the last preceding gubernatorial election received the first and
second greatest number of votes." CoLo. REv. STAT. § 49-1-4(13) (1963). Query
whether this is a just classification, in that any political party might number the
greatest percentage of electors and yet not have even run a gubernatorial candidate.
3 An elector is one "who is legally qualified to register to vote in this state." COLO.
REV. STAT. § 49-1-4(4) (1963).
4 Purging the registration book is required by COLO. REv. STAT. § 49-4-21(1) (1963).
5 A registration book contains the identification and registration information pertaining
to individual electors. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 49-1-4(21), '(22) (1963).
6 COLO. REV. STAT. § 49-4-21(3) (1963)
(emphasis and footnotes added). See also
COLO. REV. STAT. § 49-4-21(4) (1963), which required similar action before the
primary election in 1964.
7
Harrell v. Sullivan, 220 Ind. 108, 40 N.E.2d 115 (1942), overruled on other
grounds, State v. Marion Cir. Ct., 225 Ind. 7, 72 N.E.2d 225 (1947). As to the
problem of concern here, Harrell is closely analogous on one point of its four alternative holdings. Harrellholds that:
The requirement that registration boards . . . shall supply the county
chairmen of the two major political parties with copies of registration
memoranda is likewise invalid for two reasons. It is bad for classification
since . . . it grants privileges to the members of two political parties which,
upon the same terms, do not equally belong to all.
Id. at 124, 40 N.E.2d at 121.
The broad language in Marion Cir. Ct. overruling Harrell "in all things" has not
been followed in Indiana or elsewhere. Cf. Terry v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 599 (S. D.
Tex. 1950); State v. Millspaugh, 241 Ind. 656, 659, 175 N.E.2d 13, 15 (1961);
Indiana Dep't of Rev. v. Callaway's Estate, 232 Ind. 1, 5, 110 N.E.2d 903, 905
(1953). Apparently the Marion Cir. Ct. holding is being limited to the question of
the constitutionality of a statute requiring appointment of public officials from members of political parties, which is the point on which Harrell is overruled. In Harrell,
the taxpayers laid a great deal of stress in their brief on the furnishing of memoranda
at public expense for private (major political party) purposes. See Annot., 140
A.L.R. 455, 459 (1942).
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States, 8 it is submitted that this enactment falls within the prohibition of "special legislation."
I.

THE REGISTRATION LAWS

The laws regarding registration, purging of voters who did not
vote or register, and re-registration of voters, are all a part of the
"machinery of election" or of conducting an election.'0 Nothing in
our constitutional system expressly sanctions legislative favoritism or
discrimination in the elective process based on political party affiliation.11 Nonetheless, in Colorado, no person can lawfully be permitted to vote at any primary, general or special election without first
having registered within the time and in the manner required by
statute.' This includes designating one's political affiliation. The
underlying purpose of the registration laws is the prevention of election fraud.' 3
As a consequence of the new provisions of the Election Code,
the County Clerk would appear to be required by law to use tax-paid
personnel and the facilities of his office to provide the county chairmen of the winning and runner-up political parties with a free list
of purged voters. This free service' 4 is given without provision for
8

Mason v. Missouri, 179 U.S. 328 (1900). See also Stewart v. Bacon County, 148 Ga.
105, 95 S.E. 983 (1918) ; People v. Hoffman, 116 Ill.
587, 5 N.E. 596 (1886);
Coggeshell v. Des Moines, 138 Iowa 730, 117 N.W. 309 (1908); Pope v. Williams,
98 Md. 59, 56 Atl. 543 (1903), affd, 193 U.S. 621 (1904); Capen v. Foster, 29
Mass. (12 Pick) 485 (1832).
9 COLO. CoNsT. art. V, § 25. The statute may also violate the equal protection clause
of the Federal Constitution. Throughout the paper there will be references to that
clause and its application. The theory of invalidity under equal protection, is predicated
on an analysis quite similar to the one utilized in this paper; however, the special
legislation argument would seem to have more validity and less technical problems
associated with it. For instance, the questions of a) standing, b) jurisdiction, and c)
the giving of advisory opinions or declaratory judgments, present problems if a
"federal case" is made out. There would seem to be no problem that this is sufficient
-state action" and that the personal or political rights involved are appropriate to
raise a justiciable issue. As these questions are peripheral to our discussion, it has
been assumed that at least taxpaying purged electors of the minority parties would
have standing in a class action and that the Colorado Supreme Court would grant a
declaratory judgment.
1°Board of Registration Comm'rs v. Campbell, 251 Ky. 597, 65 S.W.2d 713 (1933)
(dictum).
" The heritage of a predominantly two-party system would seem to be, however, a
natural result of the "republican form" we are guaranteed. See generally BROGAN,
POLITICS AND LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, ch. 11 (1945). Brogan depicts the
so-called two-party system as not a truly national concept but states that it operates
in a regional fashion at best. In BROGAN, op. cit. supra at 47, it is further pointed out
that the framers may have attempted to provide against the two-party concept.
12 COLO. REV. STAT. § 49-4-1 (1963).
13Board of Registration Comm'rs v. Campbell, 251 Ky. 597, 65 S.W.2d 713 (1933);
Simms v. County Ct. of Kanawha County, 134 W. Va. 867, 61 S.E.2d 849 '(1950).
Cf. § IV, B infra, of this Note, as to the more express purpose.
14 COLO. REV. STAT. § 49-4-21(3) (1963). There is no provision for a charge or fee.
It is assumed that none could be made by the clerk. Compare COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 49-4-23 (1963), authorizing receipt from the county of certain fees. See also COLO.
REV. STAT. § 49-4-25 (1963), providing for examination of the books as public
records.
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equal, or any, services to other political parties or unaffiliated, i.e.,
independent, electors.
II. THE FACTS
Among electors both purged and unpurged are those affiliated
with each of several political parties and others unaffiliated with
any political party. In 1960 the names of two "minor" political
parties, the Socialist-Labor and Socialist Workers, appeared on the
general election ballots.'" These two parties cast a total of 3,375
votes in Colorado, 6 1,618 votes in the City and County of Denver,' 7
582 votes in Pueblo County, 8 over 100 votes in four other counties,"9
and some votes in almost all of the counties.2" An independent candidate for the United States Senate in 1960 received 3,351 votes. 2 '
In 1964, the Socialist-Labor, Socialist Workers and Prohibition parties cast a total of 4,195 votes in Colorado, over 100 votes in nine
different counties,2 3 and some votes in all but five counties.2 4 The

"major political parties" in those years were the Republican and
the

25
Democratic parties.

It would seem safe to assume that the electors voting SocialistLabor, Independent, et cetera, were also registered as other than
Democrat or Republican, and that the percentage purged from each
group would be approximately the same. It would then follow that,
although there has been no serious threat to the dominance of the two
major parties currently in power, there are substantial numbers of
electors whose rights stand to be infringed.
Since the burden of proof, through the presentation of adequate
facts, is on the one who attacks the constitutionality of registration
statutes, 26 it would seem of paramount importance that some discrepancy be shown between re-registration of members of the major
15 STATE OF COLORADO, ABSTRACT OF VOTES CAST 10

(1960).

16 Ibid.
17Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.
2
1Ibid.
2
2Id. at 20 (1964).
23 ibid.
24 Ibid.
2

Ibid. Even more impressive was the New Hispano showing in the 1966 gubernatorial
race, in which they tallied 16,201 votes. STATE OF COLORADO, ABSTRACT OF VOTES
CAST 25 (1966). Elsewhere in the nation, it was found that in Norwalk, Connecticut,
in the 1947 and 1949 elections, the two major political parties were the Socialist
Party with the Republican Party in 1947 and with the Democratic Party in 1949. See

Mills v. Gaynor, 136 Conn. 632, 73 A.2d 823 (1950).
26 People v. Earl, 42 Colo. 238, 254, 94 Pac. 294, 299 (1908)

that the registration statute attacked was not special legislation).

(holding, inter alia,
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and of the minor political parties (the latter taken to include inde2
pendents). It is submitted that this can be accomplished. 1
III.

THE PROBLEM

Article V, Section 25 of the Constitution of Colorado provides:
The general assembly shall not pass local or special laws in
any of the following enumerated cases, that is to say; for ... the
opening or conducting of any election ....
granting to any corporation, association or individual any special or exclusive privilege,
immunity or franchise whatever. In all other cases, where a general
law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted.
As can be seen, Colorado adopted this section for the purpose
of prohibiting special legislation, privileges and favoritism where
general laws could be applied.
It is well settled that a law is not local or special when it is
general and uniform in its operation upon all in like situation, [so
the second question is] . . . whether or not the dassification provided by the acts under consideration is unreasonable....
'To make such a law general there must be some distinguishing
peculiarity which gives rise to a necessity for the law as to the designated class. A mere classification for the purpose of legislation without regard to such necessity, is simply special legislation of the
28
most pernicious character, and is condemned by the constitution.'
What "distinguishing peculiarity" gives rise to a necessity for a law
affording to the two major political parties the gratuity and favor of
a free list of purged voters?
IV. THE

TESTS

A. Power
The legislature has authority, under its police power, 9 to enact
reasonable regulations for registration of electors only as long as
such regulations do not violate any provision of the constitution of
the state or of the United States.8 0 Basically, the tests for determining
the validity of the statutes in question under both the state and federal constitutional provisions, i.e., the "special legislation" and "equal
protection" clauses, respectively, are the same.81 This would seem to
2 The election commission records regarding purged and re-registered electors are not
broken down; in Denver, however, the information is on IBM cards and could be
grouped to reflect the statistics necessary.
28
People v. Earl, 42 Colo. 238, 264, 94 Pac. 294, 302-03 (1908), citing State v. Miller,
100 Mo. 439, 13 S.W. 677 (1890).
29 People v. Hoffman, 116 Ill. 587, 5 N.E. 596 '(1886); People v. Ford Motor Co.,
271 App. Div. 141, 63 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1946).
30 Simmons v. Byrd, 192 Ind. 274, 136 N.E. 14 (1922) ; State v. Seibert, 228 Mo. App.
1133, 65 S.W.2d 129 (1933).

31 State Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (1931); Rosenblum v. Griffin, 89 N.H.
314, 197 Atl. 701 (1938); Milwaukie Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen, 214
Ore. 281, 330 P.2d 5 (1958),

(1959).

appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 359 U.S. 436
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be true, despite the fact that the two provisions are the "antithesis"
of one another." That is, whereas one prevents discrimination in
enlarging the rights of citizens, the other prevents discrimination in
restricting their rights."8
B. The Purpose
The legislature's valid exercise of power is predicated on its
having a valid purpose in the first instance. The legislature's purpose must be established before determining whether the classification itself is reasonable. According to the cases, the underlying purpose is the prevention of election fraud.8 4 It has been said that the
exercise of legislative power in this area is for the purpose of regulating, not qualifying, the exercise of the right of sufferage 8 8
Apparently, in this instance, the purpose of the legislature was to
increase the number of voters of all persuasions exercising the elective franchise. Undoubtedly if the purpose had been to aid the major
political parties at the expense of the minor parties or minor party
and independent electors, the legislation would have been unconstitutional from the outset.8 6
C. Determination of Reasonableness of the Classification
"In the matter of classification, the legislature has a wide range
of discretion. '83 Special legislation, or class legislation as it is sometimes called, violates constitutional prohibitions when the classification used is arbitrary and capricious, 3 when it is not reasonable, 9
32

State v. Savage, 96 Ore. 53, 59, 184 Pac. 567, 570 (1919). Compare Truax v.
Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921); Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S. 157
'(1912); Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1901); American Sugar
Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89 (1900), to the effect that the Fourteenth
Amendment is not necessarily infringed by special legislation.
33Savage v. Martin, 161 Ore. 660, 684, 91 P.2d 273, 286-87 (1939). But see Rosenblum v. Griffin, 89 N.H. 314, 197 At. 701 (1938), to the effect that the equal
protection clause requires equality of benefit as well as equality of burden.
34See note 13 supra.
3sPiuser v. Sioux City, 220 Iowa 308, 262 N.W. 551 (1935); Dysart v. St. Louis, 321
Mo. 514, 11 S.W.2d 1045 (1928) ; Simms v. County Ct. of Kanawha County, 134
W. Va. 867, 61 S.E.2d 849 (1950).
36 See note 7 supra. Compare Remsen v. Woolley, 22 N.J. Super. 459, 92 A.2d 87
(1952), with Harrell v. Sullivan, 220 Ind. 108, 40 N.E.2d 115 (1942), overruled
on other grounds, State v. Marion Cir. Ct., 225 Ind. 7, 72 N.E.2d 225 (1947).
3
7Driverless Car Co. v. Armstrong, 91 Colo. 334, 338, 14 P,2d 1098, 1100 (1932),
citing Rifle Potato Growers Co-op. Ass'n v. Smith, 78 Colo. 171, 240 Pac. 937
(1925). See also cases cited at 16 AM. JuR. 2d Constitutional Law § 495 n. 20, at
862 (1964).
38
Walters v. St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231, 237 (1954) ; Southern Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216
U.S. 400 (1910); Billings v. Illinois, 188 U.S. 97 (1903) ; Connolly v. Union Sewer
Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902) ; Cotting v. Godard, 183 U.S. 79 (1901) ; Gulf, Colo.
& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897); State ex rel. Astor v. Schlitz
Brewing Co., 104 Tenn. 715, 731, 59 S.W. 1033, 1040 (1900).
39New York Rapid Transit Corp. v. New York, 303 U.S. 573 (1937), reh. denied,
304 U.S. 588 (1938) ; Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301
U.S. 459 (1937) ; Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S.
183 (1936).
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when it is unjust,4 ° when it does not have a rational basis, 4 ' when it
is not based on a reasonable distinction in principle,4 2 when it is not
reasonably adopted to secure a legitimate public interest,4" or when
it reflects no material or substantial differences between the regulated and nonregulated classes." Also, when one class benefits,
there must be good reason for conferring a special privilege on that
class.4 5 Furthermore, the statute "must affect alike all persons in the
46
same class and under similar conditions.
If we assume the valid purpose of the legislation,4 7 the next
step is to determine whether the classification limiting the distribution of the purged voter list to the county chairmen of the two major
parties is reasonable, by the tests above. One reason for the legislature conferring a special privilege on the two major political parties
might have been the belief that other political parties would not
have a county chairman in each of the sixty-three counties. Also, the
legislature might have felt that the classification was reasonable
because this was the only way of getting any voters re-registered. It
is of record, however, that votes are cast in most of the counties by
these other political parties, 48 so there would seem to be at least one
person to receive the information. And, in any event, the independent voters are in no way represented by the classification. It is just
as arbitrary to distinguish Democrats and Republicans from New
Hispanos as it would be to distinguish red-headed and black-haired
men.4 9 Yet this is the net effect of the statute. Similarly, the other
tests (above) are not met. Thus, there would seem to be no reason,
in law or fact, to classify into "major" and "minor" political parties.
40

Consumers' League v. Colo. & So. Ry. Co., 53 Colo. 54, 125 Pac. 577 (1912).
41 Minnesota v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
42
American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89 (1900).
4Woolfv. Fuller, 87 N.H. 64, 174 Ati. 193 (1934).
44 Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936) ; Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) ; State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S.
527 (1931). The Supreme Court of Colorado has held that:
to constitute class legislation within the constitutional prohibition, the classification must be unreasonable. The question of classification is primarily for
the legislature. Courts will not interfere with legislative classification unless
it appears that there is 'no fair reason for the law that would not equally
require its extension to the excepted class.'
Driverless Car Co. v. Armstrong, 91 Colo. 334, 338, 14 P.2d 1098, 1100 (1932),

citing Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173 (1910) (emphasis added).
45 Champlin Refining Co. v. Cruse, 115 Colo. 329, 173 P.2d 213 (1946).
46
Zeigler v. People, 109 Colo. 252, 264, 124 P.2d 593, 598 (1942) ; accord, Champlin
Refining Co. v. Cruse, 115 Colo. 329, 173 P.2d 213 (1946).
47 The burden of proof is almost too heavy to meet on this point. An object (purpose)
would probably be held valid for an exercise of power if any set of facts could reasonably be conceived which would allow a finding of constitutionality. McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Allied Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959)
Savage v. Martin, 161 Ore. 660, 91 P.2d 273 (1939).
48 See notes 15-25 supra.
49 Tanner v. Little, 240 U.S. 369 (1916).
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Furnishing a free list of purged voters to the two major political
parties is a "sophisticated" mode of discrimination (in equal protection language) against all other political parties and individual
voters, but it would seem that the constitutional provision should
nullify "sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination."50
D.

Determination of the Reasonable Relation Between Classification and Purpose

If there is no legislative power, then the reasonableness and
valid scientific basis of the classification are to no avail in upholding
the statute.5 ' Likewise, if the classification is improper, there can be
no reasonable relationship of that classification to any legitimate
2
ends of the legislation.1
A valid purpose and power have been stipulated above.13 Now
assume arguendo that a valid classification exists. The analysis is
still not complete, however, until a reasonable relationship is established between the classification and the purpose. The classification
will not serve to achieve the legitimate ends sought unless it is also
assumed that the county chairmen are required, 54 by implication, to
to make an effort to re-register all electors purged.
E. Discrimination in Administration
The constitutionality of the statute before us must be tested in
its practicaleffects. The validity of a statute depends upon how it is
construed and applied. 5' Under the existing law, all purged voters
are not treated uniformly throughout the state in an effort to reregister them. 56 The extent of the effort made to re-register them is
delegated to the discretion of two major political party county chairmen in each county. The natural objective of these chairmen is not
to get all purged voters re-registered, but rather it is to register only
those persons who vote for their own party. It is clearly unreasonable
to expect the Republican or Democratic county chairmen to exert as
50Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939).

See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S.
339 (1960) ; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S- 356 (!886). See also Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
51 Tanner v. Little, 240 U.S. 369 (1916).
52 Walters v. St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231 (1954).
53 See text, § IV, B supra.
4 Note that county chairmen are not officials of the government nor strictly under
legislative, judicial or executive control. Cf. State v. Millspaugh, 241 Ind. 656, 175
N.E.2d 13 (1961) (judicial control).
55Concordia Fire Ins. Co. v. Illinois, 292 U.S. 535 (1934) (equal protection case);
Mackay Tel. & Cable Co. v. Little Rock, 250 U.S. 94 (1919) ; Sunday Lake Iron Co.
v. Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350 '(1918). In re Hunter, 97 Colo. 279, 49 P.2d 1009
(1935) (practical inequalities may be permitted).
56 For the uniformity requirement, see note 28 supra and accompanying text.
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much effort in getting registrations of Socialist-Laborites as they will
in procuring the registration of members of their own parties. Nor
will they make an equal, uniform and impartial effort to register all
purged voters in a spasm of patriotism to "get out the vote." Obviously a county chairman will use the furnished lists with selectivity
and partisan discrimination (in urging re-registration and in giving
assistance to the purged electors) in order to justify his own political
existence and to achieve the election of his own party candidates,
which (latter) function is his primary one.
V.

OTHER POSSIBILITIES

If the Colorado law had provided that the County Clerk and
Recorder must mail notices to only those purged voters who were
registered as Democrats and Republicans or of any other class or
groups less than a whole group of purged voters, the unconstitutionality of such unreasonable special privileges would be clear. Likewise
it seems clear that a law furnishing a free list of purged voters to
the county chairmen of all political parties would violate the constitutional rights of unaffiliated voters.
While courts have power to designate legislative schemes as
unlawful, they have no authority to prescribe how the legislature
should meet any particular problem or lawful objective." It is helpful in this study to keep in mind that the lawful objectives of
the legislature to obtain the registration of all purged voters (so
that they would not be dis-enfranchised at subsequent elections)
could have been accomplished in various constitutional ways. For
example, the legislature could have required the County Clerk within
ninety days after (or before, or both before and after) a general
election to mail notices to each purged voter at his last registered
address warning him or her that they were purged and must reregister in order to be eligible to vote in any subsequent election.
Similarly, the legislature could have provided that the County
Clerk could cause copies of the registry list, or the purged list, or
both, to be printed in handbill form and copies made available to
any person for a specified fee.58 In Colorado, certain school districts
are already authorized to pay from one to two cents per name to the
57

Williams v. State, 85 Ark. 464, 108 S.W. 838 (1908), affd, 217 U.S. 79 (1910);
Driverless Car Co. v. Armstrong, 91 Colo. 334, 14 P.2d 1098 (1932); Baird v.
Wichita, 128 Kan. 100, 276 Pac. 77 (1929).
58 This would be similar to the New Jersey practice. See Remsen v. Woolley, 22 N.J.
Super. 459, 92 A.2d 87 (1952). The New Jersey procedure is permissive with the
County Clerk as to whether or not such copies will be prepared at all. However,
preparation and availability could be made mandatory. The fee, if any, could be set
sufficient in amount to recoup some, if not all, of the cost preparation.
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County Clerk and Recorder for registration lists used in their
elections.59
CONCLUSION

In summary, Colorado Revised Statutes, 1963, Section 49-4-21
(3) appears unconstitutional as follows:
A. A general law could have been made applicable without
giving an exclusive and special privilege to any political party.
B. The classification made is clearly unreasonable, partisan
and discriminatory.
C. The discrimination inherent in the law violates the requirement that there be a reasonable relationship between a legitimate end
sought to be achieved and the means utilized.
If by law, lists of purged voters are to be prepared by the County
Clerk and Recorder and furnished to anyone, they must be equally
available to everyone on the same basis, whether furnished free or
for a fee.

9

5 See COLO. REv. STAT. § 123-10-7 (1963).

WATER FOR RECREATION: A PLEA
FOR RECOGNITION
INTRODUCTION

T

he State of Colorado has reason to be concerned with the allocation of water resources in order that the use thereof will not be
denied for recreational purposes. The importance of the recreational
use of water both to Colorado residents and to its tourist industry is
indicated by a survey of various statistics. In 1965 alone 416,793
resident and non-resident fishing and combination fishing and small
game licenses were sold' bringing in a revenue of $1,838,559.2
$69,176,055.23 was spent by resident and non-resident fishermen in
Colorado in the same year.3 In 1966, 462,337 fishermen spent nearly
twenty-five million hours fishing in Colorado. 4 Of a total of 31 state
parks and recreation areas, only two are non-water oriented." In
1966, 1,871,843 persons attended these parks and recreation areas.6
These figures cannot but emphasize the importance to the people
of Colorado of the state's water resources and their desirability for
recreational use. It becomes important to inquire into what action
can be taken to insure that water will be available in the future for
recreational use. The importance of the issue is increased by the fact
that in normal, non-drought years, Colorado water at least in the
Arkansas, South Platte and Rio Grande basins is already overappropriated.7
In its constitution, adopted in 1876, Colorado declared its
adherence to the appropriation system of allocating water resources. 8
The water of every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated,
within the state of Colorado, is hereby dedared to be the property
of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of the people
of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter provided.
Colo. Const. art. XVI, § 5
1Colo.

Game, Fish & Parks Dep't, Game Management Div., Economic Value of Hunting & Fishing to the People of the State of Colorado - 1965, March 31, 1966.
Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Colo. Game, Fish & Parks Dep't, Information & Education Div., Fact Finder, April
16, 1967.
5 Colo. Game, Fish & Parks Dep't, Fish Management Div., Colo. Park and Recreation
2

System.

6 Colo. Game, Fish & Parks Dep't, Information & Education Div., Fact Finder, April
16, 1967.
7 Interview With Colorado Deputy State Engineer, William R. Smith, in Denver, Colo.,
April 10, 1967.
8 The appropriation system has been adopted by most of the arid western states. SAX,
WATER LAW 1 (1965). This system permits a user to obtain a right to water without the necessity of owning or occupying the land adjacent to the surface stream or
lake as is required under the riparian system.
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The right to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream
to beneficial uses shall never be denied. Priority of appropriation
shall give the better right as between those using the water for the
same purpose; but when the waters of any natural stream are not
sufficient for the service of all those desiring the use of the same,
those using the water for domestic purposes shall have the preference over those claiming for any other purpose, and those using the
water for agricultural purposes shall have preference over those
using the same for manufacturing purposes.
Colo. Const. art. XVI, § 6
The constitutional provisions raise the major issue with which

this note is concerned: whether or not water for recreational uses
can be appropriated. The possibility of appropriating water for
recreation is first discussed as though there were adequate supplies

of water available for appropriation. The subsequent portion of the
paper is devoted to a discussion of the need for compensation if
unappropriated waters are unavailable, and to the desirability of a
permit system as such a system would relate to the preservation of
water for recreational use.
I.

APPROPRIATION OF WATER FOR RECREATIONAL USE

The elements traditionally recognized as being necessary to
accomplish an appropriation of water are a declared intent to use
the water for a beneficial use, a diversion of the water from the
stream, and an application of the water to the intended use within a

reasonable time. The problems posed for a recreational use by the
required elements are the scope of "beneficial use" and the need for
a diversion.
A. Beneficial Use

The requirement of a beneficial use is explicitly stated in the
Colorado Constitution.' ° The Colorado Supreme Court decisions
have consistently recognized the necessity for a beneficial use." The
problem arises in defining the scope of beneficial use in order to
discover whether or not a recreational use of water is within that
scope. The Colorado Constitution does not provide that definition,
but instead merely names three possible uses and arranges them in a
hierarchy, giving use for domestic purposes precedence over agricultural use, and agricultural use priority over water use for manu9

KINNEY, THE LAW OF IRRIGATION 227-28, 242, 246-50, 252 (1894); SAX, WATER

LAW 10 (1965).
10
Art. XVI, § 6.
"See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. Rocky Mountain Water Co., 102 Colo. 351,
79 P.2d 373 (1938) ; Drach v. Isola, 48 Colo. 134, 109 Pac. 748 (1910) ; Farmers'
High Line Canal & Reservoir Co. v. Southworth, 13 Colo. 111, 21 Pac. 1028 (1889).
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facturing.' Several states have expressly declared, by statute, that
recreation is a beneficial use.' 8 On March 9, 1966, the General
Assembly of Colorado approved an act to prevent and control water
pollution and for the first time mentioned "recreation" as a beneficial
use."4 By statute Colorado has also stated that the use of water for
private and public bathing establishments is beneficial.' "
There is no Colorado Supreme Court case which would indicate
definitively that that court would consider a recreational use of water
beneficial. Some cases seem to assume that the constitution intended
an economic use when it used the word beneficial.' 8 Other cases
emphasize the idea of economic in the sense that the use be not
wasteful.' 7 Under either interpretation a recreational use could be
justified.
In a case that was subsequently overruled, but on different
grounds, the Colorado Federal District Court held that recreation
is a beneficial use.'" In that case, the Cascade Town Company sued
to enjoin the defendant power company from storing water in
reservoirs and piping it down the mountain, taking the water from
the creek from which the plaintiff derived its water source. The
defendant's action would dry up the creek which flowed through
the plaintiff's property and destroy a waterfall which created luxuriant vegetation from its spray and mist. The plaintiff had spent a
significant amount of money to improve the area as a resort. The
trial court decided that the plaintiff's use of the water to promote
an environment conducive to rest and relaxation was beneficial and,
on this basis, granted the injunction. The Eighth Circuit, on appeal,
reversed the district court's ruling.' 9 Although the appellate court
agreed that the promotion of rest and relaxation is a beneficial
use,20 it interpreted the lower court decision as being based on an
§ 6. It has been noted that the drafters of the Colorado Constitution probably intended a "true preference," i.e., a use not necessitating compensation if displacing an inferior use, but the Colorado court has held compensation
necessary. THE LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES 12425 (Haber & Bergen ed. 1958).

12 COLO. CoNT. art. XVI,

§ 67-4301 to -4305 (1949); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-707
(1964) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 577 (Supp. 1966) ; ORE. REV. STAT. § 536.310
(1965); TEx. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 7471 (Vernon 1964).
14 Colo. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 44, § 1, at 199.
13 IDAHO CODE ANN.

15 CoLo. REv. STAT. § 148-2-3 (1963).

10Faden v. Hubbell, 93 Colo. 358, 28 P.2d 247 (1933) (water diverted for commercial
propagation of fish is beneficial use); cf. Windsor Reservoir & Canal Co. v. Lake
Supply Ditch Co., 44 Colo. 214, 98 Pac. 729 (1908) '(fish propagation not beneficial

use).
17 Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, 94 Pac. 339 (1908);
Montrose Canal Co. v. Loutsenhizer Ditch Co., 23 Colo. 233, 48 Pac. 532 (1896).
18 Cascade Town Co. v. Empire Water & Power Co., 181 Fed. 1011, 1017-18 (D. Clo.
1910), rev'd on other grounds, 205 Fed. 123 (8th Cir. 1913).
9
1 Empire Water & Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co., 205 Fed. 123 (8th Cir. 1913).

20

Id. at 128.
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appropriation for irrigation. The circuit court found that the trial
court's emphasis on the artistic beauty of the waterfall resulted in
that court's overlooking the effectiveness of the plaintiff's use of the
water as compared with more customary methods of irrigation. The
appellate court felt utility, not beauty, was the dominant idea of the
lawmakers and therefore the Cascade Town Company could not
claim all of the water unless it was efficiently using all of it."'
Since we are without any clear judicial pronouncement establishing recreation as a beneficial use, it is to be hoped that the legislature
will, at the next opportunity, reinforce its intent as expressed in the
1966 water pollution act and declare recreation to be a beneficial
use within the broad scheme of water appropriations.
B. Diversion
Another element often considered necessary to complete an
appropriation of water is that of a diversion. The term "diversion"
contemplates a taking of the water from the stream so that it may
be applied to the intended beneficial use. The cases in which insistance on a diversion is made require, for the most part, some
affirmative act of the appropriator.2 2 Thus, the cases are referring
not to a natural diversion, but to a mechanical one. However, Colorado cases are far from uniform in requiring a diversion. In the early
case of Larimer County Reservoir Co. v. People ex rel. Luthe23 the
state contended that since the constitution recognized appropriation
24
by diversion, it thereby excluded appropriation without a diversion.
The state brought a quo warranto proceeding to obtain the forfeiture
of the company's corporate franchise claiming that the company could
not use the bed of a non-navigable natural stream as a reservoir.
The court, in refusing to uphold the state's claim, declared that an
appropriation requires no immediate diversion. Rather, said the court,
the true test of an appropriation is the successful application of the
water to a beneficial use and the method of distribution or diversion
is immaterial. 2 The court adopted the California Supreme Court's
definition of appropriation as "the intent to take, accompanied by
some open, physical demonstration of the intent and for some
valuable use.' '2 The Colorado court added that the appropriation is
legally completed when the act evidencing the intent is performed,
21Id. at

129.
See, e.g., City and County of Denver v. Northern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 130
Colo. 375, 386, 276 P.2d 992, 1001 (1954); Board of County Corn'rs v. Rocky
Mountain Water Co., 102 Colo. 351, 361, 79 P.2d 373, 378 (1938).
238 Colo. 614, 9 Pac. 794 (1885).
22

24Id. at 616, 9 Pac. at 796.
2"
26

Ibid.
Ibid.
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noting that the act must be followed up within a reasonable amount
of time,2 7 i.e., steps must be taken to apply the water to the intended
beneficial use. Numerous other cases have followed the example of
Larimer in stating that an appropriation of water does not require
28
a diversion.
Other cases insist just as strongly that a diversion is essential. 9
A recent case in which the requirement of a diversion defeated the
plaintiff's claim to water rights is ColoradoRiver Water Conservation
Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co."° In this case, the district
claimed water rights under a Colorado statute which gave the district
the power to hold for the public use enough water of any natural
3
stream to maintain a stream flow for the preservation of fish. '
The trial court dismissed the district's claim and the supreme court
affirmed basing its decision on the necessity of a diversion.32 Surprisingly enough in view of the above discussion, the supreme court
added that the legislature could not have intended to depart so
radically from established doctrine by not requiring a diversion and
that therefore the statute worked no such departure.3 3 Although the
case was decided as if the plaintiff were attempting to establish a
right to the use of water, the statute might have been viewed as an
exercise of the police power and this would not involve the question
of appropriation.
The most probable reason for the elusiveness of the requirement
of diversion is that, in most cases, in order to use the water, it must
be taken from the stream. In an early treatise, Kinney stated that the
theory of the appropriation system is based upon a prior possessory
right and that no possession or exclusive property could be obtained
without diverting the water from its natural channel.3 4 The unusual
case is that of the Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v.
Rocky Mountain Power Co. 5 in which a stream flow was desired to
be maintained without any need for taking the water from the stream.
27

Id. at 617, 9 Pac. at 796.

28

Cascade Town Co. v. Empire Water & Power Co., 181 Fed. 1011, 1018 (D. Colo.
1910), rev'd on other grounds, 205 Fed. 123, 129 '(8th Cir. 1913) ; Town of Genoa
v. Westfall, 141 Colo. 533, 349 P.2d 370 (1960) ; Thomas v. Guiraud, 6 Colo. 530,
533 (1883).
29 See, e.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co.,
406 P.2d 798 (Colo. 1965) ; City and County of Denver v. Northern Colo. Water
Conservancy Dist., 130 Colo. 375, 386, 276 P.2d 992, 1001 (1954); Board of County
Comm'rs v. Rocky Mountain Water Co., 102 Colo. 351, 361, 79 P.2d 373, 378
(1938) ; Windsor Reservoir & Canal Co. v. Lake Supply Ditch Co., 44 Colo. 214, 98
Pac. 729 (1908).
30406 P.2d 798 (Colo. 1965).
31 COLO. REV. STAT. § 150-7-5(10) (1963).

32 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co., 406 P.2d
798, 800 (Colo. 1965).
33 Ibid.
34

KINNEY, THE LAW OF IRRIGATION 252 (1894).
35406 P.2d 798 (Colo. 1965).
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Thus, although cases recognize that there can be an appropriation
without diversion3" they contemplate a subsequent diversion, which
is what they refer to when stating that the act evidencing the intent
7
to appropriate must be followed up with reasonable diligence.1
There are several statutory provisions which indicate that a
diversion need not always be required. Under the "Meadow Act" no
mechanical diversion was required. 38 The present Colorado statute
which succeeds that act allows persons who have used the natural
overflow of a stream for irrigation to construct ditches and claim
a priority as of the first use if the natural overflow should diminish. 9
It will be noted that, although there was no mechanical diversion
when the water was first claimed, the water left the stream. Another
Colorado statute 40 provides for the storage of water in stream beds if
the proper steps are taken to comply with measurement requirements
which insure that the reservoir owner will not encroach on the water
rights of senior appropriators. 4 ' Allowing the storage of water in
stream beds certainly indicates that at least no immediate diversion
is essential to acquire a right to water.
Even though they do not require an immediate diversion, all of
the cases and statutes discussed above, with the exception of one, 4"
contemplate a diversion in order to use the water. But the use of
water for recreation does not necessarily require a diversion for it is
often a non-consumptive use 4" which is effected while the water
remains in the stream bed. Should a diversion still be required in a
case such as this in which it is unnecessary? That there are valid
reasons for requiring a diversion cannot be denied. The diversion
helps in establishing exclusive possession; it aids in determining
the amount of water appropriated; and it gives others notice of a
prior claim to the use of the water. 4" But there are alternative
36 See note 28 supra.

37 Larimer County Reservoir Co. v. People ex rel. Luthe, 8 Colo. 614, 9 Pac. 794 (1885).
38 Colo. Sess. Laws 1877, § 37, at 106. For examples of cases brought under this act, see
Broad Run Investment Co. v. Devel & Snyder Improvement Co., 47 Colo. 573, 108
Pac. 755 (1910) ; Humphreys Tunnel & Mining Co. v. Frank, 46 Colo. 524, 105 Pac.
1093 (1909).
39

COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-3-14 (1963).

4 COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-7-17 (1963).

41 A supplementary provision was added in 1965 which allows the state engineer to
order water released from reservoirs in stream beds as necessary to prevent evaporation from the reservoir from depleting the natural flow which would otherwise be
available to appropriators. COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-7-17(5) (Supp. 1965).
42Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co., 406 P.2d
798 (Colo. 1965).

43 But note that the preservation of a water level in a stream bed or lake, and especially
in a reservoir, results in additional evaporation which must be taken into consideration. See note 41 supra.
4Comment, Developments in Colorado Water Law of Appropriation in the Last Ten
Years, 35 U. COLO. L. REv. 493, 508 (1963).
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measures that could be taken to obtain the same security without
entailing the handicap of inflexibility inherent in requiring a diversion. A Colorado statute presently gives the state engineer supervisory control over the public waters of the state with authority to
measure the flows of natural streams and to compute diversions."
Such authority coupled with a flexible permit system could provide
the necessary security of an established water right while preserving
and protecting valuable and scarce water resources.
II.

THE USE AND REGULATION OF WATER FOR RECREATION

If an appropriation of water for recreational use is allowed and
a diversion is not required, one must still face the problems of
determining when such an appropriation may be made and under
what conditions. Further, in some situations, an appropriation would
be unnecessary to regulate water use. Several hypothetical situations
must at this point be distinguished. If no daim has yet been made to
the body of water one wishes to appropriate for recreational purposes, no real problems arise, assuming appropriation for a recreational use is recognized. It is this type of situation to which the first
part of the paper has been directed. However, as soon as the preservation of water for recreation interferes with water rights previouily
acquired through appropriation, the issue of compensation is raised.
Before discussing this issue, one must distinguish between a private
use and a public use. Further, within the scope of a public use a
"taking" under the power of eminent domain must be distinguished
from regulation under the police power.
If an individual wishes to appropriate water for a recreational
use, and the water source from which the individual wants to draw
is already fully appropriated, the individual will be unable to achieve
his goal. Certainly he could buy up any water rights offered for sale,
but he cannot force a change in use to recreation. An individual
apparently has in Colorado the power to condemn a prior right to the
use of water,4" but this power is limited to the situation in which the
individual seeks to appropriate for a higher use, within the constitutional hierarchy, 4 7 than the use to which the water is currently being
put.
The state, on the other hand, has both the power of eminent
domain and the police power. It is often difficult in any given situa45

COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-11-3 (1963).
46Black v. Taylor, 128 Colo. 449, 457, 264 P.2d 502, 506 (1953)

(court indicates constitutional preferences apply to individual appropriators if compensation) ; Armstrong
v. Larimer County Ditch Co., 1 Colo. App. 49, 27 Pac. 235 '(1891) (court disallowed
taking without compensation). For a brief discussion of preferences in Colorado, see
Trelease, Preferences to the Use of Water, 27 RocKY MT. 1. REv. 133, 145-47
(1955).
47
CoLo. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
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tion to decide which power is being, or should be, used. The decision
is an important one for on it hinges the right to compensation. If the
state in the exercise of its power has taken the property of a citizen,
the state has exercised its power of eminent domain, and compensation for the "taking" is required. 48 On the other hand, if the state
action is merely regulatory, the act is within the police power, and
any loss to the property owner is not compensable.4 9 The problem
is in drawing the line between regulation and taking.
A. Eminent Domain
The right to the use of water, established by an appropriation,
is considered a property right 50 and thus is subject to the exercise of
the state's power of eminent domain. The Colorado Constitution
dedicated the water of natural streams to the public use and declared
the same to be the property of the public." The state has title to the
water of natural streams and therefore the right to control its use.5
But the usufructuary right5" obtained by the appropriator has been
held subject to compensation if taken under the state's power of
eminent domain. 54 In Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Extension
Co. it was said:
That a city or town cannot take water for domestic purposes which
has been previously appropriated for some other beneficial purpose,
without fully compensating the owner, is so clear that further discussion seems almost unnecessary. 55

The issues with which this paper is concerned, within the scope of
eminent domain, are the possibility of taking water for recreational
purposes and the discovery of situations in which state action would
be considered a "taking."
It is clear that the state, or by delegation, municipal authorities,
can exercise the power of eminent domain to secure water for municipal use,56 and this is true though the prior appropriator was using
the water for domestic purposes.5 " Given the nature of the power of
48 Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
49 Ibid.
50 E.g., Knapp v. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 131 Colo. 42, 53, 279 P.2d
420, 425 (1955); Taussig v. Moffat Tunnel Water & Development Co., 106 Colo.
384, 106 P.2d 363 (1940) ; Fort Morgan Land & Canal Co. v. South Platte Ditch Co.,
18 Colo. 1, 30 Pac. 1032 (1892).
51 COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
52
Stockman v. Leddy, 55 Colo. 24, 129 Pac. 220 (1912).
53 See Pulaski Irrigating Ditch Co. v. City of Trinidad, 70 Colo. 565, 203 Pac. 681
54

(1922).

Town of Genoa v. Westfall, 141 Colo. 533, 349 P.2d 370 (1960) (dictum) ; Town
of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, 426, 94 Pac. 339, 340
(1908).
55 42 Clo. 421,427, 94 Pac. 339, 341 (1908) (emphasis added).
56
COLO. REV. STAT. § 139-32-1(78) (1963).
57 Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, 94 Pac. 339 (1908)
(dictum).
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eminent domain and lack of limitation thereon, it would seem clear
that the state is not subject to the priorities of the constitution.
By statute the state has granted the power of eminent domain to
municipalities to acquire property for recreational use.5" If a city
were to consider recreation high on a list of preferred public projects
and should allocate funds to promote it, the city could condemn water
and divert it to a recreational use under its statutory power.
The state has the power of eminent domain. The next issue is
to decide when it is exercising the power and is, therefore, within the
scope of the constitutional provision requiring compensation. 9
Joseph Sax has attempted to draw the line between a taking and a
regulation by distinguishing between an economic loss resulting from
the government's enhancement of its resource position in its enterprise capacity and a loss resulting from the government acting solely
in an arbitral capacity. 6 ° According to Sax, the former would be a
compensable taking; the latter would be a regulation within the
police power and non-compensable. Under Sax's formula, a state
agency or city acquiring water to provide a supply for domestic
municipal use or for irrigation would clearly be exercising its power
of eminent domain, if depriving a prior appropriator. 6
Preserving water for recreational use, however, does not fall so
neatly into either of Sax's categories. In most instances, the use of
water for recreation is nonconsumptive. 62 But, the preservation of
certain lake or stream levels might require different patterns of use
for other appropriators, whether up or downstream, requiring either
abstention from use during certain seasonal periods or abstention
from use which would impair the desired levels. Any action by the
state to insure the most beneficial use of the water might be seen
either as an enhancement of its resources or as the performance of
an arbitral function, depending on the viewpoint from which one
approached the problem. The decision as to which power should be
used to control the allocation of water is ultimately one for the
legislature to make.
B. The Police Power
Regulation of the use of water for recreational purposes could
be justified under the police power. The police power has often been
very broadly interpreted to allow state action to protect the health,
58

114-1-4 (1963).
CoLo. CONST. art. II, § 15.
60 Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 63 (1964).
61See, e.g., Town of Genoa v. Westfall, 141 Colo. 533, 349 P.2d 370 (1960) ; Town of
Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, 94 Pac. 339 (1908).
62 One must recall, however, that evaporation from water stored for recreational use
could be considerable.
59

COLO. REV. STAT. §
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morals, safety and welfare of the community.6" The limitations on the
exercise of the power are few. All property is held subject to a
reasonable exercise of the police power. "4 Reasonableness requires
that legislation in exercise of the police power serve a legitimate
public purpose and bear a reasonable relationship to the desired
goal.6 5 Recognized goals, for the attainment of which the exercise
of the police power has been legitimated, include development and
conservation of a state's resources. 66
In an early case, the Colorado Supreme Court held that legislation regulating the distribution of water through irrigation canals
was within the state's police power.67 Colorado's permit system,
which applies only to underground water, is a further example of
the use of the police power to regulate the use and development of
a valuable natural resource."
Whether or not the legislature would wish to exercise the power
it possesses will depend on several factors, e.g., the extent of benefit
to the public, the quantity and quality of harm to the individual
property owner, and alternative methods of achieving the same goal.
As to the court's position, one writer has stated that in light of the
Colorado court's liberal attitude toward the exercise of the police
power and its restricted view of the power of the court to challenge
regulatory legislation, "Colorado must be listed among the states
which would uphold any extensive regulation of water resources."6 "
CONCLUSION

Colorado has important interests, both in the tourist industry70
and in the health and welfare of .tcitizens, to consider in making
any decision as to the best method of preserving a limited and
valuable resource. The state also has an obligation under its constitution to protect the vested water right of an appropriator. Perhaps
63 See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) ; Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277
U.S. 183, 187-88 (1928) ; Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395

(1926). For an excellent analysis of the scope of the police power, see King, Regulation of Water Rights Under the Police Power, in UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW
SCHOOL, LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH CENTER, WATER RESOURCES AND THE LAW 271
(1958).

64Thiele v. City and County of Denver, 135 Colo. 442, 312 P.2d 786 (1957).
65 King, op. cit. supra note 63, at 282.
66
Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422, 430 (1936); Geer v. Connecticut,
161 U.S. 519, 534 (1895) ; Maitland v. People, 93 Colo. 59, 23 P.2d 116 (1933).
67
White v. Farmers' High Line Canal & Reservoir Co., 22 Colo. 191, 43 Pac. 1028
(1896).
68
COLO. REV.STAT. § 148-18-1 to -15 (Supp. 1965).
69 King, op. cit. supra note 63, at 318-19.
70 According to a January 1967 report of The Colorado Visitors Bureau, 7,142,105 visitors came to Colorado in 1966 and spent $555,478,354. These figures can be compared
to a total of 6,287,755 visitors in 1965 who spent $499,782,666. If these increases,
exceeding 10% in one year, continue, the need for water for recreation will also
increase.
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one possibility of achieving a balance between these interests in time
of conflict would be the adoption of a permit system to regulate the
use of surface waters.
The ideal system of water law has been stated to consist of the
following elements: (1) the system should encourage the development of water resources toward the optimum benefits of a limited
resource; (2) the system should provide security to the water user for
his investment; (3) the system should permit flexibility; and (4) the
system should protect public interests in the water against waste and
for use for navigation, fishing, and recreation. 7 A permit system
could be designed that would aid in approximating the listed goals
including the promotion of a recreational use of water. Obviously
no system should have as its central theme the preservation of water
for recreation. All systems, given the scarcity of a resource, should
aim primarily at obtaining the maximum beneficial use of that limited
resource. The latter goal will, even if only incidentally, promote the
former. Given the fact that a recreational use is relatively non-consumptive, the recreational use to that extent would add to the benefit
derived from the water.
A meaningful permit system must allow an administrative
agency to view an individual's request for the use of water in comparison with other competing uses and in light of the overall quantity
of a limited resource. The greatest problem in creating a useful permit
system is deciding what standards to set as a framework for the
administrative agency's decision as to what constitutes the "best"
use of water at any given time. One way in which to make such a
decision less crucial, and at the same time to make the permitted use
of water more flexible and more able to meet changing needs and
priorities, would be to limit the duration of a permit. If, for example,
a certain lake now holds more than sufficient water to provide for
recreational use, it would be wise to permit the use of at least some
portion of the water elsewhere. If the time should come when the
level of water in the lake is seriously impaired, and the most beneficial use is declared to be the preservation of the lake, a change in
use patterns would be required at the expiration of the permit.
A permit system could be very significant in preserving water
for recreational use if the legislature were to declare that use to be
of high priority as a matter of public policy. The legislative declaration would weight recreation heavily in any administrative choice
as to the preferred use of water at any given time.
71Trelease, Desirable Revisions of Western Water Law, RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT:
FRONTIERS FOR RESEARCH 203, 204 (Western Resources Conf. 1960).
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It should also be noted, assuming a permit system is adopted,7"
that the regulation of water through the use of the permit system
is an exercise of the police power and would not result in the need
for compensation. The need to compensate could, however, be built
into the permit system if such a result were desired. The statute
could require reasonable payment for any change in use at the
expiration of the permit, thus forcing the individual who can put
the water to a more beneficial use to compensate the individual who
is to lose his permit. It would be hoped that equity could be built
into the permit system, for example, by allowing a permit to last
long enough to permit a reasonable return on an original investment,
without requiring compensation as uses change. The latter could
force a recreational use, which has an inestimable non-monetary
value, out of the system to the extent it is a consumptive use.
The adoption of the permit system would, hopefully, incorporate both flexibility and certainty into Colorado water law. No solution
to a water use problem can guarantee both absolute flexibility and
absolute certainty. Where the objectives conflict, each must give
somewhat to achieve a desired balance. In the past, certainty has
been emphasized. To preserve water for recreational use more flexibility is required than we now have.
Constance Hauver

questions might arise as to the constitutionality of a permit system as applied to
surface waters in Colorado, considering the constitutional provisions set forth at the
beginning of this paper. These questions cannot be addressed in the limited scope of
this note. For an excellent analysis demonstrating the constitutionality of extensive
regulation of a constitutionally created right to water, see King, op. cit. supra note 63.

72 Some

A NEW TEST FOR THE LEGALITY OF
CIVIL RIGHTS DEMONSTRATIONS

O

September 16, 1963, approximately 200 Negro students
marched from the campus of Florida A. & M. in Tallahassee
to the county jail to protest the arrest, the day before, of some of
their fellow classmates for attempting to integrate certain Tallahassee
movie theatres. They were also apparently marching to protest
general policies of segregation, including the segregation of the jail.
Outwardly, the students did not display the characteristics of a
normal demonstration, for they carried no signs and upon reaching
the jail grounds made no speeches or other verbal protests. Although
there was some singing and clapping, no violence was evident. Upon
reaching the service entrance of the jail, not normally used by the
public, a surprised deputy sheriff met them and requested that they
move back from the door. They complied, but for the next thirty
minutes stood or sat on the jail driveway and adjacent curtilage of
the jailhouse. Although the demonstrators blocked traffic on this
driveway, they did not block the vehicles on the public streets in the
vicinity of the jail. The sheriff arrived and gave the Negroes ten
minutes to disperse or else be arrested. A few left, but the majority
refused and were arrested and indicted under the Florida criminal
trespass statute.' The demonstrators were convicted by a jury, and
the Circuit Court affirmed the convictions.2 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari when further appeal in the state
court was prevented by the Florida District Court of Appeals' refusal
to review the convictions. 3 Subsequently, the Court upheld the convictions, by a 5-4 decision, on the ground that there was sufficient
evidence to support the trespass charges.'
In Adderly v. Florida, the Supreme Court took a step which it
had previously hesitated to take. This opinion represents the first
decision by the Court, since the Negro civil rights movement gained
impetus in the early sixties, to permit the boundaries of property to
define the limits of the first amendment. This Comment will trace
N

1FLA.

STAT. ANN. § 821.18 (1965) provides:
Every trespass upon the property of another, committed with a malicious
and mischevious intent, the punishment of which is not specially provided
for, shall be punished by imprisonment not exceeding three months, or by
fine not exceeding one hundred dollars.
2
The opinion of the Florida Circuit Court for Leon County (1964) is unreported.

3 Adderly v. Florida, 175 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 1965)
1023 (1966).

(per curiam), cert. granted, 382 U.S.

4Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 *(1966) (opinion for the majority written by Mr.
Justice Black; dissenting opinion written by Mr. Justice Douglas, concurred in by
the Chief Justice and Justices Brennan and Fortas).
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the decisional development in the area of civil rights demonstrations,
and discuss the significance Adderly has had upon the Negroes'
right to demonstrate.5
During the past six years, the Negro civil rights movement has
been most active in the streets and public meeting places. There is
daily mention in the newspapers of the various means of self-help
the Negroes are employing - picketing, protest marches, sit-ins, and
even wade-ins- in seeking equality under the law. It was only a
matter of time before the Supreme Court was faced with the opportunity of deciding the legality of these self-help methods. Generally,
the convictions the Court was requested to review resulted from
violation by demonstrators of petty criminal statutes, such as breach
of the peace, 6 obstructing public passage ways,7 and failure to disperse upon orders. 8
In the line of cases preceding Adderly, the Court employed four
basic methods for reversing the lower court convictions.
The first method was displayed in the Court's initial sit-in case,
Garner v. Louisiana,9 in which it skirted the issue of whether the
Negroes had a constitutional right to be in a restaurant to protest its
segregated facilities. Rather, it decided the case on the basis of total
lack of relevant evidence to support a finding that a breach of peace
statute had been violated and therefore, there was a denial of due
process under the fourteenth amendment.'0 Thus, by failing to
directly meet the constitutional issues presented, Garner signaled the
Court's approach to future cases.
The Court also found the lack-of-evidence method a useful tool
in several other cases." Most significant of these was Brown v.
Louisiana,2 in which five Negroes were arrested for breach of the
peace while staging a sit-in in a small, segregated library. The Court
found that the Negroes did not disturb others, disrupt the library
5 See KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966)

(excellent discussion

of the rights of the Negro under the first amendment before Adderly).
6 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
7Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).

8Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776 (1964) (per curiam) (common law, not
statutory, breach of the peace).
9 368 U.S. 157 (1961). This case involved the arrest of several Negroes for disturbing
the peace by attempting to be served at a segregated lunch counter. The Negroes were
peaceful and did nothing more than ask for service. The convictions were reversed by
a unanimous opinion because the record lacked any evidentiary support of the charge.
10 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides:
No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
11Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 '(1966) ; cf. Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284
('1963) (breach of peace convictions for playing basketball in a segregated park,
reversed).
12383 U.S. 131 (1966).
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facilities, or violate the library regulations,'" and reversed the convictions since there was "not the slightest evidence which would or
could sustain the application of the statute to petitioners."' 4 The
majority conceded that the state could regulate its public facilities
but added that in so doing it should not use regulations as a means
to discriminate against those who were engaged in lawfully exercising their first amendment freedoms.' 5 Thus the Court, in reversing
the convictions on a procedural due process ground, failed again to
decide the question of whether the first amendment guarantees demonstrators the right to exercise their freedoms of free speech or
assembly against the wishes of property owners.
Mr. Justice Black wrote a strong dissent in Brown, perhaps in
anticipation of the Adderly case, in which he chided the majority for
not recognizing the right of a property owner to enjoy his property
for its normal and dedicated use.' 6 Apparently the Court did not
feel bound by the reasoning in Brown because the decision in
Adderly, written by Mr. Justice Black, adopts Black's dissenting
view in Brown. This might suggest that the Court's original enthusiasm for the demonstrations of the civil rights movement has dampened somewhat.
Second, as evidenced by Cox v. Louisiana,17 the Supreme Court
has reversed convictions on the ground that the statutes upon which
they were based were void for vagueness. That is, the statutes were
found to be too broadly drawn to define and punish specific conduct
with the result that the statute does not give fair warning of the
conduct it prohibits. 8
Cox involved the arrest of the leader of 2000 demonstrators
protesting against segregation and discrimination. The leader was
convicted of disturbing the peace, obstructing public passages, and
131d. at
14

id. at

142.
139.

5

Id. at 143.
16 Id. at 166, where Mr. Justice Black, in his dissent, wrote:
The First Amendment, I think, protects speech, writings, and expression of views in any manner in which they can be legitimately and validly
communicated. But I have never believed that it gives any person or group
of persons the constitutional right to go wherever they want, whenever they
please, without regard to the rights of private or public property or to state
law. . . . Though the First Amendment guarantees the right of assembly
and the right of petition along with the rights of speech, press, and religion,
it does not guarantee to any person the right to use someone else's property,
even that owned by government and dedicated to other purposes, as a stage to
express dissident ideas.
17 379 U.S. 536 (1965). There were two separate majority opinions delivered by Mr.
Justice Goldberg. No. 24 at 379 U.S. 536, reversed convictions for disturbing the
peace and obstructing public passages. No. 49 at 379 U.S. 559, reversed a conviction
for picketing before a courthouse.

1

18 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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picketing near a courthouse.'" Despite the reversal of the breach of
peace conviction on the ground of vagueness, the Court used strong
dictum, later adopted in Adderly, to the effect that there is a proper
that it would have no
time and place for such demonstrations, and 20
tolerance for demonstrations not properly held.
A third technique employed by the Court was to reverse the
convictions because, as a result of state action, the Negroes involved
were deprived of equal protection of the law secured to them by the
fourteenth amendment. 21 Generally this tactic was used where a state
statute or local ordinance required segregation, 2 or where there was
evidence of statements made by officials indicating a policy of
segregation. 2
As a fourth method, the Court has incorporated the first amendment into the fourteenth and declared that the latter does not allow
24
states to make criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular views.
This is held to be an infringement upon the right to exercise the first
25
amendment freedoms. In this regard, Edwards v. South Carolina
Interestingly enough, the Court found that the statute prohibiting picketing near a
courthouse was a proper exercise of the state's police power. It felt that the state
had a legitimate interest in protecting its judicial system from any influences or
pressures such picketing might create. However, it reversed the conviction because
it found that the Chief of Police had authorized the demonstration to be held where
it was. To have upheld the conviction would have sanctioned entrapment by the
state.
20 379 U.S. at 574, where the Court stated:
Nothing we have said . . . is to be interpreted as sanctioning riotous
conduct . . . or demonstrations, however peaceful their conduct or commendable their motives, which conflict with properly drawn statutes and ordinances designed to promote law and order, protect the community against
disorder, regulate traffic, safeguard legitimate interests in private and public
property, or protect the administration of justice and other essential government functions ....
We also reaffirm . . . that the right of peaceful protest does not mean that
everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may do so at anytime and at any
place. There is a proper time and place for even the most peaceful protest
and a plain duty and responsibility on the part of all citizens to obey all
valid laws and regulations.
(established the doctrine that state action
21 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)
cannot deprive Negroes of equal protection under the laws).
22 Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964) (state health regulations required segregation of toilet facilities); Peterson v, City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963)
(city ordinance required segregation in restaurants).
"Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963) (public officials openly stated that
Negroes could not desegregate lunch counters); Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61
(1963) (per curiam) (traffic judge compelled segregation in his courtroom). See
also Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964), in which the Court reversed convictions for trespassing in a segegated amusement park because the arresting individual was a deputy sheriff acting in his authority as such rather than in his authority
as an agent of the park. The Griffin case is interesting because it seems to say that
if an arresting officer is not enforcing the laws equally, the Court will find the
necessary involvement by the state to make the convictions invalid under the fourteenth amendment. This is consistent with the Court's refusal to permit discriminatory
use of the law at any level of the state government.
4
(per curiam) (demonstrators
2 Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776 (1964)
assembled in a peaceful, orderly fashion in front of the city hall to protest segregation.
25372 U.S. 229 (1963).
19

304
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is important, since it clearly shows that demonstrations on public
streets and in areas where the public is normally permitted to assemble are clearly legal if they are orderly. Edwards involved demonstrations on statehouse grounds which were open to the public.
The Court reversed the breach of peace convictions because it found
the Negroes' rights of speech, assembly, and petition for redress of
grievances were violated.
The result of these four methods is that the Negro civil rights
movement, as other protest movements which preceded it,2 6 now has
a claim to the use of the public streets and meeting places as a public
forum to express its first amendment freedoms subject only to nondiscriminatory regulations which the state may impose to preserve
social order and control. Until Adderly it appeared as if the Court
were going to sanction all demonstrations so long as they were
orderly and not in violation of a precise, narrowly drawn statute
prohibiting such activity. However, Adderly presented a well-defined issue which could not be easily evaded. The Court could not
employ the first method discussed above because there was sufficient
evidence to support the criminal trespass convictions. 7 The mere
fact of the Negroes' presence on the property was enough evidence
to sustain the trespass charges. Moreover, unlike the breach of peace
statute in Cox, Florida's trespass statute defined specific conduct of
a limited kind and therefore was not void for vagueness.28 Nor, as
discussed in the third technique above, were the demonstrators denied
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed to them by the fourteenth amendment, for there was no evidence that the trespass statute
was not enforced equally. The Negroes were arrested not because
the sheriff disagreed with the views they espoused, but only because
they were using the jailgrounds in a non-traditional manner. 29 The
case clearly was one within the fourth method mentioned and presented the court with the choice of either following its prior reasoning by supporting the demonstrators' rights to exercise their first
amendment freedoms or subordinating those rights to Florida's trespass statute. The Court chose to depart from the trend of its previous
opinions and upheld the rights of the property owner, in this instance
the state, by allowing the demonstrators' convictions to stand.
It is significant that Adderly involved a demonstration on jailgrounds whereas the demonstrations in Cox and Edwards were held
on courthouse and statehouse grounds respectively. The point is that
2

6See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.

88 (1940).

27

385 U.S. at 46.

28Id. at 42.

2

Id. at 47.
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from time immemorial, citizens have traditionally gathered at their
statehouses and customary meeting places to petition their government and express their views. However, such demonstrations have
not been customary on jailgrounds. The Court emphasized that there
was "no evidence at all that on any other occasion had similarly large
groups of the public" congregated on the Tallahassee jailgrounds
for any reason.30
The Edwards, Cox and Adderly cases display the application of
what could be termed a normal use test which it appears the Court
developed to determine the validity of a civil rights demonstration.
Assuming that the Court is faced with the fundamental issue of
whether to sanction a certain demonstration as a proper exercise of
first amendment freedoms, it seems that the Court will now ask
whether it has been customary for the property to be used as a
platform for such demonstration. In so doing, the Court's concern
appears to be with whether or not the property is being put to its
dedicated use.3 1 The examination precipitates to the sole question
of whether or not the public previously has customarily gathered on
this place to exercise its constitutional rights. If it has, then the
demonstration is valid so long as it remains orderly.
If the Court continues to apply the normal use test to civil
rights demonstrations, there may be a significant effect on the Negro
civil rights movement. The Court in Adderly warns the Negroes
that their demonstrations are not warranted in all public places. It
advises them that the custodian of a public building has the power
to maintain the security of that building and to preserve the property
for its dedicated use." The most obvious repercussion Adderly will
have on the civil rights movement should be to cause its leaders to
hesitate before they organize a demonstration. Their lesson from
Adderly is that they no longer have free reign to demonstrate where
they please; consequently, they will be forced to choose their demonstration sites more carefully.
It is necessary to point out that by restricting itself to the question of whether a demonstration is within the normal use of certain
public property, the Court could very easily bind itself to an inflexible test. On its face, the examination of the nature of the public
property involved appears sufficient to ascertain the validity of a
demonstration but it seems to be too narrow a test to apply when
one considers that the Court is balancing the valuable first amendment freedoms against the concept of property ownership. A test
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.:

"The State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preseve the
property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated."
3 Ibid.
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that stops at the consideration of only the nature and normal use of
the property fails to consider other important factors, such as the
time and manner of the demonstrations or the serenity or security
necessary for the proper use of the property. For example, by the
strict application of the normal use test, a demonstration on a statehouse lawn during the early hours of the morning or during the visit
of a foreign dignitary would be valid. Moreover, application of the
normal use test to a large demonstration protesting the discriminatory
practices of a cemetery might prove awkward with a showing that
similarly large groups had previously gathered on the cemetery
grounds for Memorial Day services or burials. Here, the factor of
serenity would be an important consideration.
Although in Adderly the Court made mention of the fact that
security was necessary for a jailhouse, 8 it did not emphasize this
factor as being important to the decision. Of course, it could be
argued that these factors are inident to a normal use of the property,
but as yet, the Court has not taken this step and until it does, the
civil rights leaders will be hesitant and uncertain regarding the status
of their demonstrations.
Unless the Court considers the above factors, and others of this
nature, as necessary elements in a normal use test, it will find itself
bound by a test too narrow to apply in all situations. It must be
pointed out, however, that the Court has not yet had the opportunity
to discuss any elements other than the place of the demonstration.
Therefore, the Court's position is not so firmly entrenched that it
cannot adopt these additional elements if it so desires. Adderly only
discussed the propriety of the place of the demonstration. But from
the language in Adderly, i.e., that persons cannot exercise their first
amendment freedoms "whenever and however and wherever they
please," 84 it seems reasonable that when the Court is presented with
the proper case it will adopt these other necessary elements and in so
doing give the normal use test the desired flexibility.
R. Franklin Erisman

3Id.
34

at 41.

Id. at 48.

OUR DIAMoND IN ROUGH
REPORT OF THE DEAN

Seven and one-half decades ago the University of Denver welcomed its first class of eager law freshmen. Many things have
happened since that first class entered.
We are about to begin our seventy-fifth year - our diamond
anniversary. It is a year of reflection on the past, present, and potential future successes of the law school. During this next academic
year, 1967-68, we will spend considerable time considering the
question of the professional's responsibility in a changing society:
a challenge in freedom. Detailed plans of our inquiry soon will be
available. A distinguished group of law alumni are serving as
seventy-fifth year commissioners; plans which they are making to
commemorate our seventy-five years look exciting. But that's next
year. For the present, let us review the past year's profit and loss
statement.
Education is in the business of losing money. From a "cost
analysis" standpoint, its product is difficult to identify because an
evaluation must be made of many intangibles such as intellectual
stimulation and challenge. A rough profit measure, the school's
graduates, cannot be computed until some years after graduation.
We must account for future return, rather than only immediate gain.
Because of the delayed return on the educational investment, we look
forward and backward as well as at the present. Accordingly, let
us glance at some of our goals, some of our tasks, reviewing progress
and propect in drawing up a statement of the current and projected
"condition" of our College of Law.
The lawyer has a responsibility both to those who will seek his
assistance as clients and to the general public. It is necessary, therefore, that he learn not only legal skills - he must also learn a great
deal about the nature of modern society, a society in which change is
ubiquitous.
The responsibility of the lawyer is matched by the responsibility
of the law school which must train him for his task. As teachers of
law we must produce men who, by their contact with the main currents of legal and social thought, will have gained the power of
analysis, the power of judgment, and the devotion to rational inquiry
which are the precious possessions of those who are not prisoners of
their time and place. In short, we must produce true professionals
who will continue to learn throughout their lives.
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We have said that change is ubiquitous in modern society, and
this applies both to the law itself and to the study of law, for people
demand that their legal institutions be sufficiently flexible to meet
the temper of the times. Hopefully, then, the student in law school
will be thinking in three dimensions.
First, he will look backward to the great traditions and heritage
of the law on which our society has been based, not for ironbound
dogmas but for the enduring ideas which give our society continuity
despite myriad changes.
Second, the law student will constantly examine the present.
What is the current pattern of law in action? How does the law
operate - not as it exists on the books, but as it is put to use in the
present social structure? What patterns of legal and social control
are really effective?
Third, the law student must look not only at time past and time
present, but also at time future. He must be alert to the problems
which will exist decades ahead as well as the day after tomorrow.
He cannot escape the formidable question: What must I, as a trusted
administrator of the law, do in the years to come?
Given this background, at least three major goals of the College
of Law can be identified. These goals might be described as ten-year
objectives, although they should form the basis for action and planning next year and each year thereafter. Simply stated, the goals are
that a law school, and specifically the University of Denver College
of Law, must and will be, within the next ten years: (a) a teaching
institution, (b) a research organization, and (c) a center and seat of
community action and service programs. Thus, our goals are set;
what then, are the tasks for accomplishment? What is the College
of Law doing now, toward implementation of the goals and tasks
identified?
I.

TEACHING

The primary objective of the law school today is teaching. But
the teaching goal has broad dimensions.
The College of Law offers traditional courses on which the
courts of the United States examine for admission to the practice of
law. The curriculum will continue to contain these courses to achieve
a necessary goal of the law school. In addition, the College of Law
offers a rich choice of courses and other work geared toward realization of those goals not so immediate and practical, yet equally important to the total education of the modern professional.
The Professional Responsibility Program established in the curriculum has begun to survey methods by which the professional
ideals, attitudes, and ethical tradition of the bar can become part of
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the students' common culture. Ethics and ideals are values. Accordingly, an expert in values, a lawyer-theologian, has been appointed
to our faculty beginning this June. Professor James E. Wallace
intends to expand the Professional Responsibility Program and give
the experience-centered programs greater intellectual depth. He
plans exhaustive research dealing with the problems of legal culture
and ethics.
The development of technical skills, which are the dominant
professional skills, needs much attention. Already, some faculty
members are beginning to develop and use teaching materials which
will focus on counseling of clients, negotiation and settlement of
cases, and evaluation of the judicial process in terms of other fields
of learning. We are closely examining the traditional legal curriculum to determine whether its content actually meets the longstated teaching goals of the University of Denver College of Law
and, more importantly, whether the present curriculum truly develops those often used professional skills. In this process, the fields
of sociology, economics, general semantics and international relations
are being systematically added as special courses and as part of
traditional courses.
For example, Professor Walter Probert, Visiting Professor,
during the year conducted two seminars involving various interdisciplinary techniques. He conducted seminars in Legal Counseling
and in Law and Communications utilizing his expertise in law as
well as in general semantics. For the year forthcoming, H. Laurence
Ross, Chairman, Department of Sociology, New York University,
will be a visiting scholar on the law faculty. He has made an extensive study of the process of negotiating and settling automobile tort
claims in one of the nation's largest insurance companies. He will
bring to the curriculum further depth of understanding through interdisciplinary examination of a major legal task: negotiation and settlement. It is hoped that other fields of inquiry - such as political
science, history, psychology, and philosophy - can soon be developed in the legal setting. The importance of the totality of knowledge is stressed in our developing Joint Degree Programs. Presently,
the Master of Arts degrees in International Relations, Economics,
and Sociology are being pursued by students while they are attending
the law school. These Joint Degree Programs are a part of the
developing areas of concentration which are later discussed and
described.
Perhaps the most significant development during the year was
the receipt of a grant from the Ford Foundation in the amount of
$150,000 to establish a training program in law for Spanish-Americans. The purpose of the program is to facilitate the entrance of
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capable young Spanish-American students in the Rocky Mountain
Region into the legal profession. Legal ability in this minority
group is surely greater than the small number of Spanish-American
lawyers would imply. Additional persons available to give competent counsel and advice to the Spanish-American community and
to provide leadership for this group are required. It is hoped that
the program will achieve this objective. Initially, the school will
conduct a special preparatory program, under the direction of
William S. Huff, for twenty carefully selected students. After the
summer preparatory sessions, approximately twelve of these students
will be selected to enter law school as regular students and will be
given substantial scholarship and subsistence aid.
Because we realize the importance of specialty to the law, certain
limited areas of knowledge, where faculty and research facilities are
available, will be systemized and organized as specialized areas
wherein students may pursue semi-specialized training in the senior
year. During the first two years of legal training, a rigid set of
required courses will be provided. In the senior year, however, a
wide elective choice will be given. Rough departments of specialization have been established, and coordinated courses in certain
areas are offered, all toward providing an opportunity for a student
to develop some specialized professional skills in an area that the
student has chosen. The areas of emphasis presently existing are as
follows.
A. Administrationof Justice.
A grant from the Russell Sage Foundation in 1964 established
the Administration of Justice Program. Since the beginning of the
program, over $300,000 has been given by the Foundation. Course
work and research opportunities are offered. The program has made
significant contributions to the legal community in its study of the
Denver District Court and the United States District Court for
Colorado. It is hoped that the changes in the administration of these
courts will show the indispensability of such a program of continuous
research and community action.
In a strictly legal area, the College of Law, at the instance of
and in cooperation with the Denver Bar Association and the Legal
Aid Society of Denver, proposed a research program for determining
and studying the legal needs of the poor. The Office of Economic
Opportunity made a grant of $75,135 to the Law Center for this
study. The far-reaching impact of the study for community legal
service to the poor, and for guidelines for similar programs in other
parts of the country, is clear.
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An important study of the freshman law student, and eventually
of the total law school culture, was begun in 1966. As a joint effort
with the University of Southern California Dental School, the College of Law has surveyed the current freshmen and has carried on a
series of voluntary seminar meetings with a randomly selected group
of students. Probably most significant is that the study should result,
eventually, in an understanding of what makes the successful law
student. Hopefully, some of these conclusions can be used as a basis
for more sensible admissions policies than mere reliance on test scores.
The Boettcher Foundation provided important assistance to a
training program which exposes students to the trial court judicial
process. A generous grant of $6,000 was made by the Foundation to
finance, with the help of the court itself, five student judicial clerksships in the Denver District Court.
Through a generous gift from the Joe and Betty Alpert Foundation, two law students were able to serve in the Colorado Legislature
this year as Legislative Interns. They worked under the supervision
of Lyle Kyle, director of the Colorado Legislative Council. By their
efforts, legislators were assisted in research toward accomplishing
their difficult lawmaking tasks.
B. Trial Advocacy
The College of Law has one of the most extensive programs of
student practice of any law school.
The County Court Program of representation of indigent criminal defendants is ably supervised by practitioner Alan Bucholtz,
J.D. '65. The Legal Aid Program is supervised by Legal Aid Staff
Attorney, William H. Ward, Jr. A new program of student participation in the Public Defender's Office has been directed by the
Public Defender, Edward H. Sherman. Adams County Public Defender John L. Kane, Jr., LL.B. '60, has instituted a similar program
with our students. In June, student assistantships to the Denver
District Attorney will be available.
Under a grant from the Office of Economic Opportunity, a
neighborhood law office has been established at 221 Twenty-fourth
Street. Therein, under the supervision of three highly competent
Legal Aid attorneys, students are able to learn about the important
problems of practice and more importantly, the legal problems of
the poor.
In each of these trial programs, a student is exposed to most of
the areas of actual legal practice, thereby experiencing some of the
ways in which a lawyer utilizes the intellectual skills which he learns
in law school. Practical internships become more and more important
in our legal curriculum each year. They are a significant part of our
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educational endeavor; they are one of the elements that makes our
law school unique.
C. Natural Resources
We are developing an extensive natural resources program including both teaching and research. Numerous natural resources
courses are given at this time and additional courses and independent
work will be added as the years progress. Support in an amount
exceeding $100,000 has already been provided by the petroleum
industry toward establishing a professorship in Natural Resources.
Professor Gary Widman will be assisted in the program by three
newly appointed faculty members beginning in the fall of 1967:
John J. Schanz, Jr., mineral economist, jointly appointed with the
Denver Research Institute; Don H. Sherwood, Executive Director,
Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation; and Thomas P. Brightwell, tax specialist.
The demands of our industrial, recreational and population
explosions on a shrinking resource inventory and on a deteriorating
physical and aesthetic environment have justifiably alarmed the farsighted. We believe these demands have overmatched the ability of
existing institutions and policies to evaluate competing claims or to
make the farsighted decisions necessary to enhance our civilization
and to promote economic stability in resource-based industries. Consequently, we are now establishing a Resource Law Center to undertake interdisciplinary studies of current resource and environment
problems in an attempt to clarify and evaluate the effects of present
policies. The Center will suggest new legislative, administrative and
judicial policies with the intent of illuminatng the potental effects
of competing resource claims, promoting reasoned and farsighted
allocation decisions, and improving the administration of justice in
natural resource and environment control cases.
D. Taxation
A faculty which will allow special and intense study of the law
of taxation in its various relationships with other parts of the law is
rapidly developing. The full-time tax faculty numbers three. Under
the direction of Professor James Nathanson, a tax program of logical
progression and concentrated complexity is being established.
All of the above specialized areas, and others hereafter developed, may be pursued simultaneously with the first law degree. The
type of limited specialized offerings will not justify work beyond
the original degree. In this sense, our program will be unique and
singular in legal education. Yet, it will be logical and consonant
with the facts of today and ten years hence.
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II. RESEARCH
Research of a nature and variety far beyond doctrinal research
is demanded in the legal field. Empirical, artistic, philosophical, and
other methods of research must be employed to forecast and understand the future. Such research is necessary to develop and present
alternate choices for policy decisions which will enable us to keep
pace with and look forward to the pervasive change now occurring
and which will occur at a more rapid rate in the future. Further,
research is necessary to analysis and exploration of rapidly developing fields of knowledge which are directly and indirectly related to
the task of the law and lawyers. Through research, our horizons,
our methods and our effectiveness can be maintained and advanced.
Without an exploration of fields not traditionally considered "legal,"
our education can only be temporal and quickly outmoded in the
matrix of a changing society. Further, without research, the people
whom we are serving, the public, will soon lose faith in our formal
legal system and accept nonlegal solutions to problems properly
belonging to the law.
Research does not exist in a vacuum. The same research that is
pushing forward legal frontiers must be fed back into the curriculum.
Hence, the teachers of our law school must be the researchers. In the
process of inculcating professional ideals, developing professional
skills and imparting a knowledge of the law in relation to other
fields of knowledge, our professors must integrate the results of the
research conducted with course materials. Thereby, the teaching
function of the law school is strengthened, the persons taught are
informed of the latest developments and the research is tested and
verified in the legal course offering. In our research, and its relationship to teaching, we must be constantly aware of the significant
world about us and be quick to explore new and changing approaches
to ordering human behavior; we must be quick to respond to the
developing knowledge of other fields of inquiry of every variety.
The research component of the College of Law must be related
to the specialized areas identified above. We can identify a few of
those research areas which are now being pursued and which we
believe should be expanded: (a) Administration of Justice: We are
developing new courses and new techniques of research and counseling, together with notions of administering courts and law offices.
(b) Professional Responsibility: We are focusing on the traditions
of the legal practice and on the "new client" - the poor who are
increasingly being provided legal services. (c) Legal Projection:
We will study and evaluate methodologies toward systematic consideration of the impact of change in the legal order. (d) The
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Various Legal Roles: We are analyzing and identifying the actual
legal knowledge required by lawyers and non-lawyers in contemporary society. In the fall of 1966, the College of Law invited a dozen
scholars to a conference on para-legal occupations. (e) Resources
Law Center: We are executing research and are preparing proposals
for other projects in the natural resources field. (f) The Legal
Curriculum: Related to the legal role study, but on a more general
level, the entire legal education task is being reviewed; at the same
time, the goals and objectives of legal education, in a changing
world, are being re-evaluated. With the assistance of support from
the United States Office of Education ($90,426), materials for a
modern curriculum are being developed slowly.
III.

SERVICE TO THE COMMUNITY

The law school must be a community endeavor. In this function,
service can be rendered directly to the profession and to the public.
For the profession, a law school must assist in the programs of continuing legal education. Research and teaching methods, developed
from research, must be made available to the bar which, in turn, can
operate and support a comprehensive Continuing Legal Education
Program. For the public, the law school, through its research programs, must identify areas of public concern and importance. After
identification, the law school must lead the profession and the public
in programs based on sound research. The law school must be an
active agent, a leader in legal analysis, review and reform.
The Continuing Legal Education Program is now formalized as
the Joint Committee for Continuing Legal Education in Colorado,
which is a joint effort of the Denver and Colorado Bar Associations
and the College of Law. It is ably directed by Arthur Barry. Outstanding among the presentations already given by our Continuing
Legal Education Program was the Uniform Commercial Code Institute - one of the largest such institutes held in the United States.
Under the direction of the Honorable Sherman G. Finesilver,
Research Associate at the College, three important grants for
equally important projects have been made during the year: Safety
Courses for Older Drivers, Training of Physically Impaired Drivers
and Training Courses for Adult Deaf Drivers:
The Association of American Law Schools and the Law and
Society Association have designated the University of Denver College of Law as recipient of a $50,000 grant from the Walter E.
Meyer Research Institute of Law and the Russell Sage Foundation
to conduct a 1967 summer institute entitled Social Science Methods
in Legal Education. The institute is for the training of experienced
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law professors. Twenty-three such law professors from across the
country will attend the summer institute under the able direction of
nationally-known and prominent legal and social educators including
Professor Maurice Rosenberg, Professor Allen H. Barton, and Professor Jerome H. Skolnick. The institute's placement in Denver is an
important recognition of the national prominence of the College of
Law in the field of interdisciplinary study and the training of law
teachers in innovative law teaching methods and concepts. The
selection of the University of Denver by the national accrediting
organization is a source of pride to the law faculty.
The law school must enlarge its facilities and make those facilities available to the public. It must continue to provide leadership
in legal change at an accelerated pace, all to the advantage of legal
institutions and the public.
The year 1966-67 has been marked with stability and growth in short -progress.
The year can be characterized as one of emphasis on building of faculty strength. Of course, this emphasis will
continue. With a faculty of double strength since 1965-66, we
believe that we can emphasize quality of program and instruction for
the students. If any emphasis for the forthcoming Diamond Anniversary year can be identified, it would be that of student involvement at a very high intellectual level.
Respectfully submitted,
Robert B. Yegge, LL.B., '59
Dean and Professor of Law
The Law Center
Denver, Colorado
May 1, 1967 - Law Day
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APPENDICES

The law school enterprise involves at least three elements: the
law alumni, the students, the faculty. Herein follow details concerning the three elements.
A. Alumni Affairs
Our graduates

-

the alumni

-

are our ultimate satisfaction:

visible evidence that the education business is a profitable endeavor.
The Honorable Robert H. McWilliams, LL.B., '41, was elected
President of the Law Alumni at the alumni meeting "Back to
Mapelli's" on May 13, 1966. He succeeded Hamlet J. Barry, Jr.,
LL.B., '40. He in turn appointed Pierpont Fuller, Jr., LL.B., '32, as
Law Alumni Fund Chairman who followed Richard P. Brown, LL.B.,
'35. President McWilliams also appointed a Seventy-fifth Year
Commission and its Chairman, Edward C. King, LL.B., '22, and
Co-chairwoman, Norma L. Comstock, LL.B., '39. The Commission
consists of: Noah Atler, LL.B., '26; Charles Baer, LL.B., '39; Hamlet
J. Barry, Jr., LL.B., '40; David Brofman, LL.B., '29; Richard P.
Brown, LL.B., '35; William H. Burnett, LL.B., '48; Walter L.
Gerash, LL.B., '56; John Gorsuch, LL.B., '25; Stephen H. Hart,
LL.B., '33; Louis A. Hellerstein, LL.B., '24; William Hickey, J.D.,
'66; Robert H. McWilliams, LL.B., '41; Arch L. Metzner, Jr., LL.B.,
'49; James C. Owen, Jr., LL.B., '56; Alan R. Phipps, LL.B., '37;
Paul D. Renner, LL.B., '52; Charles Rosenbaum, LL.B., '21; Henry E.
Santo, LL.B., '51; Samuel S. Sherman, Jr., LL.B., '35; Harry S.
Silverstein, Jr., LL.B., '35; Henry W. Toll, Jr., LL.B., '55; Albert E.
Zarlengo, LL.B., '33; Professor William S. Huff, LL.B., '57; ViceChancellor Robert S. McCollum; Professor Thompson G. Marsh,
LL.B., '27; Professor Walter Probert; Dean Robert B. Yegge, LL.B.,
'59; Dayton Denious; Edward G. Knowles; Peter H. Holme, Jr.;
Morrison Shafroth; Warren Jones, LL.B., '24; Governor John A.
Love, LL.B., '41; Richard M. Schmidt, Jr., LL.B., '48; Assistant Dean
Christopher H. Munch; Ronald Griffith, J.D. Candidate; and Rocco
Santarelli, J.D. Candidate.
Under the chairmanship of Dick Brown, contributions to the
Law Alumni Fund increased sixfold in the past academic year. The
total gifts in the 1964-65 year were $8,325, composed of $3,437
from alumni and $4,888 from other sources. In the 1965-66 year,
the total gifts were $27,623 of which $20,736 were alumni and
$6,887 were from other sources. The Fund for 1966-67 is running
ahead of the 1965-66 record. Important advancements have been
made in soliciting funds, some of which have been the establishment
of a class agent system for the alumni, the appointment of an assist-
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ant to the dean for alumni affairs, and the creation of regional
representatives.
A systematic attempt has continued to inform the alumni of the
activities of the College of Law. The Law Center News, the official
law alumni publication, reaches graduates quarterly. Occasional
issues of the student newspaper, The Denver Docket, and selected
publications of special interest are circulated from time to time.
The talent and accmumulated knowledge of alumni has always
been given freely to the College of Law. During the past year, scores
of degree holders from the University of Denver and from other
institutions have participated in our education enterprise: as parttime teachers, as guest lecturers, as participants in the Continuing
Legal Education programs, as leaders in alumni activities and fund
raising. Kudos are offered for the priceless contributions made by
our alumni and friends, too numerous to list here.
B. The Student Body
The people that the College of Law serves, by teaching, are our
law students - the transitory element, but the measure and essence
of our product.
A total of 486 people were enrolled in the Fall Quarter in 1966.
Of these, 316 attend the Day Division (including 10 women) and
170 study in the Evening Division (also including 10 women).
Unlike days of the past, 293 of our students are married. More
interestingly, there are four husband-wife law student teams among
the student body.
Our freshman class entering in the fall of 1966 is particularly
intriguing to analyze. In the Day Division, there were 114 freshman
representing 30 states and holding bachelor degrees from 71 different colleges. These 114 freshmen were selected from 492 applicants
as opposed to 372 applicants in the year immediately preceding. The
Law School Admission Test average was 559 as opposed to 541 in
1965 and 511 in 1964. Our law school aptitude test average of 559
puts us in the top one-fourth of accredited law schools, based on test
scores. In the Evening Division there are 50 freshmen. These freshmen hold bachelor degrees from 31 different colleges; 15 have
masters degrees. Their Law School Admission Test mean is 540.
The Evening Division freshmen were chosen from 99 applications.
Our law students have made significant contributions in the
past year. The 1965-66 academic year heralded in the first year of
an independent student edited and operated law review. The issues
of the DENVER LAW JOURNAL produced to date, indicate the high
quality of performance of the students and the significant contribution to legal literature which the independent law review of our
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College of Law can make to the totality of legal literature. The
focus of the review has been of a general rather than a specific
nature. The first issues of the independent review have begun to
establish a firmer intellectual reputation for the College of Law.
In order to enrich the Review, two student editors made an inspection trip during the academic year to the following major law reviews: New York University Law Review; Columbia Law Review;
Northwestern University Law Review; University of Chicago Law
Review; Yale Law Journal; Harvard Law Review. Special and
symposia issues of the review are planned for next year to establish
further, the already growing reputation of the DENVER LAW JOURNAL. It may be truly said that the DENVER LAW JOURNAL is a
scholarly publication of dignity and of earned respect.
The student government of the College of Law evidenced clear
and substantial signs of maturity during the academic year. Mr. Arlan
Preblud, J.D., '66, was elected to the national office of Executive
Vice President of the American Law Student Association (the number two position in The American Bar Association affiliated student
organization), and Mr. Jon Holm, J.D. candidate, was elected Circuit National Vice President of the same organization on April 1,
1967. The Student Bar Association organized, financed, and produced a law student newspaper, The Denver Docket.
Student organizations have organized and sponsored important
and nationally known speakers during the past year including Ralph
Nader, Norman Dacey and Sir Zafrulla Khan. The International
Law Society became a member of the Association of Student International Law Societies, one of twenty-two approved law schools
which are members of this elite association.
During this last academic year, a placements program has been
established. Prior to this year, placements were handled by a faculty
member who was overburdened with other activities. With the
appointment of Arthur R. Barry to the staff of the College of Law,
a systematic and organized placement program has begun. Mr. Barry
has been able to place recent and past graduates as well as to obtain
employment for current undergraduates.
C. The Faculty
Those teaching - the faculty - are the continuing and the distinguishing element of the College of Law.
1. Senior Ranks of the Faculty
Charles E. Works was promoted to Professor Emeritus effective
September 1, 1966. "Chizzie" began teaching at the College of Law
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in 1934 as a part-time instructor. In 1948 he accepted an appointment as Associate Professor of Law and in 1951 he was promoted to
Professor of Law. During his years of service to legal education,
scores of successful practitioners were enlightened and challenged
by his demonstrative teaching techniques. "Chizzie" has earned the
respect due his new tenure; we are fortunate that he remains actively
interested in our endeavor. Faculty, students, and alumni salute the
devoted years of service which his promotion celebrates.
The following promotions to the rank of Professor of Law were
made during the year: John Phillip Linn, LL.B., '55; Christopher H.
Munch, Lawrence P. Tiffany and Joseph A. Page were promoted to
the rank of Associate Professor of Law.
The following new appointments were made during the year:
John J. Schanz, Jr., Professor of Natural Resources; James E. Wallace, Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Professional
Responsibility Program; Thomas P. Brightwell, Assistant Professor
of Law; Glenn W. Clark, Assistant Professor of Law; Don H.
Sherwood, Adjunct Professor of Law.
Walter Probert was appointed Visiting Professor of Law for
1966-67. H. Laurence Ross has been appointed Visiting Professor for
1967-68.
Only one resignation was received during the year, that of
Professor William B. Stoebuck who was on leave during the year
pursuing doctoral studies at Harvard University. He accepted a
position at the University of Washington beginning September
1967.
2. Administration
I want to express special thanks to Professor Lawrence P.
Tiffany who has served for the last two years as Assistant Dean
of the College. At his request, Professor Tiffany will return to
full-time teaching July 1, 1967, at the rank of Associate Professor,
with tenure. The service that Dean Tiffany has rendered to the law
school cannot be measured and the gratitude of the faculty cannot
be expressed properly. All of us at the law school salute Dean
Tiffany for his fine and continuing service. Professor Tiffany will
be succeeded as Assistant Dean by Christopher H. Munch. In 196667, Professor Munch has served as a Visiting Professor on leave
from the Air Force Academy where he has served as Chairman of the
Department of Law. Professor Munch has accepted a full-time
appointment as Professor of Law at the College of Law and resigned
his position at the Air Force Academy, effective July 1, 1967. The
faculty welcomes Professor Munch as a member of the teaching
faculty and as an important part of the administrative team.
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Patricia Ann Black came to the College of Law in 1949 as a
part-time secretary. She gained the confidence of the late Dean
Gordon Johnston and became his personal aid. In 1964, she was
promoted to Assistant to the Dean with rank on the professional
staff. Many of us owe our smooth progress through school to
"Dean Black."
Pat married George Vardaman, Professor of Administration at
the University of Denver, on December 18, 1965. As Pat was known
as one of the most competent administrative staff members of the
University, it was inevitable that another department of the University would discover her. At the beginning of 1967, the University established a new Department of Administrative Systems
and appointed Pat to act as its operating administrative assistant.
While Pat remains at the University, the College of Law misses her;
it will be sometime before her shoes are filled, notwithstanding her
continued contact with the school in her new capacity.
3. Professional Staff
Howard I. Rosenberg was appointed Associate Director of the
Legal Services to the Poor Study and managing staff attorney for the
Neighborhood Law Center at 221 Twenty-fourth Street, Denver.
Leonard Davis, J.D., '65, and Selma Raphaelson were appointed
staff attorneys at the Neighborhood Law Center.
William H. Ward, Jr., Acting General Council, Legal Aid
Society of Metropolitan Denver, succeeded to Mr. Rosenberg's duties
as Coordinator of the Legal Aid Program.
John C. Hanley assumed the duties of Assistant to the Dean for
Business Affairs on February 1, 1967. Charles F. Cortese, M.A., '66,
served as Assistant to the Director of the Administration of Justice
Program for 1966-67 and Boyd Littrell, M.A., '67, has accepted the
same appointment 1967-68.
4. Activities of the Faculty
Your faculty has actively participated in professional and community activities. The faculty's awareness of professional responsibility has been increased over the past year and that awareness will
be further stimulated over the years to come.
Professor Ved P. Nanda served as Chairman of the Regional
Conference on "Science, Industry and Law in Transnational Transactions" on April 21, 1967, the second consecutive time the meeting
has been held in Denver under Professor Nanda's leadership. Professor Nanda has attracted the regional competition of the "Phillip
C. Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition" which was
held at the school on April 1, 1967. Professor John Phillip Linn,
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LL.B., '55, planned and executed the annual Collective Bargaining
and Labor Management Relations Conference, April 13 and 14, 1967.
Professors James Nathanson and William S. Huff directed and
executed an Estate Planning Course from January 16 to March 20,
1967. Supported by a grant of $11,620 from the National Institute of
Mental Health, Professor Gresham M. Sykes chaired a conference on Ethical Issues in Behavioral Research, June 2-4, 1966, involving scholars from many universities. Each of these activities has
nationwide importance and establishes the concern of the University
for service to the practicing and academic professions.
The faculty has established a forum to discuss the issues and
interests of legal education and the faculty. During the year, faculty
forums included the following topics: "Law and Technology"; "International Law on Civil Strife -Revolutions,
Civil Wars"; "Discussion of the Efficacy of Law Reviews"; "Law and Sociology, Communications Problems."
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FACULTY ROSTER
A. ALTONIN, Assistant Professor of Law; A.B., 1953, Columbia; LL.B., 1961,
St. Johns University; LL.M., 1962, J.S.D. Candidate, New York University. RESEARCH
IN PROGRESS: Criminal Law Aspects of The Sherman Act; Criminal Conspiracy.

WILLIAM

KENNETH E. BARNHILL, JR., Adjunct Professor of Law and Director of Natural Resources Program; B.A., 1951, LL.B., 1953, University of Colorado. RESEARCH IN
PROGRESS: Planning Natural Resources Program.
ARTHUR R. BARRY, Director of Continuing Legal Education, Placement Officer and

Alumni Coordinator; B.S., 1940, U. S. Military Academy; LL.B., 1951, Georgetown
University; Colonel U. S. Army, Ret. RECENT PUBLICATIONS: "Commercial Paper,"
The UCC In Colorado, March 1967, publications of the Committee on Continuing
Legal Education In Colorado.
THOMAS BRIGHTWELL, Assistant Professor of Law; B.S., 1958, LL.B., 1963, University
of Colorado; C.P.A., 1960.
GLENN W. CLARK, Assistant Professor of Law; A.B., Magna Cum Laude, 1959, Harvard

College; LL.B., 1963, Yale Law School.
VANCE R. DITrMAN, JR., Professor of Law; A.B., 1925, LL.B., 1927, Yale Law School.
RECENT PUBLICATIONS: Colorado Practice, vol. 3, West Publ. Co., 1965. Colorado
Practice, vol. 4, West Publ. Co., 1966. RESEARCH IN PROGRESS: Additional volume

of Colorado Practice Methods, dealing with the Rules of Civil Procedure.
GARY V. DUBIN, Assistant Professor of Law; A.B., 1960, University of Southern California; LL.B., 1963, New York University. RECENT PUBLICATIONS: "Mens Rea Reconsidered: A Plea for a Due Process Concept of Criminal Responsibility," 18 Stanford
Law Review 322-95 (1966). Book: The Jurisprudence of the Rule Enterprise (forthcoming). RESEARCH IN PROGRESS: The Jurisprudence of Authority: An Inquiry Into
The Internal Logic of Legal Concepts.
WILLIAM S. HUFF, Assistant Professor of Law; Director, Summer Program for Training

Lawyers of Spanish-American Descent; B.S.L., LL.B., 1957, University of Arkansas;
Diploma in Law, 1958, Oxford University; LL.M., 1962, Harvard University. RECENT
PUBLICATIONS: "An Aspect of Estate Planning in Colorado: The Revocable Inter
Vivos Trust," 43 Denver Law Journal 296 (1966). "Life Insurance Trusts for Everyman," 39 Colorado Law Review 239 (1967).
HAROLD E. HURST, Professor of Law; A.B., 1936, LL.B., 1938, University of Colorado;

M.S., 1940, University of Denver. RECENT PUBLICATIONS: Unpublished Research Regulation of the Oil and Gas Industry. An indexed digest of all published material
relating to regulation of oil and gas exploration, producing and marketing to 1966.
Treatise with Vance R. Dittman, Jr., DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN PROCEDURE UNDER
THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS. RESEARCH IN PROGRESS: Historical com-

parative study of development of scientific methods of proof: world government
trends, legal forms, implication for legal profession and education.
JOHN PILLIP LINN, Professor of Law; A.B., 1950, M.A., 1951, New York University;
LL.B., 1955, University of Denver. RECENT PUBLICATIONS: Books: How to Find the
Law (6th ed.), West Publ. Co. (1965). Authored one chapter. Nolte, M. C., and
Linn, John Phillip, School Law for Teachers, Interstate Publishers, Inc., pp. XIV
343, (1963). Articles: "The Immunity Doctrine and the Schools Since Molitor v.
Kaneland," Annual Proceedings, National Organization on the Legal Problems of
Education, 1966. "Powers of the Labor Arbitrator" (1965). "Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and Discrimination in Employment in Colorado" (1965). RESEARCH IN PROGRESS: Legal status of the student's file; implementation of the Fair
Employment Practices Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
NORMAN K. LINTON, Assistant Professor of Law; B.A., 1958, Reed College; M.A.,
1960, University of Oregon; Ph.D., 1966, University of California-Berkeley. RECENT
PUBLICATIONS: "Cross-examination and the witness," Berkeley Journal of Sociology
(Fall, 1965). RESEARCH IN PROGRESS: Study of the law school; development of curricular materials in research methods for law students.
THOMPSON G. MARSH, Professor of Law; A.B., 1924, LL.B., 1927, M.A., 1931, University of Denver; LL.M., 1931, Northwestern University; J.S.D., 1935, Yale Law
School. RECENT PUBLICATIONS: "Construction of Deeds, Trusts, and Wills, A Collection of American Cases" '(1965 ); "The Model Rule Against Perpetuities Act - If at
All," 11 The Practical Lawyer 73 (1965) ; "Devolution of a Possibility of Reverter in
Colorado," 41 Denver Law Center Journal 396 (1965); "Colorado's First Devise by
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Implication," 42 Denver Law Center Journal 52 (1965) ; "When is a Life Estate Not a
Life Estate in Colorado?" 43 Denver Law Journal 173 (1966). RESEARCH IN PROGRESS: Analysis of the Legal Continuum.
CLYDE 0. MARTz, Adjunct Professor of Law in Natural Resources; A.B., 1941, University of Nebraska; LL.B., 1947, Harvard University.
CHRISTOPHER H. MUNCH, Professor of Law and Assistant Dean; B.S., 1943, United
States Military Academy, J.D., 1951, University of Illinois. RECENT PUBLICATIONS:

Volumes I and II, An Introduction to Law, USAF Academy, (C. H. Munch, ed.)

1965. Under preparation: CASES AND MATERIALS ON GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS, Paul

A. Beuhler and Christopher H. Munch, 1967.
VED P. NAnDA, Assistant Professor of Law; B.A., M.A., Panjab University; LL.B.,
1955, LL.M., 1959, Delhi University, India; LL.M., 1962, Northwestern University; J.S.D. Candidate, Yale University. RECENT PUBLICATIONS: "The United States

Action in the 1965 Dominican Crisis: Impact on World Order" - Part I, 43 Denver
Law Journal 439 (1966) ; "Application of Customary International Law in Domestic
Courts", 12 New York Law Forum 187 (Summer 1966) ; "The United States Action
in the 1965 Dominican Crisis: Impact on World Order" - Part II, 44 Denver Law
Journal 225 (;1967) ; Address at the Washington World Conference on World Peace
Through Law, September 1965. Regular book reviews in the Denver Post. Books in
progress: INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVIL WARS; INTERVENTION RECONSIDERED.
JAMES NATHANSON, Assistant Professor of Law; B.A., 1957, LL.B., 1960, University of
Michigan; LL.M., 1966, Harvard University. RECENT PUBLICATIONS: "Estate Planning
with Disclaimers," 105 Trusts and Estates 1153 (1966). RESEARCH IN PROGRESS:

Evaluation of Consumer Loans.
CHARLES S. PADDEN, Assistant Professor of Law; A.B., 1942, Loyola University; LL.M.,
1955, Georgetown University; J.S.D. Candidate, Yale University. RESEARCH IN PROG-

RESS: Law, science and technology.
JOSEPH A. PAGE, Associate Professor of Law; A.B., 1955, LL.B., 1958, LL.M., 1964
Harvard University. kECENT PUBLICATIONS:

"State Law and the Damage Remedy

under the Civil Rights Act: Some Problems in Federalism," 43 Denver Law Journal
480 (1966). "Book Review: Unsafe at Any Speed," 54 Calif. L. Rev. 1133 (1966).
"Selecting the Remedy," 3 Am. Jur. Trials 637 (1965). Non-Legal Publications:
"Report on Bolivia," Atlantic Monthly, December 1965. "Report on Ecuador," Atlantic
Monthly, November 1965. "Notes From a Recife Jail," Univ. of Denver Magazine,
June 1966. "The Night a Critic Confronted the Author of 'How to Avoid Probate,' "
National Observer, May 30, 1966. "In Search of Afro-Brazil" The Reporter, November 4, 1965. "South of the Rio Grande," New Republic, April 1, 1967 (Book Review). "Civic Action in Latin America," New Republic, November 5, 1966 (Book
Review). "Still Unsafe at Any Speed," New Republic, July 30, 1966 (Book Review).
"Health Hazards in Food and Drink," New Republic, June 25, 1966 (Book Review).
"Death on Wheels," Progressive, June 1966 (Book Review). Various articles on
Latin America in the Denver Post and Boston Globe. Regular Book Reviews in the
Denver Post. RESEARCH

IN PROGRESS: Automobile Safety Design and the Legal

Process.
MARTHA PEACOCK, Assistant Librarian and Assistant Professor of Library Science; A.B.,
1931, Indiana State University; B.S. in L.S., 1936, University of Illinois Library
School.
WALTER PROBERT, Visiting Professor of Law; B.S., 1948, J.D., 1951, University of
Oregon; J.S.D., 1957 Yale Law School. RESEARCH IN PROGRESS: Law and General

Semantics.
JOHN H. REESE, Associate Professor of Law; B.B.A., LL.B., 1954, Southern Methodist
University; LL.M., 1965, S.J.D. Candidate, George Washington University. RECENT
PUBLICATIONS: "The Uniform Commercial Code in Non-Code States," Baylor Law
Review 291, (1963). Reprinted in 1 U.C.C. Reporting Service 802, (1965). Remarks
on Administration of Justice in "A Colloquay on Motor Vehicle and Traffic Law, Special Report 86," Highway Research Board of the National Academy of Sciences - National Research Council (1965). THE LEGAL NATURE OF A DRIVER'S LICENSE (LL.M.

thesis published by Automotive Safety Foundation) (1965). "The Role of the Bureau
of the Budget in the Legislative Process," 15 Journal of Public Law 63, (1966).
Remarks on the legal nature of a driver's license delivered to the Committee on Motor
Vehicle and Traffic Law at the 45th Annual Meeting of the Highway Research Board,
Highway Research Circular No. 55 (1966).

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS: A Study of

State Administrative Law in the Context of Driver Licensing.
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H. LAURENCE Ross, Visiting Professor of Law and Sociology; A.B., Cum Laude, 1955,
Swarthmore College; M.A., 1957, Ph.D., 1959, Harvard University; Chairman, on
leave, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, New York University. RECENT
PUBLICATIONS: "Uptown and Downtown: A Study of Middle-Class Residential
Areas," 30 American Sociological Review 255 (April, 1965). RESEARCH IN PROGREss: Sociology of Law, particularly the settlement of legal claims in insurance adjusting. Urban Sociology, particularly urban life styles. Deviant society and social problems, including the study of drug use and sex deviance.
E. SANTO, Adjunct Professor of Law; B.S., B.A., 1949, LL.B., 1951, University
of Denver; Judge, Denver District Court. RECENT PUBLICATIONS: "The Law Explosion and the Denver District Court," 48 Journal of American Judicature Society 221
(1965). RESEARCH IN PROGRESS: Study of Denver District Court.

HENRY

J. SCHANZ, JR., Professor of Natural Resources; B.S., 1948, M.S., 1950, Ph.D.,
1954, Pennsylvania State University. RECENT PUBLICATIONS: "Historical Statistics of
Pennsylvania's Mineral Industries, 1956-1960," Bulletin 77, Mineral Industries Experiment Station, Pennsylvania State University (in press) ; Bulletin 69, Mineral Industries Experiment Station, Pennsylvania State University, March 1967, 94 pages.
RESEARCH IN PROGRESS: "Non-Fuel Markets for Carbon," a continuation of previous
work done on carbons, under sponsorship of the Mineral Conservation Section. "Bituminous Coal Distribution and Pricing" and "Mineral Specifications," manuscripts
based on previous research sponsored by the Mineral Conservation Section. "Potential
Markets for Fly Ash," program sponsored by the Pennsylvania Electric Association.
"Mineral Raw Materials," a chapter in a study on World Trade Patterns, being done
in a collaboration with other members of the department as part of a project at Yale
University, sponsored by the State Department. "Operations Research in Mineral
Development" - a research project being done in collaboration with other members
of the department, sponsored by the National Science Foundation.

JOHN

H. SHERWOOD, Adjunct Professor of Law; B.S., 1960; LL.B., 1961, University
of Nebraska; Executive Director, Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation.

DONALD

M. SQUILLANTE, Law Librarian and Assistant Professor of Law; B.A., 1954,
Wagner College; M.S., 1957, Columbia University; LL.B., 1962, Fordham University. RECENT PUBLICATIONS: Books: Chapter IV of the work book to Pollock's
FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL RESEARCH (due for publication in 1967). Bibliography for
Alan H. Bucholtz' Handbook for the Student Practice of Law. Addresses for the
Continuing Legal Education Program to the Pueblo County Bar Association on
March 11, 1967; the Aurora Bar Association on November 19, 1966; the Bar Association at Grand Junction on May 11, 1967. Index to the Advance Opinions of the
Supreme Court of Colorado 1966-1967. A Bibliography for the Continuing Legal
Education Institute on Article 9-Secured Transactions given on January 14, 1966.
Uniform Commercial Code Bibliography - 71 Commercial Law Journal 253 (1966).
Editor of the SWLLA Bulletin (The Chapter Bulletin of Southwest Law Library
Ass'n), Library Bulletin of DU (monthly edition on various law library resources).
A monthly column commencing with 72 Commercial Law Journal 2 (1967) reviewing the UCC and writings and cases on the UCC. RESEARCH IN PROGRESS: Practical
guide to legal research and writing.

ALPHONSE

B. STOEBUCK, Assistant Professor of Law; A.B., 1951, University of Wichita;
M.A., 1953, Indiana University; LL.B., 1959, University of Washington. RECENT
PUBLICATIONS: "Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development," Colo. Law
Review (Fall, 1965); Book Review, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE by Edmund M.
Morgan, Dickinson L. Rev. (Summer, 1965) ; "Relevancy and the Theory of Probability," Iowa Law Review (Summer, 1965) ; "Minors' Capacity to Exercise Powers of
Appointment," Denver Law Journal (Fall, 1965). RESEARCH IN PROGRESS: Adverse
Possession of Mineral Interests.

WILLIAM

M. SYKES, Professor of Law and Sociology; A.B., 1950, Princeton University; Ph.D., 1953, Northwestern University. RECENT PUBLICATIONS: CRIME AND
SOCIETY, (rev. ed. 1967) ; "Service and Self-Interest," to be published, 1967; "Feeling
Our Way," a report on the conference on Ethical Issue in the Behavioral Scientist,
1967; "Court Congestion and Crash Programs: A Case Study" (co-author) to be published, 1967; "The Social Structure of the Court," Wenner-Gren Foundation Publication, 1966.

GRESHAM

P. TIFFANY, Associate Professor of Law and Assistant Dean; A.B., 1961,
LL.B., 1963, Washington University; S.J.D., 1967, University of Wisconsin. RECENT
PUBLICATIONS: Tiffany, McIntyre & Rotenberg, DETECTION OF CRIME (Little, Brown
Co. 1967) (Remington, Ed.); "Field Interrogation: Administrative, Judicial
and Legislative Responses," 43 Denver Law Journal 389 (1966).

LAWRENCE
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F. WALLACE, Associate Professor of Law and Director, Professional Responsibility Program; A.B., Cum Laude, 1943, University of California at Los Angeles;
LL.B., '1949, University of California at Berkeley, B.D., 1960, T.d., Magna Cum
Laude, 1965, Princeton Theological Seminary. RECENT PUBLICATIONS: "An Excursion
into the Affinities Between Law and the Behavioral Sciences," journal of Legal Education, vol. 18, 1965, pp. 43-53; "Relationships Between Law and Religion in American Society," Review of Religious Research, vol. 7, 1966, pp. 63-70; "Law and
Religion : Patterns of Intersystem Relationships," Review of Religious Research, vol.
7, 1966, pp. 146-157; THE MINISTRY AS PROFESSION, Random House, Inc., 1967, in
press.

JAMES

Assistant Professor of Law; B.S., 1957, University of Nebraska; LL.B.,
1961, University of California; LL.M., 1966, University of Michigan.

GARY WIDMAN,

E. WoRKs, Emeritas Professor of Law; A.B., 1920, LL.B., 1922, Harvard
University. RECENT PUBLICATIONS: 'How to Get the Most Out of the Standard
Deduction," Tax Ideas Service, Prentice-Hall (1965).

CHARLES

B. YEGGE, Dean and Professor of Law; A.B., 1956, Princeton University; M.A.
1958, LL.B., 195,9 University of Denver. RECENT PUBLICATIONS: "Some Goals; Some
Tasks," Denver: University of Denver, 1966; "Opening Brief: In the Interests of
Cooperation Between Lawyers and Social Scientists," Denver: University of Denver
College of Law, 1965 (mimeographed). "The Shades of Gray," The Student Lawyer,
February, 1965: "The American Lawyer: 1976," American Bar Association Journal,
August, 1966; "Statics and Dynamics in American Civil Law; A Sociology of Legal
Institutes"; "What Happened to My Law Degree," Paper read at Various Legal
Roles Conference, Graystone Lodge, Colorado, October, 1966. RESEARCH IN PROGRESS:
Motions and Pre-trial Proceedings in Colorado; Law and Social Change.

ROBERT

PROGRAM COORDINATORS
ALAN H. BUCHOLTZ; A.B., 1959, Utica College; J.D., 1965, University of Denver.
PROGRAM: County Court Practice, State and Federal District Court Practice. RECENT
PUBLICATION: Handbook for the Student Practice of Law (1965).

0. LAWSON; B.A., 1948, M.S., 1950, University of Colorado.
Legislation, Legislative Internship Program.

HARRY

HOWARD I. ROSENBERG;
sity. PROGRAM: Legal

PROGRAM:

B.A., 1949, Roosevelt College; LL.B., 1952, DePaul UniverAid, State and Federal District Court Practice, Neighborhood

Law Center.
H. SHERMAN; A.B., 1932, University of Denver, LL.B., 1937, University of
Michigan; Public Defender in and for the City and County of Denver. PROGRAM:
Public Defender Program.

EDWARD

H. WARD,JR.; LL.B., 1938, Northwestern University School of Law, Acting
General Counsel, Legal Aid Society of Metropolitan Denver. PROGRAM: Legal Aid
Clinic.

WILLIAM
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